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This focuses on corporate dividend policy. The first empirical chapter analyses the information 
content of dividend announcements and factors that drive dividend changes in Oman, as a unique 
environment, for the period 2000-2011. Our work complements, and contrasts with, an existing 
study (Al-Yahyaee et al., 2011), which demonstrates a positive correlation between dividends and 
stock prices in Oman, in support of the signalling theory. Employing multiple methods from earlier 
studies, we demonstrate that there is some relationship between dividends and future profitability. 
However, after controlling for the nonlinearity in the profitability process, we find no evidence for 
the signalling theory of dividends. Furthermore, our analysis affirms the importance of past and 
current profitability in influencing the magnitude and the propensity to change (increase or 
decrease) dividends in Omani firms. Moreover, the results provide no evidence of the life cycle 
theory as an important factor that influences dividend changes in the emerging market of Oman. 
The second chapter examines the relationship between managerial overconfidence, dividends and 
firm value by developing theoretical models that examine the conditions under which managerial 
overconfidence, dividends and firm value may be positive or negative. Furthermore, the models 
incorporate moral hazard, in terms of managerial effort shirking, and the potential for the manager 
to choose negative NPV projects, due to private benefits. Our models demonstrate that 
overconfidence can lead to higher dividends (when the manager is overconfident about his current 
ability) or lower dividends (when the manager is overconfident about his future ability). 
Furthermore, our results demonstrate that managerial bounded rationality could impact this 
relation. 
The final chapter empirically examines the effect of managerial overconfidence on UK firms’ 
payout policy for the period 2000 to 2012. The analysis incorporates, in addition to common firm-
specific factors, a wide range of corporate governance factors and managerial characteristics that 
have been documented to affect the relationship between overconfidence and payout policy. Our 
results are robust to several estimation considerations. The findings show that the influence of 
overconfident CEOs on the amount of and the propensity to pay dividends is significant within 
the UK context. Specifically, we detect that there is a reduction in dividend payments in firms 
managed by overconfident managers compared to the non-overconfident counterparts. Moreover, 
we affirm that cash flows, firm size and profitability are positively correlated, while leverage, firm 
growth and investment are negatively correlated with the amount of and propensity to pay 
dividends. Interestingly, we demonstrate that firms with the potential for undervaluation reduce 
dividend payments. Some of the corporate governance factors are shown to motivate firms to pay 
xii 
 
more dividends, while these factors seem to have no influence on the propensity to pay dividends. 
The results also show that in general higher overconfidence leads to more share repurchases but 
lower total payouts. Overall, managerial overconfidence should be considered as an important 
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1. Chapter 1: Introduction 
Corporations pay dividends to their shareholders. This payment depends on their financial 
situation and development needs. Firms make decisions about whether to pay dividends or not. If 
firms decide to pay dividends, the method, the amount, and the form of dividends is also decided. 
Since Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) seminal dividend irrelevance theorem, corporate dividend 
policy has continued to puzzle financial economists for over 50 years. In the real word, researchers 
observe that many firms pay dividends, while others do not. This phenomenon encourages scholars 
to find explanations for the question of why firms pay and change dividends, as well as the effect 
of dividends on firms’ value. A complete understanding of corporate dividend policy has not been 
achieved yet in spite of the extensive research in this area (e.g., Brav et al., 2005). 
The signalling theory of dividends has been proposed in traditional corporate finance, which 
employs the standard assumption of fully rational, self-interested and utility maximising agents, 
attempting to explain firms’ dividend policy. This theory argues that companies use dividends to 
convey information about their future prospect to the markets (Bhattacharya, 1979; John and 
Williams, 1985; Miller and Rock, 1985). That is, in the presence of asymmetric information 
between agents and shareholders, managers use dividends as a communication device. The 
empirical studies on this theory tend to focus on the market reaction to dividend announcements, 
and on the relationship between dividends and earnings. Although researchers find some support 
for the effects of dividend announcements on stock prices in both developed and developing 
markets (e.g., Aharony and Swary, 1980; Dasilas and Leventis, 2011), results on the association 
between dividend changes and earnings are inconclusive (Aggarwal et al., 2012).  
For example, Grullon et al. (2005) affirm that dividend changes do not convey any information 
about future earnings changes, which is inconsistent with the earlier study of Nissim and Ziv 
(2001), and argue that the opposite pattern revealed in the previous work is due to the assumption 
of linearity in the earnings process. Aggarwal et al. (2012) introduce another argument to the 
inconsistent findings on the relationship between dividends changes and future earnings. 
According to their argument, the mixed results are attributed to the variation of asymmetric 
information across public firms. They argue that the signalling theory of dividends is more likely 
to be supported among firms that have high level of asymmetric information. Black (1976) argues 
that the higher tax on dividends compared to capital gains make dividends effective as a signalling 
device.  
The characteristics of the Omani market offer an opportunity to re-examine the signalling theory 
of dividends. In Oman there is no tax on dividends and capital gains. This would enable us to test 
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the tax based signalling theory (Black, 1976). Further, Omani firms change their dividend levels 
more frequently, rely heavily on bank financing and have high ownership concentration. These 
characteristics suggest that dividend changes should not be informative about future earnings 
changes. However, other market characteristics such as low corporate disclosure requirements, 
low transparency, unpublished earnings forecast and few professional analysts encourage 
managers to use dividend announcement to signal future profitability.  
In a recent development, behavioural corporate finance examines the effects of managerial 
psychological biases on corporate finance decision-making (investment appraisal, capital 
structure, and dividend policy).  A particular bias that has been analysed is that of managerial 
overconfidence. Much of the work has focussed on the effect of this managerial bias on investment 
appraisal and capital structure (e.g., Heaton, 2002; Malmendier and Tate, 2005a; Malmendier and 
Tate, 2005b; Doukas and Petmezas, 2007; Liu and Taffler, 2008; Malmendier and Tate, 2008; 
Croci et al., 2010; Campbell et al., 2011; Malmendier et al., 2011). However, the research on 
managerial overconfidence and dividends is recently emerging, and is little understood (Wu and 
Liu, 2008; Cordeiro, 2009; Deshmukh et al., 2013). 
For example, Wu and Liu’s (2008) theoretical model demonstrates that overconfident managers 
are more likely to pay high dividends due to their biases in their assessment of future earnings. In 
contrast, Deshmukh et al. (2013) develop a model which shows that, because overconfident CEOs 
overestimate the value of future projects and view external finance as costly, they are more likely 
to pay less dividends. However, none of these studies have theoretically considered the influence 
of agency problems on this relationship. Moreover, empirical studies on the impact of managerial 
overconfidence on corporate dividend policy have been conducted in the US, for the period from 
1980-1994 and have not controlled for corporate governance factors and CEOs characteristics 
(Cordeiro, 2009; Deshmukh et al., 2013).  Cordeiro (2009) finds that the presence of overconfident 
CEOs is negatively associated with the likelihood of paying dividends, but not with the amount of 
dividends. In contrast, Deshmukh et al. (2013) show that managerial overconfidence reduce the 
amount of dividends.  
The objective of this thesis is to study corporate dividend policy in both standard and behavioural 
corporate finance settings, and aims to provide further explanations as to why firms change their 
dividend policy. In a standard corporate finance setting, this project examines the information 
content of dividends, dividend signalling, in an emerging market where the institutional 
environment differs significantly from those in developed markets (i.e., Chapter 3). Moreover, the 
thesis attempts to answer the question of why dividend policy varies across firms from a 
behavioural corporate finance prospective. Specifically, Chapter 4 develops a theoretical model to 
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demonstrate the impact of a particular managerial cognitive bias, overconfidence, on dividend 
policy and firm value. The final chapter in this thesis, Chapter 5, aims to empirically investigate 
the impact of managerial overconfidence on corporate dividend policy in the UK. 
Our first contribution from Chapter 3 is that we find evidence on the tax-based signalling model 
(Black, 1976), which suggests that dividends have to be taxed at higher rate to convey information 
about future earnings. This result is in line with the recent work of Kuo (2013) who detects a 
positive association between taxable stock dividends and future profitability. Moreover, the 
sample of Omani firms enables us to test the information content of dividends in a poor 
information environment. The results provide a further contribution to the existing literature in 
this area (e.g., Aggarwal et al., 2012). We show that the signalling theory of dividends does not 
hold among firms that exhibit a high level of asymmetric information, which contradicts the 
findings of Aggarwal et al. (2012) in the US. The final contribution of this chapter is that we 
provide an explanation for the high tendency of Omani firms to change their dividend levels. We 
report that the significant correlation between current earnings and dividends explains this 
phenomenon. Thus, investors should not anticipate dividend changes as a signal of future earnings 
changes (consistent with Grullon et al., 2005). 
The second issue in this thesis in Chapter 4, theoretically examines the relationship between 
managerial overconfidence, dividend policy and firm value. This paper provides additional 
explanations to the contradictory evidence in the recent studies (Wu and Liu, 2008; Deshmukh et 
al., 2013).  It shows that managerial overconfidence might lead to an increase or a decrease in 
corporate dividend policy. An increase happens when the manager is overconfident about his 
current ability to affect the success of current project: Model 1. However, when the manager is 
overconfident about his future ability to effect the success of a future project, an overconfident 
CEO pays less dividends: Model 2. We further show that managerial bounded rationality could 
affect this relation.  
Chapter 5 provides several contributions to the existing literature on behavioural corporate 
finance. First, this study is the first paper that empirically investigates the influence of managerial 
overconfidence on payout policy in the UK.  Our findings show that the effect of overconfident 
CEOs on the level of, and the likelihood to pay dividends is persistent outside the US (in line with 
Deshmukh et al., 2013). The second contribution is related to the relationship between 
undervaluation and dividend policy. We demonstrate that undervalued firms pay less and are more 
likely to reduce dividends. This suggests that undervaluation should be considered as a factor in 
determining dividend policy. Third, we show that overconfident managers in undervalued firms 
reduce dividends less compared to rational peers; this stands in a sharp contrast to the earlier 
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studies that argue that overconfident CEOs pay less dividends because they usually believe their 
stocks are undervalued (e.g., Malmendier and Tate, 2005a; Hackbarth, 2008).  Fourth, 
overconfident CEOs in firms with high institutional holdings and ownership concentration 
distribute more dividends compared to their rational peers.  
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical 
literature related to dividend policy. In general, this chapter starts with a discussion of corporate 
financial policy in a standard corporate finance framework with particular focus on dividend 
policy. Furthermore, the chapter surveys the literature on the relationship between managerial 
compensation and corporate financial decisions. The chapter also reviews the relevant literature 
in behavioural finance before moving to behavioural corporate finance. 
In a standard corporate finance setting, Chapter 3 empirically examines the information content of 
dividends, and the factors that affect dividend policy in an emerging market: Oman. It starts first 
with a brief discussion of the relevant literature. The hypotheses are developed based on prior 
literature and the institutional setting of the Omani market. The subsequent section describes the 
data and the sample selection. This is followed by two main empirical examinations; the 
relationship between dividend changes and earnings; and factors effecting dividend changes. 
Chapter 4 develops theoretical models in a behavioural corporate finance setting. These models 
examine the relationship between managerial overconfidence and dividend policy. It begins with 
an overview of the model, and subsequently presents different models on the effect of 
overconfidence on dividend policy when managers are overconfident about current ability (Model 
1) and overconfident about future ability (Model 2). Furthermore, the impact of managerial 
bounded rationality on the relationship between overconfidence and dividend policy is stated in 
the final section of this chapter. Numerical examples for each model are also presented. 
Chapter 5 analyses the effect of managerial overconfidence on corporate dividend and payout 
policy. The relevant theoretical and empirical studies are discussed. Then this chapter develops 
hypotheses that are drawn from the previous section. The data and the methods used to test the 
hypotheses are stated. Next the results of the estimated methods are presented. Finally, a 
discussion of the findings is reported. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis, and draws conclusions from 
the empirical analyses and theoretical models. It also considers the limitations of the projects and 




2. Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This thesis focuses on the economic and behavioural factors affecting corporate dividend policy, 
employing both theoretical and empirical approaches.  In order to give the analysis some context, 
this chapter reviews the theoretical and empirical literature relating to corporate financial policy 
generally, before placing a particular focus on dividend policy. First, an overview of the corporate 
finance literature in a standard corporate finance framework (i.e. under the assumptions that 
market participants (managers and investors) are fully rational, self-interested, maximisers of 
expected utility) is presented. This section provides a brief literature review of corporate 
investment and financing decisions before focusing on corporate dividend policy. Moreover, the 
chapter discusses managerial compensation packages and their relevance to corporate financial 
decisions. The last section, behavioural corporate finance, begins with an overview of individual 
psychological biases before introducing the emerging research on the impact of managerial 
overconfidence on investment, financing and dividend policy decisions.  
2.1 Standard corporate financial decisions 
Traditional corporate finance focuses on firms’ investment, financing and payout decisions under 
the assumptions of fully rational, self-interested and utility maximising agents. This section 
surveys the literature on corporate financial policy in a standard framework. It starts with a brief 
summary of corporate investment decisions before moving to capital structure decisions. Dividend 
policy, the focus of this study, will be reviewed in more detail. 
2.1.1 Corporate investment decisions 
The corporate investment decision is one of the most important decisions that firms make in order 
to maximise shareholders’ value. It involves an investment made by a firm with the aim to receive, 
in return, future cash flows. This decision is crucial to ensure the future success of a firm in practice 
(e.g., Holmes, 1998). A firm is more likely to be liquidated or under financial distress if it makes 
bad investment decisions (e.g., Keasey and Watson, 1989). In general, firms should take all value 
maximising projects. Investment appraisal techniques are used to evaluate new projects and assist 
firms in deciding which investments to take. The net present value (NPV) technique is widely used 
in practice to evaluate new projects. Graham and Harvey (2001) note that over 70% of CFOs in 
their sample use NPV techniques to evaluate new projects. The principle of NPV is to discount 
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the future cash outflows and inflows, and sum them together. A firm should accept (reject) all 
projects if the NPV is positive (negative).1 
2.1.2 Corporate financing decisions 
Corporate financing decisions have attracted scholars’ attention since the seminal work of 
Modigliani and Miller (1958), who provided the bedrock of modern corporate financing theories. 
Their work argues that in an efficient market with no taxes, asymmetric information, transaction 
costs and bankruptcy costs, a firm’s value is independent of its financing decisions. However, the 
irrelevance proposition of Modigliani and Miller has been questioned in the corporate finance 
literature with regards to its validity in an inefficient market or under the relaxation of some of its 
assumptions. Specifically, studies focus on whether firm’s value is affected by corporate financing 
choices in a less efficient market or in the presence of asymmetric information or agency problems. 
This prompted the development of several theories of corporate financing decisions such as the 
trade-off, pecking order, market timing and agency theory. 
2.1.2.1 Trade-off theory 
The trade-off theory was developed by relaxing Modigliani and Miller’s assumption on the 
absence of tax and bankruptcy costs. It argues that a firm could maximise its value by choosing 
an optimal debt/equity ratio. This could be accomplished through weighting the benefits and costs 
of taking additional debt when a firm seeks external financing (e.g., Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
More specifically, the optimality of debt-to-equity ratio is more likely to be determined by the 
trade-off between the advantages of interest tax shields (Scott, 1976) and costs of bankruptcy or 
financial distress associated with debt (Miller, 1977).  
This theory provides an explanation for industry differences in capital structure choice and justifies 
the moderate debt-to-equity ratios observed in reality. Graham and Harvey (2001) survey more 
than 300 CFOs in the US and find that 83% of CFOs in their sample have a strict or flexible target 
leverage ratio. Desai et al. (2004) examine the effect of tax deductibility on corporate borrowing. 
Their results show that firms are more encouraged to issue debt in response to tax incentives.  
Frank and Goyal (2009) investigate factors that influence corporate capital structure over the 
period 1950-2003 in the US and find evidence for the trade-off theory. The earlier work of Leary 
and Roberts (2005) show that firms rebalance their debt-to-equity ratio towards the optimal range. 
Similarly, Flannery and Rangan (2006) use a partial adjustment model to examine how firms 
                                                 
1 The NPV is not the only technique that is used to evaluate firms’ investments. Firms might also use the payback 
and the internal rate of return (IRR) to decide whether to take new investments or not.  
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adjust to targeted leverage ratios. Their results reveal that firms adjust about one-third of their 
capital structure toward a targeted debt/equity ratio each year. Rongbing and Ritter (2009) obtain 
similar results. 
Although the trade-off theory has explained to some extent the variation of debt-to-equity ratios 
between firms, it is unable yet to explain why firms with similar risk have different capital 
structures and why leverage is negatively correlated with profitability (e.g., Fama and French, 
2002). 
2.1.2.2 Pecking order theory 
By relaxing Modigliani and Miller’s assumption regarding no asymmetric information, Myers 
(1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) develop the pecking order theory of capital structure. This 
theory explains the behaviour of corporate financing decisions from a different perspective than 
the former theory. It states that in the presence of asymmetric information, the way a firm finances 
its investments could convey signals to the market. For example, when firms want to raise funds 
through issuing equity, investors might evaluate this action as a signal of overvaluation, leading 
to a drop in the firm’s value. According to the pecking order theory, agents can overcome this 
problem by using internal funds instead. Issuing debt is the second choice because debt financing 
is less affected by the superior information that the manager has about his company. Equity 
financing comes as a last alternative due to the fact that investors might interpret this decision as 
a bad signal and hence harm firm’s value. 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) examine the behaviour of corporate capital structure by testing 
the pecking order and trade-off theories in the US from 1971 to 1989. They find that the pecking 
order theory explains most of the financing behaviour in US firms, while little support for the 
trade-off theory is found. Further, they find an explanation for the negative correlation between 
leverage and profitability. Similarly, Fama and French (2002) report that the pecking order theory 
justifies the relationship between leverage and profitability. 
Using large panel data from 1980 to 2005, Leary and Roberts (2010) find that only 50% of the 
firm’s capital structure behaviour can be explained by the pecking order hypothesis. This 
percentage increases to 80% when they incorporate other factors considered by other theories. 
The study of de Jong et al. (2011) compares the prediction of the trade-off theory against the 
pecking order in American firms from 1985 to 2005. Their results reveal that the pecking order 
theory is better in explaining corporations’ issuing decisions while the repurchase decisions are 
predicted more accurately by the trade-off hypothesis. 
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Frank and Goyal (2003) investigate the pecking order theory among US traded firms over the 
period from 1971 to 1998, and their results show that there is some evidence of the pecking order 
theory, especially amongst large firms until 1990. However, this aspect of pecking order behaviour 
is diminished when they include conventional leverage factors and 1990-1998 samples.  In fact, 
they find that firms are more likely to seek external financing through issuing equity than debt, 
which contradicts the pecking order theory. Similarly, Chen et al. (2013) examine the pecking 
order theory in Taiwanese firms and find results inconsistent with this theory. 
2.1.2.3 Market timing theory 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) relate market timing to corporate capital structure based on the 
relaxation of the Modigliani and Miller (1958) assumption of efficient capital markets. More 
specifically, Baker and Wurgler (2002) examine the influence of market timing on corporate 
capital structure in US firms by studying the correlation between market-to-book ratios which 
measures market valuation, and debt-to-equity ratios. They find that corporate market timing has 
a significant impact on firms’ capital structure. Graham and Harvey’s (2001) survey shows that 
about 75% of CFOs consider stock mispricing when they decide to issue debt or equity. This 
finding reflects the importance of securities’ mispricing in corporate financing decisions. 
Furthermore, the studies of Hovakimian (2006), Kayhan and Titman (2007) and Chen et al. (2013) 
find evidence of the relationship between market timing and the firms’ capital structure. 
Alti (2006) uses a different approach to examine relationships between corporate financing 
decisions and equity market timing. More precisely, he investigates to what extent an initial public 
offering could be captured by market timing and its effect on capital structure. His findings reveal 
that firms that go public during a hot-market (i.e., high IPO volume in terms of the number of 
issuers) tend to issue more equity and reduce leverage than cold-market firms in the short run 
which is inconsistent with the Baker and Wurgler (2002) finding. 
Mahajan and Tartaroglu (2008) examine the effect of equity market timing on capital structure in 
all firms in G-7 countries for the period from 1993 to 2005. Their results show that leverage is 
negatively correlated with historic market-to-book ratios in G-7 countries, which is consistent with 
the empirical evidence of Baker and Wurgler (2002). However, when they include the market-to-
book ratio as a measure of growth opportunities in the regression, they find a negative correlation 
between leverage and current growth opportunities which they attribute to being evidence of the 
trade-off theory.  
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2.1.2.4 Agency theory and leverage  
By relaxing the Modigliani and Miller (1958) assumption of no agency conflict between agent and 
shareholders, Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that corporate debt could be used to align the 
interest of managers to those of shareholders. That is, managerial ownership and the probability 
of bankruptcy increase when firms use debt instead of equity to finance new investments. This 
would lead managers to work toward maximising shareholder’s value. Another benefit of using 
debt is to mitigate the problems associated with overinvestment (e.g., Jensen, 1986). Managers 
might use firms’ resources to obtain private benefits at the expense of shareholders or invest in 
negative NPV projects due to incompetency. Thus, firm’s debt reduces the cash flow available for 
managers to spend in such value reducing projects. This could potentially explain corporate capital 
structure behaviour.   
Kim and Sorensen (1986) test the relationship between agency problems and corporate financing 
policy. Their results reveal that agency costs explain the cross sectional variation of corporate debt 
policy. That is, firms with less agency problems (i.e., high insider ownership) have greater 
leverage ratios and vice versa. Similarly, the studies of Agrawal and Gershon (1987) and Mehran 
(1992) find that managerial ownership is positively related to the debt ratio. Harvey et al. (2004) 
investigate the role of corporate debt in reducing the agency problems in emerging markets where 
extreme conflict of interest between the agent and principals is likely to be present. Their results 
indicate that leverage mitigates the agency costs and enhance firm’s value.  
D’Mello and Miranda (2010) examine the influence of long-term debt on overinvestment over a 
long period (1965-2004) in the US. Their findings reveal that unleveraged firms have high cash 
ratios which could be potentially overinvested, whilst the introduction of debt leads to a significant 
drop in the excess cash. Further, they show that the relationship between the reduction in the cash 
ratio and poor investment opportunities are positively correlated. They also detect a negative 
association between abnormal capital expenditure and the issue of debt. The impact of reduction 
in overinvestment is also found to have positive effects on equity value. A recent study of Gomariz 
and Ballesta (2014) on the relationship between short-term debt and overinvestment in Spanish 
listed firms, affirms the importance of lower-debt maturity in mitigating the underinvestment and 
overinvestment problems. 
Our review of the corporate finance research in firms’ investment and financing decisions has 
emphasised the importance of agency and information problems. This provides a strong context 
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for our subsequent focus on the research into corporate dividend policy, which we consider in the 
next section. 
2.1.3 Corporate dividend decisions 
Dividend policy has been puzzling researchers for many decades since the seminal work of Miller 
and Modigliani (1961). Financial economists have developed many theories in attempting to 
explain the dividend puzzle. The signalling theory of dividend argues that dividend policy has a 
positive effect on a firm’s value. Likewise, the agency theory claims that distributing dividends 
avoids the agent wasting firm’s resources. In contrast, the tax effect theory suggests that dividends 
are more likely to have a negative impact on firm’s stock price. Moreover, a number of other 
theories have been developed to provide other explanations to why firms pay or change dividends 
including the life-cycle and the catering theories of dividends. 
2.1.3.1 Dividend irrelevance theorem 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) argue that in a world with no information asymmetry, taxes and 
bankruptcy costs, corporate dividend policy has no effect on either the price of a firm's shares or 
its cost of capital. Thus, dividend policy has no effect on a firms' value. According to this theory, 
a firm’s value is determined only by its basic earnings power and its degree of business risk.    
Miller and Modigliani respond to the contrary studies which argue that dividend changes affect 
share price in the same direction, that is, an increase (decrease) in dividends result in an increase 
(decrease) in the share price. Their argument states that these effects are attributable not to the 
dividend itself but rather to the informational content of dividends with respect to future earnings. 
In other words, the preferences of shareholders for current dividends rather than future capital 
gains are not responsible for this behaviour. Instead, investors view the changing (up or down) of 
dividends as a signal that management expects future earnings to change in the same direction.  
An increase in dividends would be viewed as a positive signal that would lead investors to bid up 
the share price and vice versa.  
A further M and M argument is that a clientele effect exists. A company will attract shareholders 
whose preferences with respect to the payment and stability of dividends correspond to the 
payment pattern and stability of the firm itself. This suggests that investors desiring stable and 
predictable dividends as a source of income would hold the stock of firms that pay about the same 
dividend amount each period, and investors who favour capital gains would be more attracted to 
growing firms that reinvest a large portion of their earnings, which results in a fairly unstable 
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pattern of dividends. Because shareholders get what they expect, M and M argue that the value of 
their firm's stock is unaffected by dividend policy.  
Despite most economists believing that MM's conclusions are correct, given their assumption of 
perfect and efficient capital markets, it is worth mentioning that the underlying assumptions of 
their theorem are difficult, and probably impossible, to meet in the real world. After all, when any 
underlying assumption is violated, the value of a firm is no longer independent of corporate 
dividend policy.  
2.1.3.2 Dividend signalling theory 
The signalling theory of dividends suggests that firms use dividends’ to convey information about 
their future prospects, given the assumption that agents possess more information about their firms 
than investors. Lintner’s (1956) survey shows that managers change their dividends in a smooth 
and gradual manner over time, towards a target payout ratio. Thus, they avoid large ‘swings’ in 
dividends over time.  
Bhattacharya (1979) develops a dividend signalling model where he shows that corporate cash 
dividends can be viewed as a mechanism to reduce the asymmetric information between the agent 
and the shareholders. According to his argument, managers can use dividends as a signal of future 
cash flow. Further, Bhattacharya (1979) demonstrates that the higher the cost of signalling, the 
more informative dividends should be about the expected cash flow. According to his model, tax 
on dividends makes dividends more costly which in turn strengthens the credibility of the 
information that is conveyed through dividends. That is, the higher the tax on dividends the more 
the dividends should signal about the future cash flow. This would separate good firms from bad 
firms as it is costly for the latter to imitate. This argument is also supported by the theoretical 
model of John and Williams (1985), where they show that taxable dividends are used by managers 
to convey private information that is not captured by other published reports such as audited annual 
reports. Taken together, these models demonstrate that dividends should be more informative 
when they are taxable. 
The empirical studies of this hypothesis tend to focus on two factors: a) the effect of dividends on 
stock prices (that is, market reaction to dividends), and b) the relationship between dividends and 
earnings. The earlier works on the relationship between dividend changes and stock prices reveal 
that the stock price reacts positively (negatively) to the announcement of dividend increases 
(decreases) which is in line with the signalling theory. The empirical studies in the US, and other 
developed markets, affirm that dividend changes are positively associated with stock price 
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adjustment in the same direction (e.g., (Pettit, 1972; Charest, 1978; Aharony and Swary, 1980; 
Asquith and Mullins, 1983; Kane et al., 1984; Bajaj and Anand, 1995; Nissim and Ziv, 2001; 
Gunasekarage and Power, 2002; Harada and Nguyen, 2005; Lie, 2005; Dasilas and Leventis, 
2011).  In the UK, Lonie et al. (1996) use a sample of 620 UK. Their results are in line with earlier 
studies that are conducted in the US. That is, firms that increase (decrease) dividends exhibit a 
positive (negative) significant abnormal stock return in the announcement date.  McCluskey et al. 
(2006) detect similar results in the case of dividend increases using a sample of 50 Irish Companies 
for the period 1987-2001. McCaffrey and Hamill (2000) find that market reacts positively to 
dividend initiation announcement in UK firms. 
Furthermore, the studies in the emerging markets detect similar results to those in the developed 
markets. For example, Thirumalvalavan and Sunitha (2006) detect that the market reacts positively 
to dividend announcements in the Indian market. Al-Yahyaee et al. (2011) empirically examine 
the market reaction to the announcement of dividend increases in the Omani market and find 
evidence for the signalling theory. Similarly, in Jordan, Al-Shttarat et al. (2013) show that there 
is a significant abnormal return following the announcement of dividend increases.  
However, it remains unclear what the nature of the relationship between dividend changes and 
future earnings is. In fact, the empirical results reveal mixed conclusions. Watt (1973) conducts 
an early study of the information content of dividend announcements and finds that the dividend 
conveys little information about future earnings. Likewise, Gonedes (1978) detects that dividend 
changes are not informative about future earnings. DeAngelo et al.  (1996)  study the information 
content of dividends in NYSE-listed firms that experience a reduction in earnings after a long term 
of earnings growth. Their finding reveals that dividends are not a reliable signal of future earnings 
which is inconsistent with the dividend signalling theory. Benartzi et al. (1997) investigate the 
relationship between dividend announcements and past, current and future earnings in the US. 
Their result shows that there is a high correlation between dividend changes and concurrent 
earnings changes. However, they find that dividend changes are uncorrelated with future earnings 
changes. Moreover, Li and Zhao (2008) empirically find that firms with greater asymmetric 
information are less likely to pay, initiate or increase dividends in the US.   
In line with the dividend signalling hypothesis, Brickley (1983) examines the relationship between 
the payment of special dividends and regular dividend increases, and current and future earnings. 
He finds that earnings are increased in the current and subsequent year following these 
announcements which is consistent with the signalling theory. By employing a large sample of 
quarterly cash dividend changes, Aharony and Dotan (1994) find that dividend increasing 
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(decreasing) firms exhibit on average grater (smaller) unexpected earnings changes in the 
subsequent years. Nissim and Ziv (2001) study the information content of dividends in the US for 
the period of 1963 to 1998. Their results show that dividend changes are positively associated with 
future earnings changes. Likewise, the earlier studies of Chen and Wu (1999), Harada and Nguyen 
(2005) and Stacescu (2006) present evidence consistent with the dividend signalling hypothesis. 
Other studies also examine the revision in earnings forecasts following dividend changes.  Carroll 
(1995) finds a positive relationship between dividend changes and analysts’ forecasted revisions 
spanning up to five quarters ahead. Furthermore, Ofer and Siegel (1987), Denis et al. (1994) and 
Yoon and Starks (1995) report that analysts revise earnings forecasts after dividend changes.  
Healy and Palepu (1988) study the earnings performance surrounding dividend initiation and 
omission in the US. They find evidence that dividend initiated firms experience a positive earnings 
changes before (at least one year), during and after (up to two years) the dividend changing year 
which is in line with the information content of dividend. However, this tendency is not affirmed 
in the dividend omitting firms. They attribute the latter finding to the potential survival bias in the 
dividend omission sample. A similar study is conducted by Ho and Wu (2001) while taking into 
account the problem associated with survivorship bias. Unlike the results reported by Healy and 
Palepu (1988), their findings reveal that there is an insignificant earnings increase following 
dividend initiation and omission. Balachandran et al. (1996) examine the association between 
interim dividend cuts and omissions of future earnings in the UK. Their results indicate the 
signalling power of interim dividend cuts and omissions on future earnings changes. 
The inconclusive results on the relationship between dividend changes and future earnings in the 
previous literature prompted a further investigation on this issue. For example, Joos and Plesko 
(2004) take a different approach to test the information content of dividends. They argue that 
dividends could signal future earnings changes when it is too costly for a firm. The signal is too 
costly when a firm increases dividends at a time when it has a current loss and a negative cash 
flow. They compare this group with those firms that increase dividends and have a current loss 
and a positive cash flow. Their result shows that dividend increases provide information about 
future performance in the group where the signal is too costly. Another explanation for the mixed 
findings in the previous studies is reported by Grullon et al (2005). They argue that the 
contradictory results in the previous studies might be attributed to the assumption of the linearity 
of mean reversion in earnings. After controlling for this issue through using the partial-adjustment 
model for profitability developed by Fama and French (2000), they detect that dividend changes 
provide no information about future earnings changes. A very recent study by  Aggarwal et al. 
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(2012) argue that the inconclusive results on the relationship between dividends and future 
earnings in the previous studies might occur due to the variation in asymmetric information among 
public firms which insufficiently provides adequate testing power in the US. They use a sample 
of foreign firms that cross-list on US stock market in the form of American Depository Receipts 
(ADRs) which represents firms with a poor information environment. Their results reveal a strong 
association between dividend increases and future earnings among those firms which is in line 
with the signalling hypothesis. However, they do not find support for this in the case of dividend 
decreases.  
Earlier studies of Kane et al. (1984), Easton (1991), Lonie et al. (1996) and McCluskey et al. 
(2006) investigate the effect of the joint announcement of dividend and earnings on stock prices.  
Kane et al. (1984) study the corroborative effect of the two signals on stock prices in the US. In 
their study, the earnings and dividend announcements are divided into six groups: dividend-
increase and earnings-increase, dividend-increase and earnings-decrease, dividend-decrease and 
earnings-increase, dividend-decrease and earnings-decrease, dividend-no-change and earnings-
increase, and dividend-no-change and earnings-decrease. They find that there is a statistically 
significant interaction effect, hence, supporting the corroboration hypothesis. Subsequent studies 
of Easton (1991) in Australia, Lonie et al. (1996) in the UK and McCluskey et al. (2006) in Ireland 
reveal similar results. Overall these studies suggest the importance of the two announcements in 
explaining the abnormal stock return. 
Recent studies find that share repurchases have become globally popular and the market reacts 
positively to this announcement: there is a positive correlation between the announcement of share 
repurchases and stock prices (e.g., Chowdhrya and Nanda, 1996; Isagawa, 2002; Grullon and 
Michaely, 2004; Oded, 2005).  
2.1.3.3 Agency cost and dividends 
According to agency theory, a conflict of interests arises as a result of the separation of ownership 
and control due to the fact that agents do not always act in the interest of shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Managers may use the excess cash to invest in bad projects either to advance 
their own interest or due to incompetency. Hence, corporate dividend policy can play a crucial 
role in aligning the interests of managers to those of shareholders. Managers distribute dividends 
to commit not to use firms’ free cash flows in private benefits and to eliminate the overinvestment 
problem (Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986; Crutchley and Hansen, 1989; Jensen et 
al., 1992; Alli et al., 1993; Saxena, 1999; Mollah et al., 2000). 
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Furthermore, paying high dividends reduces the internal cash flow and forces firms to seek 
external financing from the capital markets which imposes further monitoring by the capital 
markets (Easterbrook, 1984). Thus, this monitoring reduces the agency costs and enhances the 
firms’ value. Another potential conflict may exist between shareholders and bondholders. On the 
one hand, shareholders may set a high level of dividend in order to expropriate wealth from 
bondholders which reduces the amount of funds available to bondholders (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). On the other hand, bondholders would prefer to impose some restrictions on the dividend 
payments in order to make sure that the firm has enough money to pay its debt (Smith and Warner, 
1979; Kalay, 1982).2 
Numerous studies have attempted to provide an explanation for dividend payments through 
addressing agency costs. For example, Rozeff (1982) empirically investigates the relation between 
agency cost and dividend policy for 1,000 non-regulated firms in the US over the period 1974 to 
1980. He finds that agency costs are a very important factor in determining the dividend policy. 
Specifically, he demonstrates that firms tend to pay high dividends when insiders have a lower 
fraction of the equity and/or the majority of equity is owned by outsiders.  Dempsey and Laber 
(1992) conduct a similar study to Rozeff (1982) for the period from 1981 to 1987 where this period 
is characterized by low inflation, stronger economic growth and lower taxes compared to the 
period  used in Rozeff (1982)’s study. Their results continue to hold in the latter period suggesting 
that the agency problem and dividend payout are highly associated.  
Holder et al. (1998) use a sample of 477 US firms from 1980 to 1990, and find that insider 
ownership and dividend payout are negatively related. They also detect a positive correlation 
between dividend payout and the number of shareholders. Likewise, Saxena (1999) studies the 
determination of dividend policy in NYSE-listed firms and demonstrates that agency costs have a 
major influence on dividend policy. 
Lang and Litzenberger (1989) empirically examine the free cash flow signalling hypothesis in the 
US. They compare the market reaction to the dividend announcement between groups of firms 
that are overinvesting with those that are not. Their results show a strong market reaction to 
dividend announcements for overinvesting firms, which supports the cash flow hypothesis. 
Likewise, Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) study the market reaction to the announcement of dividends 
                                                 
2 Firms’ leverage is represented to be another mechanism that aligns managers’ interest to those of shareholders. 
Jensen (1986) affirms that corporate debt could serve as substitute for dividends in eliminating the agency problem. 
Likewise, Margaritis and Psillaki (2010) find a negative association between leverage and corporate dividend policy. 
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in Germany and document a high market reaction to the announcement of dividends in firms with 
overinvestments. 
 However, Grinstein and Michaely (2005) investigate the association between institutional 
holdings and payout policy in US firms over the period 1980 to 1996. Their results reveal that 
institutional holdings are not related to dividend policy, which is inconsistent with agency theory. 
Also, they find no evidence with regard to the use of dividend policy by institutions to control and 
monitor management actions. Consistent with this result, Brav et al. (2005) find that about 87% 
of executives do not agree with the use of dividend policy as a means of imposing self-discipline. 
Denis et al. (1997) report that CEO turnover is higher and more sensitive to performance in firms 
with outside blockholders.  Denis and Serrano (1996), and Bhagat et al. (2004) affirm that firms 
with large blockholders perform better than those with few outside blockholders. This evidence 
suggests that, from an agency perspective, management actions are sufficiently monitored in firms 
that have large outside shareholders. Hence, dividends may not be an appropriate device to 
monitor management actions in the presence of large outside shareholders (Oswald and Young, 
2008). In line with this argument, Bartram et al. (2012) report that firms make higher payouts 
when they have lower ownership concentrations (i.e., higher agency costs). 
In contrast, recent studies show that large owners can use firm resources to generate private 
benefits at the expense of minority shareholders (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Holderness, 
2003). Jensen (1986) argues that firms are likely to pay out their free cash flow when they are 
highly monitored. Faccio et al. (2001) detect that the dividend payout is higher in firms with lower 
agency conflicts. The theoretical model developed by Fluck (1999) demonstrates that an increase 
in the external shareholders’ power might encourage managers to pay higher dividends in order to 
commit not to waste firms resources on private benefits. Furthermore, previous studies reveal that 
ownership concentration is negatively related to disclosure levels. For instance, Fan and Wong 
(2002) point out that outside investors and analysts have little confidence in the reported earnings 
in firms with high ownership concentrations. Hope (2003) affirms that there is a negative 
association between ownership concentration and disclosure level.  
Many other studies provide evidence for the agency theory using data from outside the US.  Mollah 
et al. (2000) study the importance of agency costs in determining the dividend policy. Their 
findings reveal that dividend policy is significantly related to agency costs. Using data from 33 
counties around the world, La Porta et al. (2000) demonstrate that firms pay higher dividends in 
countries with better shareholder protection. Earlier works of Manos (2002) in India, Zeng (2003) 
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in Canada, and Chen and Dhiensiri (2009) in New Zealand find evidence consistent with the 
agency theory of dividends. However, Chay and Suh (2005) examine the determinants of dividend 
policy in 24 countries and their study reveals weak evidence for the agency theory of dividends.  
2.1.3.4 Tax clientele effect 
The tax effect represets another school of thought which explains the relevence of the dividend 
decision.  The tax clientele theory basically argues that the imperfection caused by the different 
tax treatments on dividends and capital gains, justifies the payout policy in corporations for two 
reasons. First, dividends are taxed more heavily than capital gains. Second, dividends are taxed 
immediately, wherease tax on capital gains are deferred until investors sell their shares. For these 
reasons, corporate dividends are less desirable than capital gains and a negative correlation 
between dividends and firm’s value should be expected (Brennan, 1970; Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy, 1979). Thus, investors with less tax advantages prefer firms that retain most of their 
earnings to avoid future tax liabilities.  
Miller and Modigliani (1961) note that the tax on dividends could play a crucial role in corporate 
payout policy. However, they argue that investors can sort themselves into clienteles to reduce the 
overall tax bill. That is, low-tax investors could prefer dividend-paying firms while high-tax 
investros prefer capital gains. Therefore, if the investors preferences’ exactly matches the 
distribution of a firm’s payout policy, the value of a firm is independent of its dividend policy. 
There are many empirical studies that support the tax-effect hypothesis. The earlier study of  Pettit 
(1977) exmaines the effect of tax on an individual investor’s portfolio. His study provides evidence 
to the clientele effect of dividend. More specifically, he finds a positive (negative) association 
between portfolio’s dividend yields and investors’ ages (investors’ income). Likewise,  Lewellen 
et al. (1978) report that high-tax investors are attracted by low dividend yield firms and vice versa.  
Graham and Kumar (2006) offer further support to the clientele hypothesis of dividends by 
investigating the stock holdings and trading behavior among a large number of households in the 
US. Their results reveal that older and low income investors prefer to hold shares in high dividend–
paying firms. Also, they find that this trend continues to hold when it comes to their trading 
behaviour: those investors buy shares before the ex-dividend day. 
In a unique market where the capital gains tax is zero: Taiwan,  Lee et al. (2006) study the tax 
dividend clientele effect, and find that investors subject to high tax rates on dividends tend to retain 
stocks with lower dividends. Further, their results show that investors in lower tax brackets buy 
stocks that raise dividends and vice versa. This pattern is consistent with the dividend clientele 
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hypothesis. More recently,  Dahlquist et al. (2014) examine the dividend tax clienteles in Swedish 
stock markets over the period from 2001 to 2005. They find that  investment funds which are 
subject to higher tax rates on dividends than capital gains acquire less dividend-paying stocks in 
their porfolios.  
2.1.3.5 The Life-cycle theory of dividends 
The life cycle theory suggests that firm’s resources, ability to access capital markets, and 
investment opportunities vary over a firm’s life (Mueller, 1972). For example, at an early stage, 
firms tend to have limited initial resources which leads firms to invest most of their resources in 
building itself (e.g., investing in product development and marketing). A growth stage occurs 
when the firm expands its customers and exploits the market potential. At a later stage, firms reach 
a period where investment opportunities disappear and market competition increases, which is 
called the “maturity stage”.  
The different characteristics of a firm over its life cycle are more likely to lead managers to adjust 
firm’s dividend policy accordingly. That is, at the early and growth stages, the firm tends to pay 
no or a low level of dividends, as they need to retain cash to overcome the potential problems 
associated with these stages. However, when a firm reaches the maturity level, the opposite 
tendency is more likely to be found. That is, not many good investment opportunities are left and 
a firm is more likely to have a high cash flow. In this matter, the firm has a high tendency to 
discharge its cash to its shareholders through, for example, dividends. 
Grullon et al. (2002) use a sample of 7,642 dividend change announcements for the period from 
1967 to 1993 and find support for the life cycle theory of dividends. In their study, they find that 
dividend-increasing firms tend to experience a decline in their profitability after this 
announcement and their capital expenditure is unaffected in the following years. They also detect 
that dividend-decreasing firms exhibit an increase in their profitability in the subsequent years. 
These findings are inconsistent with the signalling theory of dividends. Furthermore, the 
systematic risk is found to decline around the announcement of dividend increases which leads to 
a reduction in the cost of capital. This in turn, is argued to explain the positive association between 
dividend increases and stock prices. Based on these findings, Grullon et al. (2002) suggest that 
dividend increases convey information about changes in a firm’s life cycle. That is, when a firm 
moves from high growth to maturity stage, their investment opportunity set declines which is 
represented by a reduction in the firm’s retained earnings, growth rates and risk. 
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The earlier work of Fama and French (2001) studies the dividend policy in listed firms in the US 
and detects a decrease in dividend policy among those firms. They attribute their findings to the 
increase in the number of firms with a small size, low profitability and high growth. This finding 
suggests that firms at the initial stage are less likely to set progressive dividend decisions. 
DeAngelo et al. (2006) use the earned/contributed capital mix as a proxy for mature firms. Their 
study shows that the tendency to pay a dividend is high (low) when retained earnings are high 
(low). Further, they report that the earned/contributed capital mix is significantly related to the 
propensity for dividend distribution which is in line with the life cycle theory of dividends. 
Likewise, Denis and Osobov (2008) investigate the propensity to pay dividends in six developed 
markets using the ratio of retained earnings to total equity to proxy mature firms. Their results 
reveal that there is a high tendency to pay dividends in firms with high earnings to equity ratios 
which supports the life cycle theory. 
2.1.3.6 Catering theory of dividends 
Theories discussed in the previous sections are developed on the assumption that managers and 
investors are rational. Within behavioural corporate finance, Baker et al.  (2006) identify two 
approaches: a) irrational investors approach with rational manager, b) irrational managers 
approach with rational investors. The irrational investors approach examines how rational 
managers may exploit irrationality in the financial markets: e.g. by market timing when securities 
are mispriced by irrational investors, and by catering to irrational investors’ demands.3 
The catering theory of dividends developed by Baker and Wurgler (2004) argues that investors 
demand for dividends varies over time. This would cause the stock price of dividend-paying and 
non-dividend paying firms to vary accordingly. Therefore, managers respond by paying dividends 
to investors when investors place a premium on dividend-paying stocks and not paying dividends 
when there is no premium placed on a stock. Using a sample from 1962 to 2000, they empirically 
find that on aggregate dividend initiations are positively association with the dividend’s premium 
and managers tend to pay dividends when there is a dividend premium. They also detect that 
managers omit dividends when investors favour non-paying firms. 
Supportively, Li and Li (2006) provide evidence for the catering theory after extending Baker and 
Wurgler’s model and incorporate other dividend levels (dividend increase and decrease). They 
find that the tendency to increase (decrease) dividends is high (low) when the dividend premium 
                                                 
3 The irrational manager approach will be discussed in detail in section 2.4. 
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is high (low). Furthermore, the magnitude of increasing (decreasing) dividend is greater when the 
dividend premium is high (low). Moreover, they document that the level of dividend changes 
(increase or decrease) and the dividend premium has an impact on stock returns. That is, there is 
a positive (negative) relation between the stock returns and dividend premium for dividend 
increases (decreases). However, Li and Li (2006) find a negative relation between the cash ratio 
and dividend increases. Furthermore, they find a negative relation between market to book ratio 
and dividend increases and decreases. They suggest that the market to book ratio serves a dual 
purpose. That is, in case of dividend increases (decreases) it measures the investment opportunities 
(past and expected future earnings). 
Thus, the findings of the earlier studies of Baker and Wurgler (2004) and Li and Li (2006) suggests 
that managers should consider varying investors’ demand when they make dividend decisions. 
Also, managers are penalized via a lower stock price when they could not fulfil this condition (that 
is, responding to investors demand).  Hoberg and Nagpurnanand (2009) re-examine the dividend 
catering theory in the US from 1963 to 2004. The results reveal strong evidence for the catering 
theory of dividends over that period (consistent with Baker and Wurgler, 2004). However, once 
they control for risk, the relationship between the propensity to pay dividends and dividend 
premium no longer exist. They attribute this finding to the importance of risk, not the catering 
theory of dividends, to explain dividends’ behaviour. 
 In the international context, Denis et al. (2008) examine the catering theory of dividends in six 
developed countries (i.e., US, Canada, UK, Germany, France and Japan) over the period 1994 and 
2002. Their findings show little evidence for the catering theory of dividends outside the US. 
Likewise, Eije and Megginson (2008) explore the payout policies in the European Union during 
the period 1989-2005. Their findings demonstrate that the catering theory of dividends is irrelevant 
in those countries. In a sample of 23 countries, Ferris et al. (2009) investigate the catering theory 
of dividends over 1995-2004. They find that catering is more likely to present in common than 
civil law countries. A possible explanation for this finding, according to the authors, is that 
investors in common law countries exhibit a wider set of rights and protection compared to those 
in civil law countries. This would probably increase the ability of shareholders in the former 
countries to force managers to pay dividends. 
2.1.3.7 Potential undervaluation and dividends 
The disappearance of dividends (Fama and French, 2001) and the increase in the popularity of 
share repurchases has recently attracted the attention of researchers. Different hypotheses have 
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been developed to explain why the tendency toward share repurchases has increased recently: 
these include signalling, capital structure adjustments, takeover defence, excess cash distribution, 
substitution for cash dividends and wealth expropriation from bondholders. Signalling or 
undervaluation seems to be the most prevalent explanation for open market repurchases (e.g., 
Dann, 1981; Wansley et al., 1989; Ikenberry et al., 1995). That is, managers use open market 
repurchase to convey to the market that their stocks are potentially undervalued and hence transfer 
wealth to shareholders.  
Ikenberry et al. (1995) report a positive link between repurchases and abnormal returns in value 
stocks. Specifically, they find a long run abnormal return in stocks with high book-to-market ratio, 
consistent with the empirical findings of Zhang (2005). They attribute their findings to the 
undervaluation of these stocks. That is, stocks with high a book-to-market ratio are more likely to 
be undervalued. They also argue that repurchasing motivations in low book-to-market firms is not 
dominated by undervaluation. Likewise, Chan et al. (2010) affirm a positive correlation between 
repurchase announcement returns (and actual repurchases amount) and a high book-to-market 
ratio in the short run. Similarly, in a CFO survey by Brav et al. (2005), it is found that the main 
reason for open market repurchases is stock undervaluation. Thus, this implies that potentially 
undervalued firms are expected to reduce dividends more compared to non-undervalued peers. 
2.2 Managerial compensations and corporate financial policies 
Executive compensation contracts have been considered by shareholders to promote alignment of 
agents’ interests to those of shareholders. Studies in this area have affirmed the importance of this 
element in mitigating the agency problems and hence, enhancing shareholders’ value. This section 
reviews the relevant literature. 
2.2.1 Executive pay package 
The executive compensation contract consists mainly of cash and equity-based compensations. 
The cash compensation can be in the form of a fixed salary and annual bonus whereas the stock 
options and long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) are equity-based compensation. Prior studies affirm 
the importance of executive compensation to address the agency problem between agent and 
principle (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Holmstrom, 1979; Haugen and Senbet, 1981; Murphy, 
1999; Core et al., 2003). 
Managerial salaries are crucial in attracting managers. However, this flat payoff leads managers 
to have no incentives to take risky projects (Lambert et al., 1991). The annual bonus is paid to 
managers based on their achievement of threshold performance in current year. Under this type of 
22 
 
compensation, managers may be encouraged to take negative NPV projects that yield sufficiently 
high return in the current year or may make managers focus on projects with shorter life-span 
which lead them, in some cases, to pass value-added long-term projects (Narayanan, 1996). 
Therefore, the cash compensation alone establishes no link between managers’ wealth and long-
term firms’ performance.  
The introduction of equity-based compensation such as LTIPs and stock options encourages 
managers to think more strategically in making financial decisions because their wealth is tied to 
long-term corporate performance. The structure of the equity-based compensation induces 
managers to take more risk which overcomes the problem associated with cash compensation. 
However, this also might lead managers to take excessive risks due to the convexity of stock 
options. The report of Greenbury (1995) favours LTIPs over stock options because the former 
does not display convex payoff structure.  However, no conclusion has been made on which type 
(LTIPs or stock options) leads to optimal risk-taking (Lee et al., 2007). 
Taking together, the compensation package has to be well structured in order to eliminate the 
problems associated with each type of reward. For example if the constructed pay package depends 
heavily on salary and bonus, then a manager is more likely to work toward increasing the current 
year performance and avoid taking risky projects (underinvestment) which may in fact destroy a 
firm’s value in the long-run. On the other hand, equity based compensation might lead manager 
to take more risky investments (overinvestment). Therefore, the board of directors should consider 
the optimal mix of compensation’s elements when designing a managerial contract in order to 
align the interests of manager to those of shareholders. Lewellen et al. (1987) find evidence that 
firms set compensation packages to address agency costs. 
Stock options are considered as a key element of equity-based compensation. Their popularity has 
increased remarkably in last two decades. For example, 83% of the largest 100 US firms had 
option plans in 1980 (Smith and Watts, 1982). Hall and Murphy (2002) report that in the US 82% 
of firms listed in S&P 500 granted options to their top executives and this percentage has increased 
by approximately 15% in 1999, reaching to 94%.  Also, the value of stock options in the 
compensation package has value of about 47% in 1999 compared to 21% in 1992. In the UK, 
Conyon and Murphy (2000) report that CEOs’ total compensations in the 500 largest UK firms 
are about £300 million and 22% of which are stock options. 
These differences between the US and the UK is studied by Kyriacou et al. (2010). They show 
that executive in the US are more likely to sell all the stock acquired at exercise, where less than 
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50% of those stock sold by UK executives. Futher, they point out different explanations of why 
and why not UK executives tend to exercise their stock options early. The four times emoluments 
rule4 restricts the value of options held by CEOs to four times of base salary plus bonuses. Thus, 
a CEO who is granted the maximum amount of options might be more encouraged to exercise his 
options in order to provide a space for the granting of additional options. However, the ability to 
defer the tax liability before 1995 gave UK executives incentives to hold the stock acquired at 
exercise.5 
Several studies investigate the effect of executive stock options on corporate financial decisions. 
This literature is discussed briefly in the following sections.6 
2.2.2 Executive compensation, risk-aversion and investments 
The feature of stock options is that managers are rewarded when a firm's stock price increases, but 
no punishments are imposed on managers when stock price decreases. Thus, this type of convexity 
payoff motivates managers to take more risky projects (Gervais et al., 2003) and hence mitigates 
the problems associated with CEO risk aversion. Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) study the impact of 
executive stock options (ESOs) and other incentives on managerial risk taking. They find that 
ESOs motivate risk-averse managers to invest in risky projects and hence, eliminate the risk-
related investment problem. This evidence has also been supported by a recent work of Heron and 
Lie (2013). 
A prior work of Lewellen et al. (1987) studies to what extent firms use cash and equity-based 
compensation packages to mitigate agency costs. Their findings reveal that stock related 
compensation is significantly and positively related to fixed assets, growth, and leverage. 
However, salary and cash bonus elements are negatively correlated with fixed assets and growth. 
Agrawal and Gershon (1987) study the impact of managerial holdings of common stock and stock 
options on investment and financing decisions of 294 firms listed in NYSE and AMEX for the 
period from 1974 to 1982. Their study detects that managerial stock holdings play a vital role in 
eliminating the agency problem. Specifically, they find that managers make the best investment 
                                                 
4  For more details see Kyriacou et al. (2010).  
5 At that time tax was paid on the gain from selling shares. Since July 1995, tax on options must be paid at exercise 
date regardless whether or not the gain released. 
6 Although the focus of the thesis on dividend policy, many studies find evidence of the impact of executive stock 
options on corporate financial policies. Furthermore, chapter 5 deals with overconfident managers and dividend 
policy in which managerial stock options are used to proxy managerial overconfidence. 
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decisions that increase shareholder value when they have high security holdings. Also, they find 
a positive association between the debt-equity ratio and holdings of firm’s securities by managers.  
The earlier study of Larcker (1983) investigates the relation between the adoption of performance 
plans in executive compensation packages, and investment decisions and stock market 
performance in the US over the period 1971 to 1978.7 The study reveals that there is a positive 
association between the adoption of performance plans and investment decisions and there is an 
abnormal stock return following the announcement of these plans compared with firms that had 
not adopted a performance plan. Likewise, other studies on the relation between equity-based 
compensations and stock performance detect a positive association between long-term incentives 
and abnormal stock return (Brickley et al., 1985; DeFusco et al., 1990). 
Datta et al. (2001) show that stock options lead managers to take the best long term investments 
and hence increase shareholders’ value. Similarly, Guay (1999) detects a positive association 
between stock price volatility and stock options, suggesting that stock options have an impact on 
firms' financing and investment decisions. Ju et al. (2002), investigates the impact of options on 
managerial compensation and finds that stock options can induce either too much or too little 
corporate risk taking, depending on managerial risk aversion and the underlying investment 
technology.  
DeFusco et al. (1991) empirically investigate the effect of changes in stock option plan on long-
run firms’ performance and financial policies for US firms between 1978 and 1982. Their results 
reveal a reduction in stock price, firms’ profitability and investments following the change in 
executive stock option plans. 
Gaver and Gaver (1995) study the executive pay components in high growth and non-growth 
firms, using a sample of 1000 US firms in 1992. The results show that firms with many investment 
opportunities pay more total compensation than non-growth firms. Also, they find that most of the 
executive compensation in high growth (non-growth) firms is driven from long term incentives 
(fixed salary).8 
A recent study by Athanasakou et al. (2013) examine the change in CEO compensation following 
periods of high investment in the US. Their results reveal a reduction in CEO options granted 
                                                 
7 Performance plans are differ from other long term executive compensation packages (see Larcker, 1983 for more 
details). 
8They argue that asymmetric information should be higher in growth firms and hence, long-term incentives reduce 
the agency problem between shareholders and agent.  
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subsequent to high investment periods. They also find that, when CEOs have more in the money 
options, firms pay them fewer options in the following years. 
2.2.3 Executive compensation and dividend policy 
A substantial body of academic literature studies the effect of executive compensation packages 
on the dividend policy (e.g., Lambert et al., 1989; Jolls, 1998; Weisbenner, 2000; Fenn and Liang, 
2001). 
Lewellen et al. (1987) study the effect of each component of executive compensation packages 
(salary and bonus compensation and stock related compensation) on dividend policy. Their study 
reveals that there is a significant positive association between the dividend payout ratio and the 
percentage of managers’ salary and cash bonus compensations, and negative but insignificant 
correlation with stock related compensations. 
Lambert et al. (1989) conduct the first study examining the effect of introducing stock options as 
a part of executive compensation package on dividend policy decisions using a sample of 221 
large US firms. Their findings show that there is a negative association between stock options and 
dividend policy decisions. In other words, the introduction of stock options in the compensation 
package leads managers to reduce dividends below the expected level and the higher percentage 
of stock options in executive compensation package leads firms to reduce dividend ratio. They 
argue that the reason for this is because executive stock options plans are not dividend protected.  
Fenn and Liang (2001) study the influence of managerial stock incentives (stock ownership and 
stock options) on corporate payout policy. Their sample consists of 1100 non-financial firms in 
the US for the period from 1993 to 1997. They find that in firms with a high potential of agency 
costs (those with low management stock ownership, few investment opportunities, and high cash 
flow) management stock ownership is positively correlated with payout ratio. However, they find 
no supporting evidence in firms with high management ownership, more investment opportunities 
and limited cash flow. In addition, they find a significant negative correlation between 
management stock options and dividend, and positive correlation between management stock 
options and repurchases. 
Aboody and Kasnik (2001) investigate the association between executive stock options and firms’ 
payout policy. Their study involves a sample of 1354 US firms over the period from 1992 to 1998. 
Their results show that CEOs with stock options are more likely to favour share repurchase over 
dividends. Also, they find that restricted stock is negatively correlated with stock options.  
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A study carried out by Kato et al. (2005) investigates the effect of the adoption of stock options 
plans on financial decisions and firms performance by Japanese firms for the period from 1997 to 
2001. Their results reveal that dividend policy and volatility are unaffected. They also find that 
firms which introduce stock options experience higher abnormal return, high growth and less 
leverage compared with firms that have not introduced stock options plans.  
Liljeblom and Pasternack (2006) examine the influence of employee and executive stock options 
on the firms’ payout policy. They document a positive correlation between stock options and 
dividend payout in firms with dividend protected options. However, in firms without dividend 
protected options, they find insignificant negative association between dividend payments and 
stock options. 
Similarly, using a sample of 1035 Taiwanese firms during the period from 2000 to 2005, Wu et 
al. (2008) study the effect of protected employee stock options on stock repurchases and cash 
dividends. Their study demonstrates a positive relation between protected executive stock options 
and cash dividend distribution. 
Cuny et al. (2009) study the impact of executive stock options on total payout (dividends and 
repurchases). Their results show that there is negative relationship between executive stock 
options and total payout. Similarly, Boumosleh and Cline (2013) detect a negative relationship 
between CEOs options and dividend policy, and Li et al. (2014) find that CEOs with high stock 
options ownership are less likely to pay dividends. This is due to luck of dividend protection 
2.3 CEO traits and corporate governance 
2.3.1 CEO traits 
Recent studies demonstrate that managerial traits have a non-trivial impact on corporate financial 
decisions. Earlier studies find that CEO personality has explanatory power in explaining capital 
structure (Cronqvist et al., 2012) and financial choice (Malmendier et al., 2011). However, the 
association between managerial traits and firm performance reveals mixed conclusions.  
Recent studies show that CEO power, measured by CEO-Chair duality, CEO-time in role and 
CEO-Ownership increases entrepreneurialism (Sah and Stiglitz, 1991); encourages CEOs to take 
risky decisions (Adams et al., 2005); reduces board members’ effectiveness (Combs et al., 2007; 
Liu and Jiraporn, 2010; Jiraporn et al., 2012); and creates moral hazard problems (Adams and 
Ferreira, 2007). Hence, CEOs with more power in their firms will be more likely to act on their 
desires and make the decisions that they want.  
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The CEO’s time in the role can also enable CEOs to align their interest with those of the board’s 
directors and can potentially strengthen their influence over the board. For instance, Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1998) theoretically demonstrate that CEOs with more tenure are able to select board 
members in their favour and decrease the composition of outside directors on the board, indicating 
an increase in the CEOs’ power. Further, Hill and Phan (1991) find that CEOs’ tenure increases 
the influence of CEOs over the boards.  
The age of the CEOs can also influence the decision-making process. Shefrin (2008) reports that 
until the age of 70, personal risk aversion is positively related to age, then this relation is revised, 
representing a nonlinear relationship between age and personal risk aversion. Agarwal et al. (2007) 
empirically find that firms’ financial decisions vary with age. Yim (2013) affirms that a firm’s 
acquisition behaviour declines with CEO age.   
2.3.2 Corporate governance 
2.3.2.1 Board structure 
The literature on corporate governance demonstrates the crucial role of board structure in 
monitoring the firm’s management (e.g., Mace, 1986; Adams and Ferreira, 2007). Board size and 
board composition have attracted the attention of many recent studies.  
The earlier studies demonstrate the importance of board size in mitigating the conflict between the 
principal and the agent (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 
1998). Whether large or small board members are efficient in monitoring the management has 
been debated in the literature. Large board membership adds more expertise which strengthens the 
relation between corporate performance and the external market (Pearce and Zahra, 1991); and 
reduces the autonomy of the CEO decision-making (Conyon and Peck, 1998; Guest, 2008). 
However, other studies show that smaller board membership is better functioning than large board 
membership (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993). The free rider problem is more likely to be 
present when board size becomes large and has been empirically supported by the previous work 
(e.g., Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Mak and Kusnadi, 2005).  
Regarding board composition, the literature documents that a large proportion of outside directors 
on the board is perceived as a strong signal of efficient monitoring of managers by the capital 
market. For instance, Fama and Jensen (1983) report that the non-executive directors on the board 
have an incentive to build reputation as expert monitors and to act in favour of the shareholder’s 
interest. Moreover, others report that the proportion of outside directors is positively correlated 
with disciplinary turnover among executives (Weisbach, 1988); stock price reaction to takeover 
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bids (Byrd and Hickman 1992); corporate performance (Bhagat and Black, 1999); and influencing 
CEO authority (Adams et al., 2005; Combs et al., 2007). 
The earlier studies detect the important role of dividend policy to mitigate the conflict of interest 
between managers and shareholders (e.g., Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen et al., 1992). 
This might indicate that effective board structure uses dividends as a device to alleviate the agency 
problems associated with free cash flow. However, the literature reveals mixed results on the 
correlation between board size and board composition, and dividend policy. For instance, Chen et 
al. (2005) find that dividend policy is unaffected by board size and board composition. In contrast, 
Adjaoud and Ben-Amar (2010) report that board composition is positively related to dividend 
payout. Furthermore, Boumosleh and Cline (2013) show that both board size and board 
composition have a positive impact on paying dividends. 
Although the literature generally demonstrates the important role of board size and board 
composition in aligning manager’s interest to those of shareholders, which in turn mitigates the 
free cash flow problems, no conclusion is made with regard to the association of these factors with 
dividend policy.  
2.3.2.2 Ownership structure 
Ownership structure has been documented as having a significant impact on monitoring internal 
management and influencing corporate financial policy. The majority of recent studies focus on 
ownership concentration and institutional holdings. Denis et al. (1997) report that CEO turnover 
is high and more sensitive to performance in firms with outside blockholders. Denis and Serrano 
(1996) and Bhagat et al. (2004) affirm that firms with large blockholders perform better than those 
with few outside blockholders. This evidence suggests that management actions are sufficiently 
monitored in firms that have large outside shareholders. Hence, payout policy may not be an 
appropriate device to monitor management actions in the presence of large outside shareholders 
(Oswald and Young, 2008). In line with this argument, Bartram et al. (2012) report that firms 
make higher payout when they have lower ownership concentration (i.e., high agency costs). We 
expect dividends and ownership concentration to be negatively correlated. 
However, other studies show that large owners can use firm resources to generate private benefits 
at the expenses of minority shareholders (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Holderness, 2003). 
Furthermore, previous studies reveal that ownership concentration is negatively related to 
disclosure levels. For instance, Fan and Wong (2002) point out that outside investors and analysts 
have little confidence in the reported earnings in firms with high ownership concentration. Hope 
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(2003) shows that there is a negative association between ownership concentration and disclosure 
level. Moreover, Jensen (1986) argues that firms are likely to pay out their free cash flow when 
they are highly monitored. A model developed by Fluck (1999) demonstrates that increasing the 
external shareholders’ power increases the threat of dismissal of insiders, which encourages 
managers to pay higher dividends in order not to waste firms’ resources on private benefits. 
Supportively, Faccio et al. (2001) detect that dividend payouts are higher in firms with lower 
agency conflicts. This in turn suggests that firms may distribute high dividends in the presence of 
high ownership concentration to mitigate these problems, implying a positive correlation.  
Institutional investors can also help to align managerial actions toward shareholder maximization. 
For instance, Agrawal and Mandelker (1990, 1992) show that firms with high levels of 
institutional ownership have better corporate monitoring mechanisms. Zeckhauser and Pound 
(1990) argue that institutional investors could be a substitute for the signalling and the monitoring 
role of dividends. In contrast, other scholars show that the payment of dividends could be 
considered as one of the mechanisms that reduce the agency costs between principal and agent in 
the presence of institutional investors. Eckbo and Verma (1994) find that institutional investors 
prefer managers to distribute the free cash flow in the form of dividends to mitigate the problems 
associated with the cost of free cash flow. Likewise, Short et al. (2002) report a positive association 
between dividends and institutional holdings in the UK. In contrast, Grinstein and Michaely (2005) 
find no support to the argument that dividend policy is associated with institutional holding. 
Hence, in the agency framework, dividends and the presence of institutional investors should be 
positively correlated, as institutional investors force higher dividends.  
2.4 Behavioural corporate finance 
Behavioural corporate finance relaxes the assumption of standard corporate finance regarding the 
rationality of agents. The earlier studies in psychology demonstrate that individuals do not always 
act in a rational manner. Thus, the literature on behavioural corporate finance focuses on the 
impact of irrational managers on corporate financial decisions. This section reviews the relevant 
literature. 
2.4.1 Human psychological biases 
A substantial body of psychological research has shown that people tend to believe that they are 
better and possess more affirmative elements than the average. For example, Greenwald (1980) 
argue that, in general, individuals tend to have positive unrealistic beliefs about themselves. Other 
studies demonstrate that people naturally believe that they are better than the average (Taylor and 
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Brown, 1988); overestimate their ability (Langer and Roth, 1975; Taylor and Brown, 1988); often 
expect good things to happen (Weinstein, 1980; Kunda, 1987); overestimate the precision of their 
information and knowledge (e.g., Fischhoff et al., 1977); attribute good outcomes to their actions 
and bad outcomes to bad luck (Miller and Ross, 1975). Taken together, the evidence suggests that 
humans tend to deviate from acting in a rational way. 
By taking the psychological biases into consideration, finance scholars investigate the influence 
of these biases on investors’ behaviour as an attempt to explain the anomalies in the financial 
markets. For example, Daniel et al. (1998) theoretically demonstrate that an overconfident investor 
who overestimates the precision of his private information can cause the stock price to overreact. 
The theoretical model developed by Odean (1998) examines the effect of overconfident investors 
on financial markets. They find an increase in the trading volume, volatility and market depth 
when traders are overconfident. Likewise, Glaser and Weber (2007) show that investors who 
believe that they possess investment skills better than the average trade excessively. Moreover, 
Barber and Odean (1999) show that investors trade too frequently without gaining and attribute 
this phenomena to investors overconfidence. In addition, they detect that investors sell gains 
quickly and hold losses too long reflecting the disposition effect. In line with the psychological 
literature that argues that men are more overconfident than women, Barber and Odean (2001) 
empirically affirm that men trade more excessively than women: they relate this finding to men 
being more overconfident than women. They also detect a significant negative return among male 
investors. The earlier work of Barber and Odean (2000) show that traders who trade more often 
exhibit a greater loss compared with those who trade less.  
However, other studies detect that irrational traders can gain abnormal return from their 
investments compared with their rational peers. DeLong et al. (1991) demonstrate that irrational 
investors underestimate the risk when they have fundamental information, which lead them to take 
larger long positions in the risky assets. Hence, they take more advantage of the assets’ risk 
premium than their rational counterparts. Kyle and Wang (1997) develop a theoretical model that 
examines to what extent overconfident traders could survive in the markets where the information 
is asymmetric. In their model, they show that overconfident investors are more likely to 
outperform their rational peers and hence survive more in the markets. Hirshleifer and Luo (2001) 
theoretically show that, in a competitive securities market, overconfident investors who trade more 
aggressively, based on their private signal, are more likely to exploit risky profit opportunities that 
are created by either noise traders or liquidity need traders: this leads overconfident traders to earn 
more profit than their rational counterparts. Likewise, Hirshleifer et al. (2006) develop a 
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theoretical model showing that, even though irrational investors’ trading is not driven by the 
fundamental value of a firm, their trading volumes impact market prices. Thus, in some cases, 
irrational traders can earn higher abnormal return than rational investors.  
The psychological biases that people and investors tend to have could spread among managers 
which may lead them to take irrational decisions. The literature in behavioural corporate finance 
studies the effect of managerial psychological biases on corporate financial decisions. Roll (1986) 
argues that when managers face uncertainty about future outcomes, they are more likely to behave 
in an irrational way. March and Shapira (1987) show that managers tend to overestimate their 
ability in controlling projects and underestimate the projects’ risks. The literature on the effect of 
managerial psychological biases on corporate financial decisions is discussed in the following 
section. 
2.4.2 Overconfidence and corporate financial policy 
Behavioural corporate finance analyses the effect of managerial psychological biases on corporate 
finance decisions. Most of this literature focuses on one particular bias: managerial 
overconfidence. The recent works have extensively examined the influence of overconfident 
CEOs on investment decisions, capital structure and mergers and acquisitions. The next section 
analyses this literature.  
2.4.2.1 Overconfident managers and financing and investment decisions 
In the absence of asymmetric information and agency costs, Heaton (2002) develops a theoretical 
model that examines the effect of managerial optimism (overconfidence) on financing decisions 
in efficient capital markets. The result demonstrates that an overconfident manager might not take 
a positive NPV project (underinvestment) that has to be externally financed because he believes 
that the market undervalues his equity and thus the external finance is too costly. He also shows 
that when a firm has free cash flow, an overconfident manager may invest in a negative NPV 
project (overinvestment) because he overestimates the cash flow from new investments.  
Malmendier and Tate (2005a) extend Heaton’s (2002) model and empirically examine the effect 
of managerial overconfidence on the investment decisions of 477 of the largest US firms for the 
period from 1980 to 1994.9 They argue that an overconfident manager invests more when there is 
a sufficient internal finance to finance new project because they overestimate the project’s return, 
and he abandons new investments when it requires external finance as he believes it is too costly. 
                                                 
9 The overconfidence proxies used in the recent literature are discussed in more details in section 2.4.2.4. 
32 
 
Their results reveal that the investment decisions are highly sensitive to free cash flow in firms 
managed by overconfident managers. Their results were not driven by agency problems or 
asymmetric information. They made a robust test for that. For example, they find that 
overconfident CEOs do not earn abnormal return from holding their options compared with the 
market’s return (no asymmetric information). They conclude their study by arguing that stock 
ownership and stock option are unlikely to mitigate the problem of overconfident managers with 
the investment decisions. Hence, overconfidence leads manager to be more sensitive to invest 
firm’s free cash flow which might destroy the company’s value. Supportively, Malmendier and 
Tate (2005b) obtain similar results using another measurement of managerial overconfidence 
based on the perception of outsiders.  
In the Taiwanese market, Lin et al. (2005) employ another proxy of managerial overconfidence 
based on managers’ earnings forecasts and they investigate the impact of overconfident CEOs on 
investment decisions in firms that exhibit high financing constraints. Consistent with the earlier 
studies, they detect high investment-cash flow sensitivity in firms managed by optimistic 
managers. Likewise, Huang et al. (2011) test managerial overconfidence, investment decisions 
and agency costs in Chinese listed companies from 2002 to 2005. They use earnings forecast and 
top executives’ compensation to measure overconfidence. The results show that overconfident 
managers are more likely to overinvest in firms with high cash flows, and the sensitivity of 
investment is greater in firms with high agency costs.  
Kamoto (2011) theoretically demonstrates the crucial role of internal funds in influencing the 
investment decisions made by overconfident managers. His model shows that overconfident 
manager deviates from optimal investments when he has sufficient or insufficient internal funds 
to finance new investments.  
Interestingly, Campbell et al. (2011) use different levels of optimism (high, moderate, low) and 
empirically find that high (low) optimistic risk-averse CEOs invest more (less) which destroys 
firms’ value. Also, they affirm that those CEOs are more likely to lose their position, particularly, 
if the board of directors act in the interest of shareholders. Furthermore, CEOs with moderate level 
of optimism are found to make the best investment decisions that enhance shareholders’ value. 
Fairchild (2005) develops two theoretical models to investigate the effect of overconfident 
managers on the financing decision (the choice between debt and equity) in the presence of 
asymmetric information and moral hazard problems. In Fairchild’s model, overconfidence is 
defined as the manager’s overestimation of his ability to affect the desirable outcome of the 
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company’s project. In his first model, asymmetric information is incorporated into Heaton’s 
(2002) model and does not consider the role of free cash flow. His result demonstrates that 
overconfident managers use more debt and that results in increasing the probability of financial 
distress. Hence, overconfidence is bad for a firm. Unlike his finding in the asymmetric model, his 
moral hazard model (similar to Hackbarth, 2002) shows an ambiguous relationship between 
overconfidence and firm value. That is, the higher level of overconfidence leads manager to exert 
more effort which is beneficial for shareholders but, at the same time, the overconfident manager 
takes more debt which is more likely to increase the probability of financial distress. It is suggested 
by the author that an optimal level of overconfidence exists that would maximise firm’s value. 
Barros and Silveira (2007) examine the influence of CEO overconfidence on corporate’s capital 
structure in Brazilian listed-firms. They find that firms managed by overconfident managers are 
more levered compared to those manage by rational peers. More recently, Malmendier et al. 
(2011) study the effect of overconfidence on corporate financing decisions. Their results reveal 
that managerial overconfidence explains corporate financing policy. Specifically, they find that 
overconfident managers prefer to use internal funds or riskless debt as a source of finance. Also, 
they detect that once it comes to choosing between debt and equity to raise funds, overconfident 
managers prefer debt over equity. 
Ben-David et al. (2013) survey firms’ CFOs to investigate the effect of CFOs overconfidence on 
corporate financial decisions. They find that an overconfident manager underestimates the 
volatility of future cash flows, leading him to use lower discount rate; engages more in mergers; 
invests heavily on capital expenditures; and their firms have high debt and rely more on long term 
debt. Graham et al. (2013) conduct a survey amongst US and non-US firms’ CEOs and CFOs and 
find that firms with optimistic CEOs use more short-term debt. 
Furthermore, managerial overconfidence is found to explain merger and acquisitions decisions. 
Roll (1986) is the first to introduce managerial overconfidence into the context of mergers and 
acquisitions. Specifically, his uses overconfidence to explain why many takeovers are value 
destroying. He argues that when manager faces uncertainty about future outcomes, he is more 
likely to behave in an irrational way. According to his hubris hypothesis, overconfident managers 
overpay for target firms because they believe that their valuation is correct and the markets do not 
fully reflect firm’s value. 
Doukas and Petmezas (2007) examine the relationship between managerial overconfidence and 
mergers conducted by listed firms in the UK for the period from 1980 to 2004. They find that 
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firms with overconfident managers exhibit positive but lower announcement returns and poorer 
long-term performance than those with rational counterparts. Malmendier and Tate (2008) 
examine the impact of overconfident managers on merger decisions on 477 largest US companies 
from 1980 to 1994. Their findings show that overconfident managers overpay for acquired firms 
and hence engage in value-destroying mergers. Also, they affirm that firms with overconfident 
managers suffer from negative stock returns following the announcement of acquisitions. 
Likewise, Liu and Taffler (2008) empirically study the correlation between overconfident 
managers and mergers and acquisitions in the US for the period from 1993-2005. Their study 
involves over 30,000 CEOs who conduct more than 1,900 mergers and acquisitions. Their results 
show that overconfident managers are more likely to acquire firms than rational peers and this 
relation becomes stronger in recent years. Also, they affirm that firms run by overconfident 
managers exhibit poor short and long run performance post-acquisition compared with those run 
by rational peers. Further, they detect that effective corporate governance cannot fully mitigate the 
problem associated with overconfident managers on merger and acquisitions decisions. Likewise, 
Brown and Sarma (2007) obtain similar results in Australian firms. 
In the UK, Croci et al. (2010) compare the bidders' performance in high and low markets 
evaluation between firms run by overconfident and rational managers. Their study involves a 
sample of over 3000 mergers and acquisitions over the period 1990-2005. Their measure of 
overconfidence is similar to Malmendier and Tate (2008). They find that rational managers create 
more value to shareholders through mergers and acquisitions than overconfident managers in all 
valuation periods. Further, after takeovers, firms with rational managers experience a better long 
term performance compared to those run by overconfident peers. Following the prior works, Ferris 
et al. (2013) study the extent to which overconfidence can explain international mergers and 
acquisitions during the period 2000-2006. They find that an examination of overconfident CEOs 
can explain the number of takeovers, diversifying and non-diversifying acquisitions, and 
overconfident manager prefers internal funds as a primary financing vehicle. 
In summary, most of the existing literature on behaviour corporate finance studies the effect of 
managerial overconfidence or optimism on financing and investment decisions. Overall, these 
studies find that overconfident managers; (1) are more likely to increase debt; (2) prefer internal 
fund over external, and debt over equity (following pecking order theory) and may pass up positive 
net present value projects if their firms do not have sufficient internal funds to cover firms' 
investment; (3) investment decisions are very sensitive to the free cash flow; (4) they conduct 
many mergers and acquisitions; and (5) their M&A decisions have a negative impact on firms’ 
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value and stock price in short and long run. However, there is little work investigating the impact 
of overconfidence on corporate payout policy, which is discussed in the subsequent section. 
2.4.2.2 Managerial overconfidence and payout policy 
Recently, emerging research in behavioural corporate finance examines the effect of managerial 
overconfidence on payout policy. Wu and Liu (2008) theoretically examine the impact of 
managerial overconfidence on corporate dividend policy. Their model is built on Miller and 
Rock’s (1985) dividend policy model assuming that agency problems do not exist and that the 
CEO's goal is to maximise firm value, with some further relaxation by incorporating some degree 
of overconfidence in the process of determining firm’s future earnings. In their model they define 
an overconfident manager as the one who overestimates his ability to maintain transitory earnings. 
They show that overconfident CEOs pay high dividends compared with rational CEOs, as they 
wrongly assess the permanent and transitory component of earnings. Furthermore, the study 
demonstrates that in an expanding (down-turning) economy, overconfident managers increase 
(decrease) the firm’s value. 
However, the other studies that examine the association between managerial overconfidence and 
dividend policy reveal opposite results. Ben-David et al. (2007) conduct a quarterly survey of 
Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) in the US, and find that overconfident managers are less likely to 
pay dividends and more likely to repurchase shares. Cordeiro (2009) argues that overconfident 
managers always believe their firms to be undervalued by the markets, such managers 
overestimate the returns from current projects, and/or believe that their firms have good 
investment opportunities. Therefore, overconfident managers prefer not to pay dividends to 
shareholders. Using data from the US for the period from 1980 to 1994, Cordeiro finds that firms 
with overconfident CEOs are less likely to pay dividends compared with those run by rational 
peers. However, no conclusion is made with regard to the impact of overconfidence on the amount 
of dividends. 
Over the same period, Bouwman (2009) investigates the market’s reaction to dividend changes, 
and the relationship between dividend changes and future earnings in the presence of 
overconfident and rational managers. She argues that if managers use dividend announcements to 
convey information about future earnings, investors should react positively to dividend increases. 
However, if investors can distinguish between overconfident and rational managers then it would 
be expected that the market will react positively to rational managers’ announcements. Her 
findings reveal that there is a greater abnormal return following the announcement of dividend 
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increases for optimistic managers compared to rational managers; this has been attributed by the 
author to the inability of the markets to distinguish between overconfident and rational managers. 
Moreover, the study detects that whether firms are run by overconfident or rational CEOs, 
dividend changes have little informational content about future earnings.  
More recently, Deshmukh et al. (2013) develop a dynamic model of dividend policy and 
overconfident managers, and empirically test it in the US over the period from 1980 to 1994. Their 
model builds on the assumptions that overconfidence CEOs view internal funds as less costly than 
external financing, overestimate the value of future projects and work toward maximising 
shareholders’ value. Their model demonstrates that because overconfident CEOs believe that 
future investments are value enhancing, they are more likely to lower dividends than rational peers 
in order to build financial slack to invest in future projects. The model further indicates that the 
effect of managerial overconfidence on dividends is weaker in high growth firms. Their empirical 
findings on the effect of managerial overconfidence on the amount of dividends are consistent 
with their theoretical predictions. More precisely, they affirm that overconfident CEOs pay less 
dividends than rational counterparts. Also, they show that in high growth firms, the impact of 
overconfidence on dividend policy is mitigated. However, firms’ total payout and share 
repurchases are found to be unaffected by the types of managers. 
Using very recent data between 1992 and 2010, Burg et al. (2012) investigate the impact of 
managerial overconfidence on corporate payout policy (i.e., dividends, share repurchases and total 
payout) in the US. More specifically, they study the change in the payout policy around CEO 
turnover by employing a difference-in-difference methodology. They based their predictions on 
the intuition that since overconfident managers believe their firms to be undervalued and view 
external finance to be very costly, they are more likely to buy back firms’ shares and to pay less 
dividends compared to rational peers. Their results indicate that incoming overconfident CEOs are 
more likely to change firms’ payout channel. That is, firms with new overconfident managers 
increase their share repurchases, whereas no effect on share repurchases ratio is found when the 
new CEOs are rational. Further, they detect an increase in cash dividends among firms with new 
overconfident managers but this increase is lower than firms with rational managers. For the total 
payout, they find insignificant differences between rational and overconfident managers. 
Shu et al. (2012) evaluate the effect of overconfident managers on scale, execution rate and 
frequency of over 2700 share repurchase programs in Taiwanese listed firms from 2000-2008. 
They find that firms run by overconfident managers tend to have a higher execution rate and invest 
more in share repurchases than those run by rational counterparts. Surprisingly, they find that firms 
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with high market-to-book ratios are managed by overconfident CEOs. This implies that 
overconfident managers buy back shares not because of undervaluation.  Further, they show that 
there is a negative abnormal return following the announcement of share repurchases programs by 
overconfident managers. 
In the UK, Andriosopoulos et al. (2013) study the relationship between information disclosure, 
managerial overconfidence and buyback completion rate over the period from 1997 to 2006. Their 
measure of overconfidence is similar to Malmendier et al. (2011) which classifies CEOs as 
overconfident if they keep holding in the money options (at least 40% in the money) at any point 
until the year of expiration. Their results indicate that information disclosure and overconfidence 
are positively correlated with buyback completion rate.  
A very recent study by Banerjee et al. (2014) examines the effect of managerial overconfidence 
on share repurchases in the US during the period from 1992 to 2011. Their results show that 
overconfident CEOs are more likely to repurchase shares and invest more on shares repurchases. 
Further, they find that this relation exacerbates amongst overconfident CEOs who are entrenched. 
They also detect that overconfident CEOs substitute repurchase for dividends and capital 
expenditure, and the market reaction to the announcement of share repurchases is less pronounced. 
In a developing market, Azouzi and Anis (2012) examine the influence of managerial emotional 
biases, i.e. loss aversion, optimism and overconfidence, on dividend policy in Tunisian firms. 
Their study involves 100 executives from both listed and non-listed companies. They find that 
emotional biases of CEOs negatively affect corporate dividend policy. In another emerging market 
(Pakistan), Rasheed et al. (2012) study the relationship between managerial overconfidence and 
dividend policy. The results contradict most previous works, showing that overconfident CEOs 
pay more dividends.10 In China, Chen et al. (2011) investigate the influence of overconfident 
managers and managerial discretion on dividend policy among 745 listed firms. Consistent with 
studies in developing markets, they detect a negative association between overconfidence and the 
amount of dividends. Furthermore, their results show that this relation is strengthened by duality 
and cash flow and weakened by state ownership and political connection.  
2.4.2.3 Is Overconfidence in CEOs always bad?  
Numerous empirical studies show that managerial overconfidence may lead to distortions in 
corporate investment decisions: overconfident CEOs are shown to have higher investment 
                                                 




sensitivity to free cash flow (e.g., Lin et al., 2005; Malmendier and Tate, 2005a; Huang et al., 
2011); engage more in acquisitions and over-pay for target firms (Liu and Taffler, 2008; 
Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Ferris et al., 2013); are more likely to misreport earnings ( Schrand 
and Zechman, 2012); and are more likely to issue biased earnings forecasts  (Hribar and Yang, 
2010). Overall, these studies demonstrate that overconfident CEOs are bad for firms. 
However, several studies suggest that overconfident CEOs can have positive effects on firms’ 
value. For example, Bernardo and Welch (2001) address theoretically the question of why 
overconfidence exits. Their model demonstrates that overconfident managers prefer not to imitate 
their peers and are more likely to explore their environment better than rational managers. 
Fairchild (2009) develops a model of managerial overconfidence, moral hazard and excessive life-
cycle debt sensitivity. He demonstrates that overconfidence leads managers to exert more effort 
and hence increase firm’s value. Gervais et al. (2011) show that risk averse overconfident CEOs 
hesitate less before taking risky projects, exert more effort and enhance shareholders’ value. The 
model of Goel and Thakor (2008) reveals that moderate overconfidence encourages risk averse 
CEOs to pursuing risky projects and mitigating the under-investment problems, hence, increasing 
firm value. Campbell et al. (2011) find empirical evidence for Goel and Thakor’s (2008) model. 
More specifically, Campbell et al. (2011) show that a moderate level of overconfidence leads 
managers to choose the best investment level that maximise firms’ value. 
Galasso and Simcoe (2011) detect that firms with overconfident CEOs are better than those with 
rational peers in terms of investing in innovation and taking their firms into new technological 
directions. Likewise, in the recent study of Hirshleifer et al. (2012), they empirically investigate 
the benefits of having overconfident CEOs in the US between 1993-2003. They find that 
overconfident managers take risky projects, invest heavily in innovation, obtain more patents and 
patent citations and achieve greater innovation success.  
2.4.2.4 Managerial Overconfidence proxies 
Since overconfidence is an unobservable characteristic, researchers have employed different 
measurements of managerial overconfidence. Those proxies can roughly be classified based on 
four categories: CEOs options, press releases, surveys of top executives, and earnings forecasts. 
A large amount of studies use the exercise of managerial vested stock options in their own firms 
to capture their belief about their companies. For example, the “Longholder”, an overconfidence 
proxy, is based on the timing of option exercise by CEOs and is employed in many recent studies 
(e.g., Malmendier and Tate 2005a, 2008: Croci et al., 2010; Campbell et al., 2011; Hirshleifer et 
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al. 2012; Ahmed and Duellman 2013; Banerjee et al., 2014). The Longholder measure of 
overconfidence is proposed by Malmendier and Tate (2008) which is defined as a dummy variable 
that is equal to 1 if the CEO at least once during his tenure hold an option (at least 40% in the 
money) until the last year. Since the CEO is exposed to firm specific risk and his human capital is 
linked to firm’s performance, he should diversify his wealth by cashing options and investing 
elsewhere. However, if the CEO fails to exercise in the money options, this provides an indication 
that he is overconfident about the future value of his company. 
The press release measure is based on outside perception (newspapers) about CEOs actions, 
behaviour and attitude which has been adopted in the recent works of Malmendier and Tate 
(2005b), Jin and Kothari (2008), Hirshleifer et al. (2012) and Banerjee et al. (2014). This proxy is 
constructed through collecting data from the press on each CEO during a sample period. CEOs 
are classified as overconfident if the number of articles that refer to the CEO as confident, 
confidence, optimistic and optimism are greater than those that refer to the CEO as not confident, 
not optimistic, reliable, cautious, conservative, practical, frugal and steady. 
The survey-based approach has been used by Ben-David et al. (2007, 2013) where they classify 
CFOs as overconfident based on their miscalibration of stock market forecast. Oliver (2005) uses 
the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index to proxy managerial overconfidence. Other 
studies such as Lin et al. (2005), Li and Tang (2010) and Huang et al. (2011) capture managerial 
overconfidence through earnings forecasts.  
A study of Barros and Silveira (2007) classify manager as overconfident based on whether a 
manager is an entrepreneur or not.  Doukas and Petmezas (2007) and Billett and Qian (2008) 
identify a manager as overconfident when he conducts five or more acquisitions in a short span. 
CEOs net purchases of their firms’ stock is also used to proxy overconfidence (Malmendier and 
Tate, 2005a; Campbell et al., 2011). 
Although different proxies of managerial overconfidence are developed in the corporate finance 
literature, the option-based measure seems to dominate other measures. Most of the previous 
studies in the UK adopt this measure in testing the effect of managerial overconfidence on 
corporate financial policy (e.g., Croci et al., 2010; Andriosopoulos et al., 2013). This is the 






3. Chapter 3: Do dividends provide information about earnings? Evidence 
from Oman11 
3.1 Introduction 
Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) famous dividend irrelevance theorem stated that, under perfect 
market conditions, firm value is unaffected by a firm’s dividend policy.  Starting from the 
observation that, in practice, investors tend to react positively to corporate announcements of 
dividend increases, there has been much theoretical and empirical work attempting to understand 
the relationship between dividends, corporate performance, and stock prices. Two major 
assumptions driving the MM irrelevance theorem were that a) a firm’s management is purely 
interested in maximising shareholder value (no agency problems) and b) corporate insiders and 
outsiders share the same information about the firm’s operations and prospects (the ‘symmetric 
information’ assumption). Subsequent theoretical research has paved the way for two competing 
explanations of the positive effects of dividends on firm value: a) the free cash-flow hypothesis 
(related to models of agency problems), and the signalling hypothesis (related to models of 
asymmetric information).12   
Under the signalling hypothesis, it is argued that dividend increases contain positive informational 
content about future earnings. Thus, dividends and earnings should be positively correlated. 
Furthermore, following an announcement of a dividend increase, current share prices should 
immediately move upwards. Under the free cash flow hypothesis, it is argued that dividend 
increases reduce managerial incentive problems by reducing the free cash flow available for 
managers to waste on value-reducing activities. Therefore, as with the signalling hypothesis, 
dividends, earnings, and share price movements should be positively correlated. 
Empirical tests of these hypotheses tend to focus on two factors: a) the effect of dividends on stock 
prices (that is, market reaction to dividends), and b) the relationship between dividends and 
earnings. The empirical analysis in the US, and other developed markets, suggests that dividend 
changes are positively associated with stock price adjustment in the same direction (e.g., Pettit, 
1972; Aharony and Swary, 1980; Kane et al., 1984; Nissim and Ziv, 2001; Gunasekarage and 
Power, 2002; Harada and Nguyen, 2005; Lie, 2005; Dasilas and Leventis, 2011), supporting the 
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specialist) from the Muscat Security Market for providing the data. Any errors are our own. 
12 In addition to the signalling and free cash flow hypotheses, there is emerging research in other theoretical directions, 




signalling hypothesis. However, when considering the relationship between dividend changes and 
future earnings, the evidence is mixed. Much of the recent work in this area rejects the dividend 
signalling hypothesis (e.g., Benartzi et al., 1997; Grullon et al., 2005).  
Aggarwal et al. (2012) argue that the inconclusive results on the relationship between dividends 
and future earnings in the previous studies might occur due to the variation in asymmetric 
information among public firms, which insufficiently provides adequate testing power in the US. 
They use a sample of foreign firms that cross-list on the US stock market in the form of American 
Depository Receipts (ADRs) which represents firms with poor information environment. Their 
results reveal a strong association between dividend increases and future earnings among those 
firms, which is in line with the signalling hypothesis. 
While most of these studies have been conducted in the US (e.g., Aharony and Swary, 1980; 
Nissim and Ziv, 2001) and other developed markets (e.g., Harada and Nguyen, 2005; Dasilas and 
Leventis, 2011), much less consideration has been given to developing markets where financial 
and institutional characteristics differ significantly. In this paper, we address this gap by examining 
the relationship between dividend changes and past, current, and future earnings in firms listed in 
the Muscat Securities Market (MSM). We employ various methods of estimating unexpected 
earnings, based on the works of Benartzi et al. (1997), Nissim and Ziv (2001) and Grullon et al. 
(2005). 
The unique institutional background in Oman provides us with an opportunity to investigate the 
information content of dividend changes, and the factors that drive the change in dividends. 
Specifically, in Oman there is no tax on dividends and capital gains (Al-Yahyaee et al., 2011) 
which allows us to re-test the tax based signalling hypothesis (Black, 1976).13  A signal has to be 
costly to be of any value. According to this hypothesis, in the absence of tax, dividends are not a 
credible signal with respect to firm prospects in the Omani market. Moreover, firms in Oman 
change their dividends frequently (see Table 3.1), suggesting that dividend changes lose their 
reliability as a signal of a firm’s future prospects (Chen et al., 2002). Furthermore, Omani firms 
depend heavily on bank financing and have a high ownership concentration (Al-Yahyaee et al., 
2011). This suggests that the cash flow problems regarding overinvestment, and the conflict of 
interest between managers and shareholders would be mitigated. Thus, there should be little role 
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for the free cash flow hypothesis, and dividend changes should have weak correlation with future 
earnings changes. 
On the other hand, Omani firms may use dividend changes as a signal of the firms' future 
profitability for many reasons. In contrast to the U.S. market, Oman has low corporate disclosure 
requirements and low transparency (Islam, 2003), unpublished earnings forecasts and very few 
professional analysts (Al-Yahyaee et al., 2011). These features suggest a poor information 
environment in Oman which might provide an incentive for firms to use dividends to convey 
information about the earnings quality of a firm (Skinner and Soltes, 2011; Aggarwal et al., 2012). 
Our analysis of the relationship between dividends and profitability in Oman complements a recent 
study by Al-Yahyaee et al. (2011). These authors examine the link between dividends and stock 
prices in Oman. They test the signalling theory by analysing the effect of dividend increases on 
stock price movements (that is, investors’ reactions to dividend announcements).  They find a 
positive relationship between dividend announcements and stock prices, in support of the 
signalling theory. In contrast, we test the signalling hypothesis by analysing the relationship 
between dividend announcements and past, current and future profitability. Besides Al-Yahyaee 
et al. (2011), we are aware of one other published study that examines dividend policy in Oman.  
Al-Yahyaee et al. (2010) estimate the Lintner model for the period 1989-2004 and conclude that 
Omani firms follow a dividend-smoothing policy.    
Our results are consistent with earlier studies in the U.S. documenting that dividend changes are 
not correlated with future profitability changes. Using matched-sample approaches, we find that 
dividend changes are highly correlated with past and current profitability changes. In testing the 
signalling hypothesis, our results reveal that current changes in dividends are associated with 
future adjusted profitability changes in year two only for the case of dividend decreases and 
omissions. However, this relationship holds for one measure of profitability only. Further, the 
linear model provides little support for the information content of dividends for the case of 
dividend decreases. More importantly, after controlling for the nonlinearity in the earnings pattern, 
we find no evidence of a correlation between dividend changes and future profitability changes.  
These findings suggest that the unique market characteristics of Oman (no tax on dividends, high 
share ownership concentration, heavy reliance on bank financing, and frequent dividend policy 
changes), lead to a diminished role for the dividend signalling hypothesis in this environment. 
However, our results show a strong association between dividend changes and changes in current 
profitability. Furthermore, the results provide no support to the argument suggested by Aggarwal 
et al. (2012) that firms in a poor information environment have more incentive to use dividend 
increases to signal their future prospect. 
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In addition to examining the association between dividend changes and future profitability 
changes, we investigate the factors that lead to dividend changes in the Omani market. Not 
surprisingly, the results show that current and past profitability changes are positively associated 
with dividend changes, increases and decreases in Omani firms.  
The results also reveal that leverage (dividend yield) is positively (negatively) correlated with the 
amount of dividend changes and increases. Furthermore, our findings show that market to book 
ratio, firm age, and current and past change in retained earnings are insignificantly associated with 
the magnitude of dividend changes and increases in Oman. For dividend-decreasing firms, we 
observe that all control variables are insignificantly associated with the amount of dividend 
decreases, except current changes in retained earnings. These results stand in a sharp contrast to 
the life cycle theory (Grullon and Michaely, 2002; DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2006). 
Our investigation of the factors that influence the likelihood of firms to change (increase or 
decrease) dividends in Oman reveals the following. We find that current and past profitability 
affects the propensity of firms to change dividends. Furthermore, the propensity of firms to 
increase dividends is positively related to firm size and negatively related to leverage, dividend 
yield and current change in retained earnings. Current investment reduces the propensity of Omani 
firms to decrease dividends while market to book ratio, dividend yield and firm age increase this 
propensity. 
Our study provides several contributions to the literature. Firstly, we provide evidence on the tax-
based signalling model (Black, 1976). We show that, in a market where dividends are not tax-
disadvantaged relative to capital gains, there is no evidence of the signalling hypothesis (in relation 
to future earnings): this is consistent with Kuo (2013) who finds a significant (insignificant) 
relationship between taxable (untaxable) stock dividends and future earnings in Taiwan. The 
second contribution is related to the information content of dividend in a poor information 
environment. We show that, even though Oman has a poor information environment, which is 
more likely to encourage firms to use dividends to signal their future prospect (Aggarwal et al., 
2012), there is no evidence of the signalling hypothesis in terms of Omani firms employing 
dividends to signal future earnings. This sheds light on the difference in corporate dividend policy 
between developed and developing countries. Thirdly, our work complements Al-Yahyaee et al 
(2011), who, similar to us, test the tax-based dividend signalling hypothesis in Oman, but they 
focus on the signalling effects of dividend changes on stock prices in the Omani market. 
Interestingly, they find a positive relationship between dividend changes and stock prices, which 
provides support for the signalling hypothesis. In contrast, we find no evidence of any significant 
link between dividend changes and future earnings, being in conflict with the dividend signalling 
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hypothesis.14 Finally, our conclusion about the strong relationship between dividend changes and 
current profitability changes enable us to understand why firms in Oman frequently change their 
dividends.  Therefore, our study provides practical applications for managers, investors as well as 
practitioners with regard to the announcement of dividend changes in Omani market.    
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the theoretical and 
empirical studies related to this paper. In section 3.3, we develop our hypotheses. Section 3.4 
describes the sample and provides descriptive statistics. Section 3.5 presents the empirical 
findings. Section 3.6 concludes the paper. 
3.2 Theoretical and empirical studies 
Following Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) dividend irrelevance theorem, much theoretical work 
has been conducted in order to understand the rationale behind corporate dividend policy, and, in 
particular, the evidence that the stock market reacts positively to dividend increases. Much of this 
work focuses on two main hypotheses; a) that dividends provide positive signals about firms to 
the market in the face of asymmetric information between managers and investors (the signalling 
hypothesis), and b) that dividends alleviate agency problems by reducing the free cash flow 
available to self-interested managers (the free cash flow hypothesis). Recently, additional theories 
have also been developed to explain the variation of dividends across firms, such as the life cycle 
theory.15  
3.2.1 The signalling theory 
The signalling theory of dividends suggests that a firm’s dividends are used to convey information 
about the firm’s future prospects, and tax on dividends makes the signal more informative 
(Bhattacharya, 1979; John and Williams, 1985). There are an increasing number of empirical 
studies examining the relationship between dividend changes and earnings. This is an interesting 
area of research, as existing studies (e.g., Allen and Michaely (2003), among others) reveal mixed 
conclusions. 
Dividend changes are found to have no information content about future earnings changes in many 
empirical studies (e.g., Watts, 1973; Gonedes, 1978; Benartzi et al., 1997; DeAngelo et al., 1996). 
                                                 
14 We identify this as an interesting, and under-researched, area of scholarly enquiry into dividend signalling: existing 
studies tend to support the dividend signalling hypothesis when considering the relationship between dividend 
announcements and stock price reactions. However, in contrast, the signalling hypothesis is largely unsupported 
when considering the evidence on the relationship between dividends and future earnings.  In our conclusion, we 
discuss this further as an exciting area for future research. 
15 For a comprehensive review of the relevant literature see section 2.1.3. 
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On the other hand, the earlier works of Nissim and Ziv (2001), Chen and Wu (1999), and Harada 
and Nguyen (2005) provide evidence of the signalling theory of dividends. 
Grullon et al. (2005) state that the mixed evidence revealed in previous studies may be attributed 
to the different methods that have been used to estimate the expected earnings.  After controlling 
for the nonlinearity of earnings expectations, Grullon et al. (2005) document that dividend changes 
are not correlated with future earnings changes.  
A recent study by Aggarwal et al. (2012) argues that the inconclusive findings in the previous 
literature on the relationship between dividend changes and future earnings might be attributed to 
the information environment. Their study show that firms existing in a poor information 
environment (i.e., high asymmetric information) use dividends to signal their future prospects.  
3.2.2 The agency theory   
Corporate dividend policy can play a crucial role in aligning the interests of managers to those of 
shareholders. Managers distribute dividends to commit not to use firms’ free cash flows in private 
benefits and to eliminate the overinvestment problem (Jensen, 1986; Lang and Litzenberger, 1989; 
Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2003). Furthermore, paying large dividends forces managers to seek external 
finance for new projects, which imposes further monitoring by the capital market (Easterbrook, 
1984).  
In the presence of high owernship concentrations, that sufficiently monitor manager’s actions, 
dividends may not be an appropriate device to mitigate the agency problems (Bartram et al., 2012). 
However, this evidence is contradicted by the earlier studies of Fluck (1999) and Faccio et al. 
(2001) which show that firms with large outside shareholders pay more dividends. 
Leverage is another mechanism that may align managers’ interests to those of shareholder and 
hence could be viewed as a substitute for dividends (e.g., Jensen, 1986; Margaritis and Psillaki, 
2010).  
3.2.3 The life cycle  
The life cycle theory presents another explanation of the variations in dividend policy between 
firms. Empirical studies show that, in the early stages, firms tend to pay a low level of dividends, 
as they need to retain cash for growth and investment opportunities. However, as they approach 
maturity, the opposite tendency is found. That is, they are more likely to pay dividends (Fama and 
French, 2001; Grullon and Michaely, 2002; DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2006; Denis and Osobov, 
2008).   
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3.3 Hypothesis development 
In Oman, neither dividends nor capital gains are taxed. As suggested by Al-Yahyaee et al (2011), 
this provides an interesting setting in which to examine the tax based signalling hypothesis, as 
developed by Bhattacharya (1979), and John and Williams (1985). Since dividends are not taxed 
in Oman, we would expect that dividend changes might be less informative about future earnings, 
compared with those in countries where dividends are taxed more heavily than capital gains. In 
contrast, if we find a strong association between dividend changes and future earnings in Oman, 
this would suggest a diminishing role for tax in explanation the signalling hypothesis of dividends 
changes.   
Moreover, the majority of Omani firms are characterised by having a high ownership 
concentration and are highly leveraged (Al-Yahyaee, 2006). These features suggest a diminished 
role for dividends in eliminating the agency conflict between the principal and the shareholder. 
Therefore, the features of Omani market (no tax on dividends and capital gains, high ownership 
concentration and high leverage) suggest that dividends changes in Oman would be expected to 
have no or weak information content about firms’ future prospects.  
Moreover, Al-Yahyaee et al. (2011) find a high propensity for Omani firms to change dividends 
very frequently (that is, every year). This tendency is similar to that reported by Choi et al. (2011) 
using Korean data. However, it conflicts with the pattern observed in the US and other developed 
markets, where firms are less likely to change their dividend levels (e.g., (Benartzi et al., 1997; 
Nissim and Ziv, 2001; Grullon et al., 2005; Andres et al., 2009). This frequent change of dividends 
in Oman may weaken the signalling properties of dividends, and their relationship with future 
profitability. The discussion leads to the following two conflicting hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3.1: Dividend changes are likely to have no or weak information content about firms’ 
future profitability in Oman. 
Hypothesis 3.1 arises from the lack of tax on dividends, and the institutional environment in Oman. 
In contrast to hypothesis 3.1, there is an argument that the Omani corporate environment may lead 
to stronger incentives to use dividends as a signalling device. Survey evidence of Brav et al. (2005) 
reveals that executives in the US do not use dividend as a signalling device when they could 
convey firms’ information to shareholders through alternative less costly channels. Unlike in the 
US and other developed markets, Oman has low corporate disclosure requirements and low 
transparency (Islam, 2003), unpublished earnings forecasting and very few professional analysts 
(Al-Yahyaee et al., 2011). This would suggest a poor information environment in the Omani 
market.  Aggarwal et al. (2012) affirm that firms that exhibit a high degree of asymmetric 
information (i.e. poor information environment) are more likely to use dividends to signal their 
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future profitability. Furthermore, high ownership concentration in Oman may lead firms to pay 
high dividends (Jensen, 1986; Faccio et al., 2001). We formalize this prediction in the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3.2: Dividend changes are likely to have information content about firms’ future 
profitability in Oman. 
The conflicting predictions in hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2 make the Omani market an interesting 
environment for studying the relationship between dividends and earnings. 
3.4 Data  
Our sample consists of Omani non-financial firms announcing cash dividends between the years 
2000 and 2011. Cash dividends, stock dividends and stock splits are gathered from the Muscat 
Securities Market (MSM) website. The data for all other factors (e.g., earnings, market value and 
book value of equity, total assets and retained earnings) are collected from the “Shareholding 
Guide of MSM Listed Companies” and “Key Indicators of Public Joint Stock Companies 
Report”16. Our sample consists of all regular cash dividends (thus excluding stock dividends, stock 
repurchases, stock splits and extra dividends). Our original sample contained 1420 dividend 
changes and non-dividend changes. After imposing the above constraints on the dividend and the 
fiscal year, the resulting sample consists of 599 dividend changes (dividend increases and 
decreases) and 152 non-dividend changes. Table 3.1 provides a list of the variables that we 
consider in this study, together with the acronyms used throughout the paper. 
Table 3.2 Panel A summarizes the distribution of firms with dividend increases, dividend 
decreases, dividend initiations, dividend omissions, and no-change in dividends by year. An 
important stylized fact, reported by Al-Yahyaee et al. (2011), is the high propensity for Omani 
firms to change dividends very frequently (that is, every year). As reported in Table 3.2, 
approximately 83% of Omani companies change their dividend level every year. This tendency is 
similar to that reported by Choi et al. (2011) using Korean data. However, it conflicts with the 
pattern observed in the US and other developed markets, where firms are less likely to change 
their dividend levels (e.g., Benartzi et al., 1997; Nissim and Ziv, 2001; Grullon et al., 2005; Andres 
et al., 2009). Comparing the frequency of dividend increases and decreases by the Omani firms in 
our sample, dividend increases (decreases) account for about 46% (31%), whereas in the US 
market they account for nearly 94% (6%) of the dividend changes  (Nissim and Ziv, 2001). 
                                                 
16 This report can be obtained from the Muscat Security Market (MSM) web site (www.msm.gov.om). It was first 
published in 2009, and it covered a 10 year period for all listed firms in MSM from 2000-2009. The second report 
was released in 2011: it covers the period from 2002 to 2011. Since 2011, no report has been published yet.  
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Another marked difference is that the number of Omani firms that initiate their dividends is higher 
than those that omit their dividends. 
 
Table 3.1. The list of the variables and their definitions 
Name Definitions 
DIVCHG The percentage change in annual dividend payments 
Size Natural logarithm of total assets 
M/B Market value of equity scaled by book value of equity 
Growth Growth in total assets 
LEV Leverage measured as total debt scaled by book value of total assets 
YLD Dividend yield is calculated as dividends in previous year divided by market value of 
equity at the beginning of previous year 
Age Firm maturity is measured as the logarithm of firm age since inception 
ERN Earnings scaled by total assets 
RE/BE Retained earnings over book value of equity 
RETACH Change in retained earnings 
ROE Return on equity calculated as net income scaled by book value of equity 
ROA Return on assets measured as operating income divided by total assets 
ECHG Change in ERN 
EDBV Change in earnings scaled by book value of equity 
EDMV Change in earnings scaled by market value of equity 
ROACHG Change in return on assets (ROA) 
ROECHG Change in return on equity (ROE) 
 
This stands in sharp contrast to the evidence on US firms where firms that omit are more than 
those initiate dividends (e.g., (Michaely et al., 1995; Ho and Wu, 2001). Panel B reports the trends 
in dividend payout policy of Omani firms from 2001 to 2011. It shows that Omani firms distribute 
a large proportion of their earnings as dividends: on average, these firms distribute over 55% of 
their earnings as dividends. 
Table 3.3 presents the descriptive statistics for each dividend group; increases (Panel A), decreases 
(Panel B), no change (Panel C), initiations (Panel D) and omissions (Panel E). The average 
(median) increase in dividends is about 83% (40%) compared with an average (median) decrease 
in dividends of approximately 34% (33%). These findings are in line with Choi et al. (2011), who 
show that dividend increases in Korea are more extreme in magnitude than dividend decreases. 
However, this finding contrasts with the previous studies in the U.S. (e.g., Nissim and Ziv, 2001; 
Grullon et al., 2005), which show that dividend increases are less extreme in magnitude. In our 
analysis, firms that increase dividends have more profit, market to book ratio and growth. 
Dividend decreasing firms are larger, have a higher leverage ratio, are more mature and have a 
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higher dividend yield. Firms that omit dividends have negative profitability and very low growth. 
Firms that initiate dividends are more profitable than dividend-omitting firms. 
Table 3.2. Frequency of firm-year observations and Cash dividends distributions 














2001 18 14 10 8 2 52 
2002 28 15 14 14 4 75 
2003 27 16 14 6 5 68 
2004 35 17 16 10 2 80 
2005 35 22 19 9 7 92 
2006 47 20 15 7 3 92 
2007 54 14 14 12 6 100 
2008 13 40 11 6 21 91 
2009 23 38 19 12 9 101 
2010 39 22 9 12 5 87 
2011 37 25 11 5 9 87 
Total for 
category 
356 243 152 101 73 925 
Panel B. Cash dividends distributions 




No. of firms pay 
Div 
No. of firm not 
paying Div 
2001 63.5 115.5 55 50 45 
2002 76.2 124.6 61 71 40 
2003 90.8 101.6 89 63 35 
2004 101.7 206.9 49 78 36 
2005 138 282 49 85 34 
2006 217.4 423.4 51 89 34 
2007 314 654.5 50 94 28 
2008 265.3 492 54 70 46 
2009 268.8 542.8 50 92 28 
2010 305.5 610.2 50 82 40 
2011 309.9 579.2 54 78 43 
Notes. Panel A shows the number of firm-year observation for each year of the sample for No Change (in dividends), 
Dividend Increases, Dividend Decreases, Dividend Initiation and Dividend Omission. The sample consists of 599 
dividend changes and 152 no dividend changes. Dividend increases (decreases) is defined as the event that firms pay 
more (less) cash dividend than the previous year. Dividend Initiation is defined as the event that firms pay cash dividend 
a hiatus of one year. Dividend Omission is defined as the event that firms cut cash dividend for the first time after paying 
them for at least one year and the firms that chose not to change dividends is defined as No Change. Panel B table reports 
the annual cash dividends for a sample of Omani firms from 2001-2011. Div is the total amount of cash dividends; 






Table 3.3. Descriptive statistics 
 N Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev. 
Panel A: Dividend increases      
DIVCHG 356 0.835 0.400 0.040 36.067 2.667 
Size 356 9.938 9.930 6.753 13.099 1.232 
M/B 356 1.972 1.650 0.209 8.789 1.349 
Growth 356 0.155 0.110 -0.272 2.583 0.286 
LEV 356 0.412 0.410 0.053 0.976 0.215 
YLD 356 0.068 0.060 0.007 0.431 0.043 
Age  356 2.762 2.710 0.693 3.689 0.540 
ERN 356 0.11 0.11 0.01 0.31 0.06 
RETA 356 0.068 0.060 -0.217 0.414 0.077 
ROE  356 0.197 0.180 0.021 0.784 0.107 
ROA 356 0.109 0.110 0.009 0.312 0.057 
Panel B: Dividend decreases     
DIVCHG 243 -0.338 -0.330 -0.778 -0.050 0.176 
Size 243 10.158 10.150 8.006 13.027 1.268 
M/B 243 1.856 1.520 0.377 17.165 1.977 
Growth 243 0.127 0.010 -0.216 5.714 0.618 
LEV 243 0.457 0.460 0.044 0.985 0.232 
YLD 243 0.129 0.080 0.013 1.316 0.195 
Age 243 2.849 2.860 1.792 3.638 0.515 
ERN 243 0.072 0.060 -0.059 0.221 0.049 
RETA 243 0.038 0.020 -0.293 0.283 0.077 
ROE  243 0.153 0.130 -0.238 0.923 0.135 
ROA 243 0.072 0.060 -0.059 0.221 0.049 
Panel C: No change in dividends     
DIVCHG 152 0 0 0 0 0 
Size 152 9.991 9.950 6.742 13.472 1.518 
M/B 152 1.700 1.710 0.208 4.425 0.880 
Growth 152 0.075 0.060 -0.178 0.553 0.133 
LEV 152 0.411 0.410 0.089 0.812 0.205 
YLD 152 0.093 0.070 0.012 0.829 0.125 
Age 152 2.680 2.640 1.386 3.584 0.527 
ERN 152 0.100 0.090 0.010 0.330 0.060 
RETA 152 0.061 0.050 -0.042 0.216 0.063 
ROE  152 0.173 0.146 0.025 0.470 0.088 
ROA 152 0.101 0.090 0.014 0.330 0.063 
Panel D: Dividend initiations     
DIVCHG 101 1 1 1 1 0 
Size 101 9.587 9.580 6.621 12.741 1.462 
M/B 101 1.849 1.180 0.000 21.476 2.968 
Growth 101 0.130 9.000 -0.150 0.646 0.177 
LEV 101 0.448 0.470 0.054 0.990 0.252 
YLD 101 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Age 101 2.524 2.560 0.000 3.497 0.657 
ERN 101 0.090 0.060 -0.050 0.300 0.070 
RETA 101 0.054 0.050 -0.849 0.651 0.177 
ROE  101 0.200 0.160 -0.139 1.127 0.199 
ROA 101 0.089 0.060 -0.051 0.298 0.071 
Panel E: Dividend omissions     
DIVCHG 73 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 
Size 73 9.246 9.140 6.522 13.390 1.533 
M/B 73 1.490 1.230 0.230 4.716 1.080 
Growth 73 0.033 -0.020 -0.394 1.110 0.272 
LEV 73 0.457 0.480 0.049 0.931 0.251 
YLD 73 0.082 0.060 0.011 0.459 0.081 
Age 73 2.843 2.920 1.792 3.526 0.478 
ERN 73 -0.010 0.000 -0.480 0.200 0.110 
RETA 73 -0.061 -0.020 -0.910 0.235 0.198 
ROE  73 -0.009 0.010 -0.910 0.326 0.209 
ROA 73 -0.007 0.000 -0.476 0.202 0.105 
Note. The table presents several characteristics of the sample of Omani firms. It reports the mean, median, maximum, minimum and standard 
deviation of variables for each dividend’s category. All variables are defined in Table 3.1. Panels A, B, C, D and E present the groups of firms 





3.5 Estimation Methods 
The hypotheses developed in section 3.3 are tested using different estimation methods including 
pooled OLS with robust standard errors, the Fama-MacBeth (1973) method and the fixed effects 
with panel data approach.  
3.5.1 Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Regression 
The analysis begins by estimating a sample linear regression: the pooled OLS regression. The OLS 
regression is the common form of a linear regression that applies an ordinary least squares 
approach to predict the variance of the dependent variable (i.e., continuous variable) from linear 
combinations of independent variables (Dougherty, 2007, p 43). This approach will enable us to 
verify our results with similar earlier works in the US (e.g., Benartzi et al., 1997; Nissim and Ziv 
2001). Although this type of regression does not exclude any observations from the analysis and 
is the easiest to run, researchers need to overcome the common problems associated with using 
this method: autocorrelation outliers, multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity. 
An outlier is an observation that is very different from the rest of the sample. On the one hand the 
inclusion of this observation in the regression produces misleading results. One the other hand, 
the exclusion of outliers from the sample reduces the sample size. Winsorisation is a statistical 
technique aiming to reduce the impact of outliers in the sample. This process can be performed in 
two ways: trimming the sample which involves removing a certain percentage of values in one or 
both sides of the distribution, or redefining the most extreme values in the tail(s) of the distribution 
to the closest extreme values (Yale and Forsythe, 1976). The latter technique is used in this study 
to avoid eliminating data from the sample. Specifically, a one percent Winsorisation is used (from 
both side of tails) on all variables. 
Multicollinearity is another problem that leads to bias in the estimated output of the OLS 
regression. It occurs when one or more of the independent variables are highly correlated which 
leads to a number of problems in understanding the significance of the individual predictor 
variables in the regression model. Researchers use a variance inflation factor (VIF) to quantify the 
severity of multicollinearity in OLS analysis. The VIF of a variable must not exceed 10, as a rule 
of thumb, in order to conclude that multicollinearity does not affect the regression outputs. In this 
current study the VIF of predictors are calculated in all models and reveal that the highest value 
of VIF is about 2.16, indicating that multicollinearity is not a major problem in our study. 
Heteroscedasticity occurs when the error term does not have a constant variance. The presence of 
heteroskedasticity causes the estimator to be inefficient. White (1980) developed a test to detect 
the association between the variance of the error term and the predictors. All OLS regressions 
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carried out in this study are estimated with heteroscedasticity-robust Whites’ (1980) standard 
errors (t-statistics). 
3.5.2 Fama-MacBeth (1973)  
This study also uses the Fama and MacBeth (1973) method to investigate the relationship between 
dividend changes and future profitability, similar to the earlier works of Nissim and Ziv (2001) 
and Grullon et al. (2005). This approach accounts for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the 
regression residual: reducing the problems associated with residual cross-sectional regression 
analysis. 
The Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure is performed in two steps: the first step is to estimate 
cross-sectional regression coefficients for all observations in each year; the second step is to 
compute time-series means of the cross-sectional regression coefficients. The autocorrelation in 
the residual over time is corrected via the inclusion lag of dependent and independent variables in 
the cross-sectional regression.17 
The reported regression coefficients in this study are the time-series averages of each year’s cross-
sectional regression coefficients.18 The Hansen and Hodrick (1980) error correction method is 
used to estimate the standard deviations for these averages.   
3.5.3 Fixed/Random effects  
In addition to the above estimation methods, panel data datasets that combine time series and cross 
sections are employed in this chapter as a robustness check on the relationship between dividend 
changes and current and future profitability on Omani listed firms. 
 There are several advantages to using panel datasets, discussed in the econometric literature (e.g. 
Baltagi, 2005; Hsiao, 2003). The panel data accounts for the individual heterogeneity in both the 
cross section and time series: controlling for unobserved variables and variables that change over 
time but not across firms. Also it reduces collinearity among variables. In a panel data setting, 
there are two model specifications that can be used: Fixed or random effects. A Hausman test is 
used to decide between these two models and determine which is preferred. The result of this test 
reveals that errors are correlated with some of the independent variables. 
Therefore, a fixed effects approach using panel data with clustering at the firm level is employed, 
which tackles the unobserved heterogeneity bias. In this study, it explains the variation about the 
mean of the dependent variable (i.e., current and future earnings) in terms of the variations about 
                                                 
17 See Nissim and Ziv (2001) and Grullon et al (2005) for more details. 
18 STATA 13 runs this test automatically using the code: xtfmb. 
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the mean of the predictors’ variables for the group of observations relating to a given firm (e.g., 
dividend changes).  
3.6 Empirical results 
3.6.1 Unadjusted/adjusted profitability changes around dividend changes 
We begin our analysis by examining the profitability performance surrounding dividend changes, 
following the earlier studies (e.g., (Benartzi et al., 1997; Fukuda, 2000; Fairchild et al., 2014). We 
accomplish this by calculating the mean of unadjusted profitability changes for year -2, -1, 0, 1 
and 2 (year 0 is the announcement year) for each dividend category. Then we replicate the same 
analysis using the mean of adjusted profitability changes, defined as the difference between the 
mean of profitability changes for dividend changes and non-dividend changes in the same 
industry. If the profitability follows a random walk, then the mean of profitability changes should 
be equal to zero. Table 3.4 reports the findings under two different panels. Panel A displays the 
mean of unadjusted profitability changes. Panel B shows the mean of adjusted profitability 
performance of dividend changing firms compared with firms that did not change their dividends 
in the same industry. 
3.6.1.1  Unadjusted profitability 
Table 3.4, Panel A, shows that dividend increasing firms have significant and positive profitability 
changes in years -1 and 0. These findings suggest that there is a strong association between 
dividend increases and past and current profitability changes for all profitability measures. This 
trend continues to hold in year 1 for the 𝐸𝐷𝑀𝑉 measure (see Table 3.1 for variable definitions), 
and in year 2 for the 𝐸𝐷𝐵𝑉 measure, indicating a support for the signalling hypothesis for only 
these two measures of profitability.  
Profitability changes of dividend-decreasing firms experience negative growth in year 0, 
significant at the 1% level. In one year prior to dividend decreases (year -1), dividend decreasing 
firms experience significant profitability improvement (for most of our profitability measures). 
For year 1, there is an insignificant growth in profitability of firms that decrease their dividends. 
These results suggest that dividend-deceasing firms are correlated with current profitability 
reduction. 
The mean profitability changes for dividend-initiation firms are positive and highly significant in 
year 0. However, we find no significant increases in profitability before or after the dividend 
initiation. In fact, we observe a negative profitability growth in the year following dividend 
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initiation. This result is inconsistent with Lintner (1956) and Healy and Palepu (1988), who find 
that firms that initiate dividends experience permanent earnings growth.  
Table 3.4. Profitability changes around dividend changes 
  Panel A: Unadjusted profitability changes 
 
Panel B: Adjusted profitability changes 
  Year -2 Year -1 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 
 
Year -2 Year -1 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 
Panel A. Dividend increases (n=356)       
𝐸𝐶𝐻𝐺 0.005 0.025** 0.025** -0.022 -0.01  -0.040* -0.012 0.035*** -0.021 -0.013 
 (0.260) (2.065) (2.429) (-0.984) (-0.350)  (-1.833) (-0.970) (2.711) (-0.924) (-0.456) 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐻𝐺 0.006 0.011** 0.013*** -0.008 -0.004  -0.001 0.006 0.014*** -0.004 0.001 
 (1.008) (2.332) (4.047) (-1.554) (-0.502)  (-0.233) (1.186) (4.417) (-0.663) (0.172) 
𝐸𝐷𝑀𝑉 0.088*** 0.080** 0.049*** 0.015** 0.016  0.063* 0.044 0.028*** -0.001 -0.020* 
 (2.618) (2.558) (7.208) (2.184) (1.552)  (1.878) (1.427) (4.092) (-0.168) (-1.809) 
𝐸𝐷𝐵𝑉 0.020*** 0.024*** 0.030*** 0.009 0.013*  0.003 0.004 0.025*** 0.004 0.001 
 (3.784) (4.552) (8.040) (1.613) (1.769)  (0.503) (0.731) (6.456) (0.690) (0.125) 
            
Panel B. Dividend decreases (n=243)       
𝐸𝐶𝐻𝐺 0.041* 0.018* -0.034*** 0.007 -0.008  -0.009 -0.021** -0.055*** 0.008 -0.011 
 (1.704) (1.839) (-5.402) (0.746) (-0.646)  (-0.361) (-2.117) (-8.701) (0.827) (-0.836) 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐻𝐺 0.019** 0.006 -0.028*** 0.002 -0.002  0.011 0.001 -0.027*** 0.006 0.003 
 (2.009) (1.055) (-8.073) (0.354) (-0.381)  (1.195) (0.014) (-8.038) (1.170) (0.661) 
𝐸𝐷𝑀𝑉 0.070*** 0.047** -0.022*** 0.012 0.006  0.045* 0.011 -0.044*** -0.004 -0.028*** 
 (2.699) (2.467) (-3.494) (1.246) (0.774)  (1.728) (0.588) (-7.125) (-0.417) (-3.413) 
𝐸𝐷𝐵𝑉 0.027*** 0.047** -0.022*** 0.012 0.006  0.009 0.027 -0.028*** 0.007 -0.006 
 (2.740) (2.467) (-3.494) (1.246) (0.774)  (0.905) (1.442) (-4.515) (0.672) (-0.731) 
            
Panel C. Dividend initiations (n=101)       
𝐸𝐶𝐻𝐺 0.028 -0.033 0.141*** -0.065*** 0.001  -0.014 -0.069 0.125*** -0.063*** -0.002 
 (0.662) (-0.480) (3.631) (-3.106) (0.077)  (-0.330) (-0.986) (3.214) (-3.041) (-0.152) 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐻𝐺 -0.006 -0.005 0.065*** -0.032*** 0.008  -0.012 -0.011 0.067*** -0.026*** 0.013 
 (-0.418) (-0.249) (4.052) (-3.165) (0.729)  (-0.916) (-0.536) (4.154) (-2.674) (1.220) 
𝐸𝐷𝑀𝑉 -0.052 0.053 0.332*** -0.088 0.012  -0.075 0.019 0.313** -0.104 -0.025 
 (-0.599) (1.584) (2.696) (-1.299) (0.684)  (-0.878) (0.551) (2.545) (-1.536) (-1.392) 
𝐸𝐷𝐵𝑉 0.009 0.004 0.081*** -0.019** 0.018  -0.008 -0.017 0.075*** -0.023** 0.005 
 (0.582) (0.225) (4.515) (-1.969) (1.547)  (-0.480) (-0.987) (4.195) (-2.492) (0.454) 
            
Panel D. Dividend omissions (n=73)       
𝐸𝐶𝐻𝐺 -0.025 0.129** -0.252** 0.061 -0.025  -0.058* 0.099 -0.262** 0.063 -0.029 
 (-0.786) (2.070) (-2.525) (1.043) (-0.786)  (-1.684) (1.591) (-2.601) (1.085) (-0.915) 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐻𝐺 -0.007 0.042*** -0.125*** 0.064* -0.035*  -0.013 0.036** -0.123*** 0.071** -0.029 
 (-0.555) (2.649) (-3.070) (1.853) (-1.968)  (-1.082) (2.269) (-3.018) (2.041) (-1.649) 
𝐸𝐷𝑀𝑉 0.036 0.152* -0.345** 0.251 -0.123  0.012 0.118 -0.363** 0.235 -0.164 
 (1.453) (1.932) (-2.261) (1.182) (-1.157)  (0.497) (1.501) (-2.386) (1.106) (-1.530) 
𝐸𝐷𝐵𝑉 0.001 0.064*** -0.090*** 0.077** -0.029*  -0.016 0.043* -0.096*** 0.072* -0.041** 
  
(0.079) (2.930) (-4.154) (1.997) (-1.696) 
  
(-1.175) (1.953) (-4.398) (1.891) (-2.459) 
Note. This table shows profitability changes surrounding dividend changes. Panel A displays unadjusted profitability changes for dividend-
changing firms. Panel B shows the adjusted profitability performance of dividend-changing firms calculated as profitability changes for dividend-
changing firms less profitability changes for those firms that did not change their dividends in year 0 in the same industry. *, **, *** indicates 
significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively using a two-tailed t-test for the means. 
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Also, these results do not support Ho and Wu (2001) and Fukuda (2000), who find that dividend-
initiating firms experienced earnings growth in year -1. Dividend omitting firms experience 
significant and negative profitability changes in year 0. However, they have significant positive 
profitability growth in year -1. For year 1, they experience positive profitability growths that are 
significant for two measures of profitability. 
3.6.1.2 Adjusted profitability 
Next, we consider the relation between dividend changes and adjusted profitability changes. The 
results in Panel B of Table 3.4 show that in year 0, dividend increasing firms perform significantly 
better than no-dividend change firms. However, this relationship does not hold before and after 
the dividend changes for most of our measures. Firms that chose to decrease dividends perform 
significantly worse than no-dividend change firms in year 0. The profitability measure (𝐸𝐷𝑀𝑉) 
is negative and significant in year 2 which indicates that firms that decrease dividends experience 
a negative 𝐸𝐷𝑀𝑉  growth in year 2. Dividend-initiating firms experience significant positive 
profitability improvement in year 0, and negatively significant profitability growth in the 
following year, compared to firms that chose not to change their dividend. Dividend-omitting 
firms perform significantly worse than no-dividend change firms in the announcement year (year 
0). However, they experience profitability growth in years -1 and 1.  
Our findings in Panel B reveal a strong relationship between dividend changes and current 
adjusted profitability changes. The signalling hypothesis suggests that changes in dividend should 
be informative about future profitability. On this basis, we find little support for the information 
content of dividend changes. 
3.6.2 Regression analysis 
In this section, we examine the relationship between dividends and profitability in more depth, 
using regression analysis. We begin by using a linear model.  Following the method of  Nissim 
and Ziv (2001), we gradually make the analysis more sophisticated by adding in variables, finally 
splitting the analysis into positive and negative dividend changes. Then we follow Grullon et al. 
(2005) by considering a superior non-linear model. 
3.6.2.1 Linear mean reversion in earnings 
In this section we investigate the link between dividend changes and profitability changes using a 
linear model of profitability expectations. We begin our analysis by examining the relation 
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between dividend changes and current and future profitability changes using the following basic 
model: 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐶𝐻𝐺𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐶𝐻0 + 𝜀𝑡                                             (3.1) 
 
where 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐶𝐻𝐺𝑡 denotes the profitability measures (𝐸𝐷𝐵𝑉, 𝐸𝐷𝑀𝑉, 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐻𝐺 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸𝐶𝐻𝐺) in 
year 0, 1 and 2 , where year 0 is the dividend change year. All variables are defined in Table 3.1. 
The basic assumption of this model is that earnings follow a random walk. 
Table 3.5 reports the OLS pooled regression output with heteroskedasticity robust White's (1980) 
t-statistics for years 0, 1 and 2. The results in Panel A of Table 3.5 show a positive relation between 
dividend changes and all current profitability measures in year 0, where the mean coefficients of 
dividend changes
 
are positive and highly significant at 1%. However, dividend changes have no 
power in predicting future profitability changes in year 1 and 2, indicating that dividend changes 
are not informative about future profitability changes consistent with the earlier studies of Benartzi 
et al. (1997) in the U.S. In Panel B, the coefficients of dividend increases are significantly positive 
with current profitability changes amongst most profitability measures. For year 1 and 2, we find 
a significant negative coefficient in the change of return on equity (𝑅𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐻𝐺) which suggest firms 
experience a reduction on the change in return of equity subsequent to dividend increases: this 
stands in sharp contrast to the signalling theory of dividends. In the case of dividend decreases, 
we find insignificant profitability changes for all years, as shown in Panel C of Table 3.5.19 
However, Nissim and Ziv (2001) argue that the dependent variable 𝐸𝐷𝑀𝑉 in Eq. (3.1) suffers 
from two specification issues. First, dividend changes might be correlated with the dependent 
variable. Second, there may be the omission of important control variables. In addressing these 
issues, they divide the change in earnings by the book value of the equity at the beginning of the 
year instead of the market value of equity, and they include the lagged return of equity (ROEt-1) 
as a control variable. Hence, following Nissim and Ziv (2001), our next step is to add a control 
variable ROEt-1 
in Eq. (3.1) to produce the following model: 
ttt ROEDIVCHEDBV   12010                                                                            (3.2) 
For τ = 1 and 2, where tEDBV  is defined as the annual change in earnings divided by the book 
value of equity at the beginning of the announcement year. 
 
                                                 






Table 3.5. Dividend changes and current and future profitability changes 
Dependent Variables 𝐸𝐷𝐵𝑉  𝐸𝐷𝑀𝑉  𝐸𝐶𝐻𝐺  𝑅𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐻𝐺 
 τ =0 τ =1 τ =2  τ =0 τ =1 τ =2  τ =0 τ =1 τ =2  τ =0 τ =1 τ =2 
Panel A. Dividend changes   
     (n = 599)               
                
Intercept 0.0102*** 0.0131*** -0.00333  0.0249** 0.0308** -0.0270  -0.129 -0.0824 -0.274  -0.00268 -0.0321 -0.0355 
  (3.12) (3.27) (-0.52)  (2.03) (2.51) (-0.80)  (-0.28) (-0.94) (-1.12)  (-0.31) (-1.09) (-0.75) 
DIVCHG 0.0404*** -0.00822 0.00311  0.0996*** -0.0128 0.0282  1.823*** 0.264 -1.781  0.0578*** -0.0203 0.0440 
 (5.53) (-1.27) (0.23)  (3.67) (-0.55) (0.78)  (2.65) (1.32) (-0.93)  (3.84) (-1.38) (0.46) 
Adj.R2 (%) 10.1 0.131 -0.151  4.02 -0.0792 -0.114  0.007 0.008 0.007  3.14 -0.129 -0.0779 
                
Panel B. Dividend increases              
(n = 356)               
                
Intercept 0.0233*** 0.00666 0.00341  0.0298*** -0.00340 -0.000345  0.346*** 0.134*** 0.415  0.00393 -0.0117 0.0119 
 (4.29) (0.74) (0.23)  (2.90) (-0.22) (-0.01)  (4.67) (6.46) (0.50)  (0.28) (-1.04) (0.80) 
DIVCHG 0.0149** 0.00423 -0.0105  0.0356** 0.0277 -0.0285  0.264** 0.0198 -3.311  0.0251 -0.0191* -0.0329** 
 (2.39) (0.55) (-0.47)  (2.45) (1.12) (-0.63)  (2.73) (0.96) (-0.91)  (1.00) (-1.86) (-2.19) 
Adj.R2 (%) 3.81 -0.463 -0.268  6.87 1.45 0.0815  0.055 -0.003 0.006  3.68 0.822 1.09 
                
Panel C. Dividend decreases       
     (n = 243)               
                
Intercept -0.0103 0.0118 0.00811  -0.0204* 0.0150 0.00282  0.451** 0.088* 0.135***  -0.0514** -0.0158 0.0136 
 (-1.32) (0.94) (0.53)  (-1.88) (1.00) (0.09)  (2.10) (1.96) (3.28)  (-2.42) (-0.83) (0.64) 
DIVCHG 0.0258 -0.00613 0.0229  0.0134 0.00615 0.0414  -0.076 -0.073 0.154  -0.00282 -0.0573 0.0665 
 (1.22) (-0.19) (0.51)  (0.46) (0.13) (0.44)  (-1.05) (-0.50) (0.86)  (-0.04) (-0.86) (0.93) 
Adj.R2 (%) 0.265 -1.44 -1.02  -1.21 -1.45 -1.02  0.027 -0.01 -0.01  -1.47 -0.591 0.743 
                                
Note. This table reports the regressions regarding the effects of current and future profitability on dividend changes. Panel A shows the results for all dividend changes. The results for dividend 
increases and decreases are presented in Panels B and C, respectively. The first row represents the coefficient and the second row represents White's (1980) t-statistics for each regression. *,**,*** 
indicates significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Similar to earlier work of Nissim and Ziv (2001) and Grullon et al. (2005), we extend Eq. (3.2) 
further and estimate the following model, which includes dummy variables to allow for different 
coefficients for dividend increases and decreases: 
      
0010010 DIVCHDNCDIVCHDPCEDBV NPt    
       
tt DNCDIVCHDPCEDBVROE    060540312                                      (3.3) 
where DPC0(DNC0) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for dividend increases 
(decreases) and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined as the same as in Eq. (3.2). Following 
Nissim and Ziv (2001) and Grullon et al. (2005), we use the Fama and MacBeth (1973) method 
to account for the problem associated with residual cross-correlation.  
Table 3.6. Dividend changes and future profitability changes 
Dependent variable = EDBVt Panel A   Panel B 
 OLS  CS  OLS  CS 
 τ =1 τ =2   τ =1 τ =2  τ =1 τ =2   τ =1 τ =2 
            
Intercept 0.00696 0.0194*  0.0118 0.0111  0.00963 0.0166  0.0166** 0.00650 
 (0.80) (1.85)  (1.33) (1.06)  (0.98) (1.47)  (3.16) (0.77) 
0DIVCHG
 -0.00394 0.0198  -0.00000125 0.0220  0.00376 0.0365**  -0.00457 0.0507** 
 (-0.58) (1.62)  (-0.00) (1.66)  (0.33) (2.41)  (-0.36) (2.33) 
00 DIVCHGDPC 
       0.0116 -0.0297  0.0286 -0.0658*** 
       (1.26) (-1.29)  (1.47) (-3.50) 
00 DIVCHGDNC 
       -0.0241 -0.0605  0.0124 -0.110 
       (-0.72) (-1.29)  (0.28) (-1.57) 
0ROE  -0.0785***   -0.0854***   -0.0376**   -0.0419  
 (-3.09)   (-5.14)   (-2.28)   (-1.79)  
1ROE   -0.0758**   -0.0791**   -0.0772**   -0.0764** 
  (-2.33)   (-3.18)   (-2.33)   (-2.51) 
0EDBV
 
      -0.394*** 0.0743  -0.312* 0.0639 
       (-3.62) (0.58)  (-1.96) (0.42) 
0DPC        0.00528 0.00644  0.00196 0.0161 
       (0.61) (0.44)  (0.15) (1.28) 
0DNC        -0.0133 -0.00495  0.00204 -0.0130 
       (-0.92) (-0.29)  (0.14) (-0.84) 
            
Year & Industry effects Yes Yes     Yes Yes    
Number of observations 599 599  599 599  599 599  599 599 
R2 0.108 0.0933     0.180 0.104    
Adj. R2 0.0928 0.0770  0.0624 0.0730  0.159 0.0802  0.287 0.183 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0143   0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0037 
Note. This table presents the regression output related to the link between profitability changes and dividend changes. DPC is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 when firm increase dividends, and 0 otherwise. DNC is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when firm decrease 
dividends, and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 3.1. OLS reports the regressions using robust standard error. CS reports the 
regressions based on the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *,**,*** indicates significance levels 
at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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The results in Table 3.6 report the regression outputs from Eq. (3.2) and Eq. (3.3) in Panels A and 
B, respectively. Each panel report two different regression outputs; OLS, which is pooled 
regression with robust standard errors, and CS, which is a cross-sectional regression, following 
Fama and MacBeth’s (1973) methodology. Panel A of Table 3.6 shows that the coefficients of 
dividend changes (𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐶𝐻𝐺0) are insignificant for years 1 and 2 in both the OLS and CS Models. 
Also, 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡 is negative and significant in years 1 and 2 for both models. Thus, the results 
demonstrate the importance of the specification issues, but do not support the information content 
of the dividend hypothesis (in contrast to Nissim and Ziv, 2001).  
The results in Panel B of Table 3.6 reveal that the coefficient of dividend increases is significant 
only in the CS Model in year 2 but with the wrong sign.20 This suggests that firms that increase 
dividends experience a negative growth in profitability in year 2, which is inconsistent with the 
information content of dividend. Panel B also shows no association between dividend decreases 
and future profitability in the subsequent years.21 
We extend our analysis further by including more control variables, similar to the earlier studies 
(e.g., Kato et al., 2002). The dependent variable is the change in profitability (EDBV) in years 1 
and 2, and the dividend change is the main explanatory variable. We include size, asset growth, 
market to book ratio, leverage, dividend yield, firm maturity and change in retained earnings in 
the prior year to the announcement of dividend changes as additional control variables:  
                        
tRETACHGRETACHGAGEYLD    18081716                 (3.4) 
where 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐶𝐻𝐺𝑡 denotes the profitability measures (𝐸𝐷𝐵𝑉) in years 1 and 2 , and year 0 is the 
dividend change year. All other variables are defined in Table 3.1.  
The estimated output of Eq. (3.4) is reported in Table 3.7. The results reveal no significant 
association between dividend changes and future profitability for the following two years as is 
shown in Models 1 and 2. Similarly, the coefficients of dividend increases remain insignificant in 
years 1 and 2 as stated in Models 3 and 4, respectively. We find an association between dividend 
decreases and future profitability in year 1: however, it is negative and significant at 10% (as in 
Model 5). This result indicates that dividend decreases signal a reduction in firms’ profitability in 
                                                 
20 Benartzi et al. (1997) find that the relationship between dividend decrease and earnings in year 1 is significantly 
negative. Similar results are obtained by Kato et al. (2002) for years 1 and 2. These results are inconsistent with the 
dividend signalling hypothesis. 
21 We repeat the same analyses using Eq. (3.1) and (3.2), using fixed effects on panel data with clustering at firm 
level. The estimated coefficients of dividend changes from Eq. (3.1) are statistically insignificant in each of the 
subsequent two years. The regression output from Eq. (3.2) also provides no evidence of the signalling theory of 
dividends in the following two years.  
15141312010   LevMBGrowthSIZEDIVCHPROFCHGt 
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the following year which is in line with the information content of dividends. These findings stand 
in sharp contrast to the recent study of Aggarwal et al. (2012), where they find that dividend 
increases convey information about future profitablity in the case of dividend increases but 
dividend decreases have no association with future profitability.22 
Table 3.7. Dividend changes, future profitability and additional control variables 
Dependent variable = EDBVt 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 τ =1 τ =2 τ =1 τ =2 τ =1 τ =2 
Intercept -0.0149 0.00470 -0.00713 0.00150 0.102 -0.0589 
 (-0.38) (0.10) (-0.12) (0.02) (1.29) (-1.08) 
DIVCH -0.00796 0.0126     
 (-1.16) (1.05)     
DIVINC   -0.00292 -0.00193   
   (-0.22) (-0.08)   
DIVDEC     -0.0732* -0.0118 
     (-1.77) (-0.42) 
Size 0.00434 0.000435 -0.00279 -0.00613 -0.00748 0.00686 
 (0.99) (0.08) (-0.41) (-0.72) (-1.31) (1.47) 
Growth -0.0238 -0.0142 0.0190 0.0158 -0.0106 0.00417 
 (-0.75) (-0.46) (0.34) (0.29) (-0.11) (0.16) 
M/B -0.00391 -0.00262 -0.00677 0.00389 -0.00164 0.00623 
 (-0.95) (-0.62) (-1.33) (0.49) (-0.20) (1.47) 
Lev 0.0312* 0.0255 0.0597 0.0809* 0.000213 -0.0443 
 (1.77) (1.23) (1.45) (1.70) (0.01) (-1.57) 
YLD -0.0721 -0.00569 0.144 0.0969 -0.261** 0.0503 
 (-1.04) (-0.09) (0.62) (0.36) (-2.31) (0.54) 
Age -0.00768 -0.00187 -0.00399 -0.00267 -0.00905 -0.00107 
 (-1.08) (-0.21) (-0.30) (-0.13) (-0.56) (-0.09) 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐻 -0.0765*** 0.0202 -0.0711 -0.281 -0.204 0.0286 
 (-2.83) (0.60) (-0.41) (-1.52) (-1.63) (0.37) 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐻−1 -0.0207 0.0197 -0.0359 -0.0441 -0.157 -0.00121 
 (-1.03) (0.76) (-0.62) (-0.42) (-1.55) (-0.02) 
Year & Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 599 599 356 356 243 243 
R2 0.112 0.0704 0.152 0.192 0.466 0.333 
Adj. R2 0.0867 0.0438 0.0598 0.104 0.318 0.149 
p-value 0.0000 0.0001 0.0028 0.0008 0.0000 0.0002 
Note. This table reports the estimated outputs regarding the link between future profitability (at year 1 and 2) and 
all dividends changes (DIVCHG), dividend increases (DIVINC) and dividend decreases (DIVDEC), by also 
considering some control variables. All variables are defined in Table 3.1. The figures in parentheses are the t-
statistics. *,**,*** indicates significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
                                                 
22 We obtain similar results when using other measure of profitability (EMV). 
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Our results in this section show a strong association between dividend changes and changes in 
current profitability. Furthermore, the results provide support to the information content of 
dividends only in the case of earnings decreases in year 1 following dividend decreases in year 0. 
3.6.2.2 The non-linear model 
 Grullon et al. (2005) argue that the linear analysis in the previous section is likely to produce 
biased results because it assumes uniformity of the mean reversion and the level of autocorrelation 
across all observations. To overcome misspecifications and to control for the non-linearity, they 
suggested the use of the modified partial adjustment model developed by Fama and French (2000) 
as follows: 
0010010 DIVCHDNCDIVCHDPCEDBV NPt     
 0004003021 )( DFEDFEPDFEDDFENDFEDNDFED  
 tCECEPCEDCENCEDNCED   0004003021 )(                        (3.5) 
where DFE0 
is ROE0-E[ROE0]; E[ROE0] is the fitted value from the cross-sectional regression of 
ROE0 on the logarithm of total assets in year -1, the logarithm of the market-to-book ratio in year 
-1, and ROE-1; CE0 
is 0EDBV ; NDFED0(PDFED0) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
if DFE0 
is negative (positive) and 0 otherwise; and NCED0 (PCED0) is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if DFE0 
is negative (positive) and 0 otherwise. All other variables are as 
defined as in Eq. (3.3). The mean reversion in tEDBV  is captured by the coefficient 1 . The 
coefficients 2 , 3 and 4 measure nonlinear mean revision in tEDBV  which indicates that the 
reversals are stronger for larger rather than smaller changes in either sign. The coefficient
1
measures the autocorrelation of tEDBV . The coefficients 2 , 3 and 4 measure nonlinearity in the 
autocorrelation of tEDBV . 
Table 3.8 reveals the results for the estimation of nonlinear model in Eq. (3.5). Similar to our 
findings in Table 3.6, we find no evidence of a relationship between dividend changes and future 
profitability changes. The coefficients for positive )( 1P and negative )( 1N dividend changes are 
statistically insignificant in both years following the dividend changes. These results provide no 
support to the signalling hypothesis of dividends in Oman; this is consistent with Grullon et al. 
(2005) in the US.  
Further, the results in Table 3.8 show the importance of the nonlinear model in explaining a large 
fraction of the cross-sectional variation in profitability changes compared to the linear model in 
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Table 3.6. That is, the average adjusted R2 increases from 9.7% to 43% and from 9.3% to 31.6% 
in year 1 and 2, respectively. These results are consistent with Grullon et al. (2005) for the US. 
3.6.2.3 Additional analyses 
In this section, following Grullon et al. (2005), we perform a number of additional analyses to 
verify the robustness of our results by replicating all of the analysis in the previous section, using 
alterative dependent variables that measure firms’ profitability; a) the change in the profitability 
level and b) the future profitability level.  
3.6.2.3.1 Dividend changes and changes in future profitability level 
Instead of the change in earnings scaled by the book value of equity tEDBV , here we use the change 
in ROA as the dependent variable; and ROA, instead of 0EDBV , as the independent variable, and 
we re-estimate all of the regressions in the previous subsection, using the linear and nonlinear 
model as follows: 
00100101 DIVCHDNCDIVCHDPCROAROA NPtt       
  tt
ROAROAROA    )( 10312                                                                 (3.6) 
 
02100100101 ( NDFEDDIVCHDNCDIVCHDPCROAROA NPtt   
0210004003 () NCEDDFEDFEPDFEDDFENDFED  
 tCECEPCEDCENCED   0004003 )                                 (3.7) 
where ROAt is equal to the operating income before depreciation in year t divided by total assets 
at the end of year t. DFE0 
is ROA0-E[ROA0]; E[ROA0] is the fitted value from the cross-sectional 
regression of ROA0 on the logarithm of total assets in year -1, the logarithm of the market-to-book 
ratio in year -1, and ROA-1.CE0 
is ROA0- ROA-1. All other variables are defined the same as Eq. 
(3.5). 
Panels A and B in Table 3.9 summarize the regression results from the linear and nonlinear model 
of profitability, respectively. Panel A shows that in year 1 and 2, the relation between positive 
dividend changes and future profitability is insignificant. Similar results are revealed for negative 
dividend changes. The nonlinear earnings model in panel B suggests that neither the positive nor 
the negative dividend changes are correlated with future changes in profitability. Further, the 
adjusted R2 is much higher in the nonlinear model (Panel B) compared with the linear model in 









Table 3.8. Dividend changes and future earnings changes 
0010010 DIVCHDNCDIVCHDPCEDBV NPt   0004003021 )( DFEDFEPDFEDDFENDFEDNDFED    
                



















𝜆4 Adjusted R2 
τ =1 0.00249 0.00908 -0.0137 -0.0307 0.0199 0.822 -0.0342 0.578* -0.685 6.186** -3.618** 43.60% 
 (0.35) (0.76) (-0.93) (-0.70) (0.12) (0.82) (-0.71) (2.11) (-1.29) (2.40) (-2.41)  
             
τ =2 0.0257* -0.0216 0.00256 -0.193 0.432 0.321 0.00865 0.126 0.0773 -3.556 1.902 31.60% 
 (2.09) (-0.88) (0.09) (-1.05) (0.82) (0.44) (0.08) (0.33) (0.09) (-0.66) (0.89)  
                          
Note. This table reports regressions regarding the link between raw earnings changes and dividend changes. Et
 
is the earnings in year t (year 0 is the event year). B-1 is the book value of equity at 
the end of year -1. DIVCH0
 
is the annual change in cash dividends in year 0. DPC0(DNC0) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for dividend increases (decreases) and 0 otherwise. ROEt 
is earnings in year t divided by the book value of equity at the end of year t. DFE0
 
is ROE0-E[ROE0], where E[ROE0] is the fitted value from the cross-sectional regression of ROE0 on the logarithm 
of total assets in year -1, the logarithm of the market-to-book ratio in year -1, and ROE-1. CE0 is (E0-E-1)/B-1. NDFED0 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if DFE0 is negative and 0 
otherwise. PDFED0 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if DFE0
 
is positive and 0 otherwise. NCED0 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if CE0 is negative and 0 otherwise. 
PCED0 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if CE0 is positive and 0 otherwise. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics computed using White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent 





Table 3.9. Dividend changes and future changes in return on assets (ROA) 
 
Panel  A. Time-series means of the cross-sectional regression coefficients from the linear model 
 









𝛽3  Adjusted R2             
τ =1 0.0146** 0.0138 0.0116 -0.254*** -0.321*** 38.10%       
 (3.13) (1.60) (0.74) (-5.58) (-3.99)        
             
τ =2 0.0214*** -0.00197 -0.0189 0.0935 -0.409*** 26.20%       
 (4.90) (-0.16) (-1.66) (1.40) (-8.09)        
                          
Panel B. Time-series means of the cross-sectional regression coefficients from the nonlinear model 
 
00100101 DIVCHDNCDIVCHDPCROAROA NPtt    0004003021 )( DFEDFEPDFEDDFENDFEDNDFED  
 



















𝜆4 Adjusted R2 
τ =1 -0.00553 0.00619 -0.00666 -0.315 0.470 9.865** -3.133 0.578 -0.815 -6.837** -3.365 53.20% 
 (-1.40) (0.68) (-0.37) (-0.82) (0.78) (3.09) (-0.59) (1.24) (-1.06) (-2.53) (-0.60)  
             
τ =2 0.00977 -0.0212 0.000654 -0.263 0.0831 -0.829 0.929 0.0829 0.500 1.844 0.277 33.60% 
 (1.66) (-1.46) (0.03) (-0.71) (0.11) (-0.18) (0.17) (0.40) (0.67) (0.43) (0.08)  
                          
Note. This table reports regression results relating changes in ROA to dividend changes. ROAt is operating income scaled by total assets at the end of year t. DIVCH0 is the annual change in the cash 
dividend in year 0. DPC0(DNC0) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for dividend increases (decreases) and 0 otherwise. DFE0 is ROA0-E[ROA0], where E[ROA0] is the fitted value from 
the cross-sectional regression of ROA0 on the logarithm of total assets in year -1, the logarithm of the market-to-book ratio in year -1, and ROA-1.  CE0 is ROA0 - ROA-1. NDFED0
 
is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 if DFE0 is negative and 0 otherwise. PDFED0
 
is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if DFE0 is positive and 0 otherwise. NCED0
 
is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if CE0 is negative and 0 otherwise. PCED0
 
is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if CE0 is positive and 0 otherwise. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics computed using 
White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. *,**,*** indicates significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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3.6.2.3.2  Dividend changes and future profitability levels 
In this section, we analyse the relationship between dividend changes and future profitability 
levels to verify our results in the previous sections and to make our findings comparable with the 
earlier study of Grullon et al. (2005) in the US. Using future profitability levels, we re-examine 
the correlation between future profitability levels and changes in dividend, using the following 
two models: 
120010010  tNPt ROEDIVCHDNCDIVCHDPCROE 
 tSIZEMBROEROE    1514103 )log()(                                              (3.8) 
 
0210010010 ( NDFEDDIVCHDNCDIVCHDPCROE NPt  
 0210004003 () NCEDROEROEPDFEDROENDFED  
tSIZEMBCECEPCEDCENCED    12110004003 )log()               (3.9) 
All variables are defined in Table 3.1 and in Eq. (3.5). The results are summarized in Table 3.10. 
Panel A shows that there is no association between dividend changes and the future level of ROE 
in both years using the linear model. Further, consistent with recent studies in the U.S., the 
nonlinear earnings model in panel B of Table 3.10 shows that there is no evidence on the relation 
between past dividend changes and the level of future profitability.  
We repeat the previous analyses using ROA as the dependent variable, instead of ROE and ROA-
1, and ROA0-ROA-1 as the independent variables, instead of ROE-1 and ROE0-ROE-1.  
ttNPt
ROADIVRDNCDIVRDPCROA 120010010  
    1514103 )log()( SIZEMBROAROA                                                    (3.10) 
 
0210010010 ( NDFEDDIVRDNCDIVRDPCROA NPt  
0210004003 () NCEDROAROAPDFEDROANDFED  
tSIZEMBCECEPCEDCENCED    12110004003 )log()              (3.11) 
The estimated outputs of Eq. (3.10) and Eq. (3.11) are reported in Tables 3.11 Panels A and B, 
respectively. The results indicate that the coefficients of positive and negative dividend changes, 
in both the linear and nonlinear models of profitability, are not significant. This suggests that 






Table 3.10. Dividend changes and future changes in return on equity (ROE) 
Panel A. Time-series means of the cross-sectional regression coefficients from the linear model 
 













R2       
  
  
τ =1 -12.73 -0.0587 8.239 -11.83 1.785 8.597 -12.73 38.10%       
 (-1.03) (-0.22) (0.98) (-0.98) (0.81) (1.02) (-1.03)        
               
τ =2 -15.12 -0.839 0.317 -5.701 4.645 2.030 -35.53 32.10%       
 (-1.01) (-1.09) (1.34) (-1.01) (0.98) (1.01) (-0.99)        
                            
Panel B. Time-series means of the cross-sectional regression coefficients from the nonlinear model 
 
0010010 DIVCHDNCDIVCHDPCROE NPt   0004003021 )( ROEROEPDFEDROENDFEDNDFED    
             



















𝜆4 𝜗1 𝜗2 
Adjusted 
R2 
τ =1 -0.167 0.0147 0.395 -0.405 5.90 12.78 0.505 1.014 -4.157 -9.176 -1.732 0.132 0.0386 41.20% 
 (-.087) (0.15) (1.27) (-0.29) (0.81) (0.92) (0.28) (1.80) (-0.97) (-0.84) (-1.75) (0.56) (2.46)  
               
τ =2 -2.938 -1.94 -0.123 3.583 -7.257 -12.34 -1.16 -2.234 3.25 7.67 3.89 -0.335 -0.168 37.50% 
 (-0.93) (-1.63) (-0.98) (0.98) (-.97) (-0.84) (-0.76) (-1.03) (1.00) (0.97) (0.87) (-1.38) (-0.88)  
                            
Note. This table reports regression results relating ROE levels to dividend changes. ROEt is earnings dividend by the book value of equity at the end of year t. DIVCH0 is the annual change in the 
cash dividend in year 0. DPC0(DNC0) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for dividend increases (decreases) and 0 otherwise. CE0 is equal to ROE0 - ROE-1. NDFED0 is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if ROE0 is negative and 0 otherwise. PDFED0 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if ROE0
 
is positive and 0 otherwise. NCED0 is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if CE0 is negative and 0 otherwise. PCED0 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if CE0
 
is positive and 0 otherwise. Log(MB-1) is the logarithm of the market-to-book 
ratio of equity in year -1. SIZE-1 is the logarithm of total assets in year -1. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics computed using White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. 





Table 3.11. Dividend changes and future return on assets (ROA) 
Panel A. Time-series means of the cross-sectional regression coefficients from the linear model 
 













R2       
  
  
τ =1 0.0021 0.0307* -0.0254 0.133** -0.629 0.0363** 0.0028 33.80%       
 (0.08) (2.04) (-0.63) (3.23) (-3.11) (3.46) (0.92)        
               
τ =2 -0.0513 -0.0143 0.00374 -0001 0.0164 0.0076** 0.590*** 37.60%       
 (-1.65) (-0.73) (0.16) (-0.02) (1.51) (2.41) (7.06)        
                    
 Panel B. Time-series means of the cross-sectional regression coefficients from the nonlinear model 
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𝜆4 𝜗1 𝜗2 
Adjusted 
R2 
τ =1 -0.043 0.0012 -0.010 0.887** -0.566 -3.335* -0.494 0.0911 -0.723 -3.872 -1.562 0.0204* 0.0042 41.20% 
 (-1.07) (0.09) (-0.24) (2.25) (-0.88) (-2.00) (-0.31) (0.19) (-0.88) (-1.37) (-0.30) (1.96) (0.85)  
               
τ =2 0.0250 -0.0196 -0.0289 0.688** 0.640 7.683 0.311 -0.294 0.767 0.422 -0.0510 0.0146 -0.0001 40.50% 
 (0.52) (-1.07) (-0.74) (3.33) (1.06) (1.21) (0.24) (-0.58) (1.32) (0.16) (-0.01) (1.05) (-0.01)  
                            
Note. This table reports regressions output relating ROA levels to dividend changes. ROAt is operating income divided by the total assets at the end of year t. DIVCH0 is the annual change in the cash 
dividend in year 0. DPC0(DNC0) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for dividend increases (decreases) and 0 otherwise. CE0 is ROA0 - ROA-1. NDFED0 is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if ROA0
 
is negative and 0 otherwise. PDFED0
 
is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if ROA0
 
is positive and 0 otherwise. NDFED0
 
is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
CE0
 
is negative and 0 otherwise. PCED0 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if CE0 is positive and 0 otherwise. Log(MB-1) is the logarithm of the market-to-book ratio of equity in year -1. 
SIZE-1 is the logarithm of total assets in year -1. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics computed using White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. *,**,*** indicates significance 
levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
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Overall, our analyses provide no support for the signalling theory. Specifically, the results 
indicate that dividend changes are only significantly related to current changes in profitability. 
Hence, our results stand in contrast to the earlier studies of Nissim and Ziv (2001) in the US, 
where they find evidence of the signalling theory, and Aggarwal et al. (2012), where they detect 
that dividend changes are informative about future profitability in a poor information 
environment. Our results are consistent with Grullon et al. (2005), who find strong evidence 
against the signalling hypothesis. Furthermore, the findings are consistent with the tax-based 
signalling hypothesis. 
3.6.3  Determination of dividend changes 
We turn our analysis to investigate factors that affect the amount of dividend changes in Omani 
firms. We include several potential explanatory variables, similar to the previous studies 
(e.g., (Fama and French, 2001; Denis and Osobov, 2008). The dependent variables are: (1) all 
dividend changes, (2) dividend increases and (3) dividend decreases. The explanatory variables 
are current and past change in profitability (EDBV and ECHG), size, age, growth, market to 
book ratio, leverage, dividend yield and current and past change in retained earnings. We 
control for industry and year fixed effects in all regressions. 
1514131210,0   LevMBGrowthSIZEPROFCHGDIVCH tt 
tRETACHGRETACHGAGEYLD    18081716                (3.12) 
The results of the regressions of dividend changes (DIVCHG) on past and current profitability 
changes are presented in Models 1 and 2 of Table 3.12. Our results show that the coefficients 
of past and current profitability measures are positive and highly significant at the 1% level, 
indicating a strong association between the magnitude of dividend changes, and current and 
past profitability changes in Omani firms. Firm size is found to be negative and insignificantly 
correlated with the amount of dividend changes: this is in line with  Fairchild et al. (2014) for 
Thailand.   
The coefficients of Growth (as a measure of firm’s current investment) are positive and 
significant at 5% level in Model 2 when using changes in earnings (ECGH) as a measure of 
profitability. The results further indicate that market to book ratio (M/B) and age are 
insignificantly correlated with the magnitude of dividend changes in Oman: this stands in sharp 
contrast to the findings in developed markets (e.g., Fama and French, 2001; Aggarwal et al., 
2012). These findings do not support the notion that firms with better investment opportunities 
reduce the magnitude of dividends to fund their investments. A possible explanation is that 
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Omani firms can easily finance their investments through banks (as noted by Al-Yahyaee et 
al., 2011) which reduces the importance of internal funds to finance new investments. Further, 
the results also provide no evidence on the life cycle theory, as the coefficient of both market 
to book ratio and age are statistically insignificant (Grullon and Michaely, 2002; DeAngelo et 
al., 2006).  
Furthermore, the estimated coefficients of leverage in Models 1 and 2 are positive and 
significant, suggesting that firms with high leverage increase the amount of dividend changes. 
This finding rules out the important of leverage in mitigating the agency problem: this stands 
in sharp contrast to the earlier studies in developed countries (e.g., Margaritis and Psillaki, 
2010). The negative coefficients of dividend yield are statistically and economically significant 
at 1% level indicating dividend stability in Oman which is in line with Al-Yahyaee et al. (2010). 
Moreover, we find insignificant association between dividend changes and current and past 
RETA changes. These findings contradict the free cash flow hypothesis where firms tend to 
pay high dividends when they have high accumulated profit. 
Models 3 and 4 of Table 3.12 present the estimated results of dividend increasing firms. Both 
measures of profitability demonstrate the importance of current and past profitability in 
determining the amount of dividend increases in Oman. The coefficients of firm size are 
negative and insignificant in Models 3 and 4, suggesting that firm’s size is not considered as a 
factor that determinates the magnitude of dividend increases in Oman. Similar to our findings 
in Models 1 and 2, we detect a positive (negative) association between leverage (dividend 
yield) and the amount of dividend increases. The former indicates the diminished role of 
leverage to reduce the agency problem. The latter suggests dividend stability in Oman. That is 
firms with high dividend yield negatively impact the magnitude of dividend increases (as in 
Model 4). We also find a significant relationship between firms’ age and dividend increases 
which is in line with the life cycle theory. The remainder of the control variables are 
insignificantly correlated with the amount of dividend increases, which is similar to our 
findings in Models 1 and 2.  
The results from investigating the association between the magnitude of dividend decreases 
and potential explanatory variables are presented in Table 3.12 Models 5 and 6. The findings 
reveal that current profitability measures (EDBV and ECHG) are negatively related to the 
amount of dividend decreases as stated in Models 5 and 6. Past profitability coefficients are 
negative and only significant in Model 5. 
The coefficient of size is positive and statistically insignificant, which suggests that firm size 
is not associated with the magnitude of dividend decreases in Oman. Unlike our findings in 
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Models 1 to 4, we find a positive association between changes in current retained earnings and 
the amount of dividend decreases. This finding indicates that when firms retain more profit in 
the current year, they pay lower dividends and vice versa.  
Table 3.12. Factors affecting dividend changes 
Dependent variables DIVCHG  DIVINC  DIVDEC 
  Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 
         
Intercept -0.0697 0.196  -0.347 -0.203  -0.864 0.291 
 (-0.17) (0.45)  (-0.77) (-0.41)  (-1.05) (0.40) 
𝐸𝐷𝐵𝑉0 6.415***   3.165*   -4.922***  
 (4.66)   (1.97)   (-3.73)  
𝐸𝐷𝐵𝑉−1 3.788**   4.365**   -3.658*  
 (2.25)   (2.34)   (-1.90)  
𝐸𝐶𝐻𝐺0  0.349***   0.193*   -0.276*** 
  (2.76)   (1.77)   (-3.55) 
𝐸𝐶𝐻𝐺−1  0.917***   1.135***   -0.787 
  (3.66)   (3.83)   (-1.58) 
Size -0.0205 -0.0467  -0.0266 -0.0284  0.0212 0.0424 
 (-0.76) (-1.59)  (-0.73) (-0.79)  (0.59) (0.97) 
Growth 0.310 0.509**  0.206 0.366  0.537 0.313 
 (1.50) (2.11)  (0.86) (1.41)  (1.70) (1.27) 
M/B -0.0482 -0.00514  -0.0552 -0.00295  0.0264 0.0509 
 (-1.35) (-0.13)  (-1.30) (-0.06)  (0.73) (1.44) 
Lev 0.553*** 0.432*  0.826*** 0.772***  0.247 -0.263 
 (2.63) (1.85)  (3.20) (2.82)  (1.26) (-0.99) 
YLD -3.458** -3.474***  -2.474 -3.004**  2.491 0.184 
 (-2.32) (-3.35)  (-1.38) (-2.26)  (1.40) (0.17) 
Age 0.116 0.0737  0.208* 0.160  0.102 -0.114 
 (1.14) (0.73)  (1.92) (1.47)  (0.78) (-0.90) 
RETACHG -1.220 -0.499  -0.651 -0.0643  1.030** 1.294*** 
 (-1.26) (-0.51)  (-0.45) (-0.05)  (2.28) (3.30) 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐻𝐺−1 -0.810 0.101  -1.218 -0.0137  0.667 0.103 
 (-0.96) (0.24)  (-1.32) (-0.03)  (0.85) (0.29) 
         
Year & Industry effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of observations 599 599  356 356  245 245 
R2 0.289 0.26  0.203 0.217  0.384 0.348 
Adj. R2 0.235 0.197  0.111 0.122  0.202 0.095 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000   0.001 0.008   0.000 0.003 
Note. This table reports the estimated outputs regarding the determinants of all dividends changes (DIVCHG), dividend 
increases (DIVINC) and dividend decreases (DIVDEC), considering current and past profitability and other explanatory 
variables. All variables are defined in Table 3.1. The figures in parentheses are the t-statistics. *,**,*** indicates 
significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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3.6.4 The propensity to change dividends 
To get a further insight, this section examines how current and past profitability, and other 
control variables used in Eq. (3.12), influence the likelihood of dividend changes, dividend 
increases and dividend decreases. We run logistic regressions using Eq. (3.12) where the 
explanatory variables are (1) a dichotomous variable that is equal to one if the firm change its 
dividend and 0 otherwise; (2) a dichotomous variable that is equal to one for dividend increases 
firms and 0 otherwise; and (3) a dichotomous variable that is equal to one for dividend 
increasing firms and 0 otherwise. Our study sample incorporates firms that do not change their 
dividends: this increases the number of observation to 716.23 We control for industry and year 
fixed effects in all regressions. 
The estimated outputs of the logistic regression are presented in Table 3.13 Models 1 to 6. The 
coefficients in Models 1 and 2 are positive and significant at 1% level for both current 
profitability measures. The lagged profitability measures are positive and only significant in 
Model 2. These findings suggest that current profitability increases the likelihood of changes 
in dividends in the same direction. We also obtain similar results for dividend increases 
(Models 3 and 4). These findings are in line with earlier studies in developed markets 
(e.g., Harada and Nguyen, 2005; Aggarwal et al., 2012) and in developing markets 
(e.g., Fairchild et al., 2014).  
The coefficients of size are found to be positive and significant in Models 1 to 4 which indicates 
that the likelihood of dividend changes and increases are more likely to occur amongst larger 
firms in the Omani market, which is in line with the results obtained by Aggarwal et al. (2012) 
for cross-listed firms in the US and inconsistent with those obtained by Fairchild et al.(2014) 
for Thailand. 
In contrast to the findings in developed countries (e.g., Aggarwal et al., 2012), market to book 
ratio (M/B) (a proxy for future investment opportunities) has significant positive coefficients 
in Models 1 and 2. However, this association is eliminated in the case of dividend increases (as 
in Models 3 and 4) indicating that future investments do not impact the propensity of firms to 
increase dividends which is in line with the recent study in Thailand (Fairchild et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, the leverage’s coefficients are negative and significant in Models 1 to 4. These 
findings indicate that firms with less leverage are more likely to change or increase dividends: 
this is similar to the results obtained by Aggarwal et al. (2012) in developed markets. Moreover, 
we find that dividend yield decreases the likelihood of firms to change and increase dividends 
                                                 
23 We include 152 observations in our regressions that reflect firms that do not change their dividends.  
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as stated in Models 1 to 4 which may be attributed to the dividend stability in Oman. The 
estimated coefficients of current change in retain earnings (RETACHG) are negative and 
significant in Models 1 and 3. These findings suggest that when firms retain more profit from 
current year they are less likely to change or increase dividends (consistent the empirical 
findings of Fairchild et al., 2014).   
The regressions for the effect of firms’ characteristics on the propensity of firms to decrease 
dividends are presented in Models 5 and 6 of Table 3.13. The results show that current 
profitably measures are negative and highly significant at 1% level. However, the coefficients 
of past profitability measures turn out to be insignificant in Model 5 and positively significant 
in Model 6.  
These findings suggest that firms’ current, but not past, profitability is likely to determine the 
reduction in dividends amongst Omani firms. This findings stand in sharp contrast to the recent 
work of Fairchild et al. (2014) where they show that both current and past performance 
influence firms’ decisions to reduce dividends. Firm size appears to be insignificantly 
correlated with the probability of firms to cut dividends as revealed in Models 5 and 6.  
The coefficients of current investment opportunities (Growth) are negative and significant at 
the 10% level: this indicates that firms with high current investments are less likely to reduce 
dividends (inconsistent the empirical findings of Fairchild et al., 2014).   
The results further indicate that firms with high future investment opportunities (M/B) are more 
likely to cut dividends. This finding could be interpreted as follows: those firms need capital 
for future investments and hence they reduce dividends. The dividend yield for dividend-
decreasing firms is negative and significant at 1% level, indicating the dividend stability is 
important for those firms. Additionally, we find that firms’ age is positively significant which 
suggest that mature firms are more likely to decrease dividends. Overall these findings suggest 
that there is little evidence of the life-cycle theory proposed by Fama and French (2001), 
Grullon and Michaely (2002) and DeAngelo et al. (2006). 
In sum we find that factors that influencing the probability of firms to change and increase 
dividends are very similar. However, they are differ from the factors that affect the likelihood 
of firms to cut dividends.  Aggarwal et al. (2012) find that informational factors are (are not) 
significantly correlated with dividend increases (decreases). Similarly, Fairchild et al. (2014) 
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demonstrate that the firm characteristics that effect the likelihood of increases and decreases 
dividends are not exactly the same.24  
Table 3.13. The propensity to changes dividends 
Dependent variables DIVCHG  DIVINC  DIVDEC 
  Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 
         
Intercept -6.000*** -5.275***  -5.027*** -4.027***  -11.42*** -9.905*** 
 (-4.13) (-3.92)  (-4.00) (-3.38)  (-5.45) (-5.51) 
𝐸𝐷𝐵𝑉0 5.095***   8.931***   -13.13***  
 (2.92)   (4.62)   (-4.75)  
𝐸𝐷𝐵𝑉−1 3.034   2.703   -1.297  
 (1.21)   (1.46)   (-0.42)  
𝐸𝐶𝐻𝐺0  0.0948**   0.0833**   -0.133** 
  (2.18)   (2.32)   (-2.46) 
𝐸𝐶𝐻𝐺−1  2.436***   1.263**   1.289** 
  (3.27)   (2.02)   (2.14) 
Size 0.443*** 0.388***  0.357*** 0.286***  0.567 0.432 
 (2.79) (2.61)  (3.40) (2.85)  (1.42) (1.23) 
Growth -0.455 -0.280  0.0776 0.123  -3.572* -3.334* 
 (-0.95) (-0.58)  (0.17) (0.27)  (-1.93) (-1.90) 
M/B 0.324* 0.335*  0.275 0.253  0.300** 0.278* 
 (2.21) (1.96)  (0.67) (0.86)  (2.10) (1.87) 
Lev -2.233*** -1.870**  -2.330*** -2.045***  0.136 0.573 
 (-2.96) (-2.56)  (-4.09) (-3.77)  (0.16) (0.67) 
YLD -19.37** -15.91*  -9.115* -6.880**  11.52*** 10.60*** 
 (-2.32) (-1.91)  (-1.91) (-2.04)  (3.47) (3.82) 
Age 0.476* 0.408  0.186 0.0938  1.188*** 1.075*** 
 (1.68) (1.49)  (0.67) (0.35)  (2.85) (2.70) 
RETACHG -1.127** -0.344  -1.548*** 0.356  0.557 0.0301 
 (-2.48) (-0.77)  (-2.75) (0.84)  (0.73) (0.05) 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐻𝐺−1 -0.501 -0.733  -0.279 -0.233  -0.432 -0.370 
 (-1.11) (-1.63)  (-0.69) (-0.54)  (-0.48) (-0.49) 
         
Year & Industry effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of observations 751 751  751 751  751 751 
Pseudo R2 0.293 0.311  0.194 0.171  0.274 0.227 
Prob>chi 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 
Note. This table reports the outputs of logistic regressions. The dependent variables are DIVCHG (=1 if firms pay 
dividends; 0 otherwise); DIVINC (=1 if dividends are increased; 0 otherwise); and DIVDEC (=1 if dividends are decreased; 
0 otherwise). All explanatory variables are defined in Table 3.1. The figures in parentheses are the z-statistics. *,**,*** 
indicates significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
                                                 
24 For example, Fairchild et al. (2014) find that cash flow and change in retained earnings are significantly related 
to the propensity of firms to increase dividends in Thailand. However, these variables turn out to be insignificant 




Our study explores the information content of dividend changes in Oman by examining the 
relationship between different types of dividend changes and past, current and future 
profitability. Prior research suggests that dividend changes convey information about firms’ 
prospects, and that a signal has to be costly to be of any value (Black, 1976; Bhattacharya, 
1979). However, the empirical results on the association between dividend changes and future 
profitability are inconclusive. Further, the earlier study of Aggarwal et al. (2012) argued that, 
in a poor information environment, firms have more incentive to use dividend changes to 
convey information about future profitability. We re-examine these arguments using data from 
an emerging market with unique market idiosyncrasies. 
In this study we investigate the relation between dividend changes and future earnings changes 
in Oman, using multiple methods from earlier studies. Thus, our work complements Al-
Yahyaee et al.’s (2011) study on dividend announcements and stock market reaction in Oman, 
where they find strong support for the signalling theory of dividends. Our initial results find 
very little support for the information content of dividend in relation to future profitability. 
Specifically, we find evidence of the information content of dividend for only one year 
following dividend decreases. Our findings provide a sharp contrast with the recent study of 
Aggarwal et al. (2012) where they detect that firms have more incentive to use dividend 
increases to signal their future prospects in a poor information environment. 
However, using a more appropriate method of estimating the expected earnings, the nonlinear 
approach, we provide no support for the signalling theory. These results suggest that in Oman 
where there is no tax on dividends, dividend changes are not informative about future 
profitability which is consistent with the tax signalling hypothesis (Black, 1976). Another 
explanation of why dividend changes do not signal future profitability might be attributed to 
the high ownership concentration and high leverage amongst listed firms in Oman (Jensen, 
1986). 
We further study the factors that affect the magnitude of dividend changes in Oman. Our results 
show that past and current profitability changes are the most important factors that drive the 
amount of dividend changes, increases and decreases. The results also demonstrate that 
dividend changes and increases are affected by dividend yield (consistent with Al-Yahyaee et 
al., 2010) and leverage. However, these factors appear to have no impact on the magnitude of 
dividend decreases. Moreover, our findings provide no support for the life cycle theory where 
firms at later stages have more incentive to distribute dividends (Grullon and Michaely, 2002; 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2006). 
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The association between firms’ characteristics and the propensity to change, increase and 
decrease dividends are also examined: this affirms that current and past profitability affect the 
likelihood to do so. A firm’s size increases the propensity of firms to change and increase 
dividends, while leverage, dividend yield and current change in retained earnings reduce the 
propensity of firms to do so. 
Our study contributes to the literature by providing evidence on the tax-based signalling 
hypothesis. In addition, our findings reveal no evidence on the use of dividend increases to 
convey information about future profitability in a poor information environment. Furthermore, 
our conclusion on the strong relationship between dividend changes and current profitability 
changes enable us to understand the reason behind the highly frequent changes of dividend 
policy in Oman. Thus, our study provides practical implications for managers, investors as well 
as practitioners with regard to the announcement of dividend changes in Oman. 
Future research may extend the analysis to explore the contrast between the relationship 
between dividends and stock price reactions, and dividends and profitability, as an interesting, 
and under-researched area. Particularly, it is interesting to ask why stock prices react so 
strongly to dividend announcements in Oman (i.e., Al-Yahyaee et al.’s (2011) evidence) when 
dividends provide little information about future profitability in the same corporations (i.e., our 
evidence).  Could this be evidence of investor irrationality (that is, investors have been 
conditioned to believe that dividend increases are good news, and hence, the stock market 
reacts accordingly)? This would be consistent with the dividend catering theory in which firms 
cater to investors’ (irrational) demands for dividends by paying out when investors place a 
premium on dividend paying stocks.25 
We suggest that, for future research, scholars extend this comparison between dividends, 
earnings and stock price reaction to other countries around the world.  For example, there is 
considerable evidence in favour of the signalling hypothesis in relation to stock market reaction 
in the US (that is, evidence of a positive relationship between dividend changes and stock 
prices) but the evidence on the relationship between dividend changes and earnings is mixed. 
As suggested in this section, it would be interesting to consider why. 
                                                 
25 Indeed, I am personally acquainted with an Omani company where the institutional investors have consistently 
been demanding 100% dividend payout ratios in recent years, despite the firm having good, value-adding 
investment opportunities available. The CEO has opined that the firm will be in trouble if it does not cut the 
dividend in order to invest in growth. This can be considered in the dividend catering framework, and 
demonstrates the dangers of catering to the short-run market reaction (dividend signalling).  
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4. Chapter 4: Dividend Policy, Overconfidence and Moral Hazard26  
4.1 Introduction 
Behavioural corporate finance examines the effects of managerial psychological biases on 
corporate finance decision-making (investment appraisal, capital structure, and dividend 
policy).  A particular bias that has been analysed is that of managerial overconfidence. Much 
of the work has focussed on the effect of this managerial bias on investment appraisal 
(managerial overconfidence has been demonstrated to increase investment into higher-risk and 
value-reducing projects) and capital structure (it has been observed that managerial 
overconfidence may result in higher corporate debt levels).   
Recently, there has been emerging research on the effects of managerial overconfidence on 
dividend policy. This area of enquiry has produced mixed theoretical and empirical results. 
Some scholars argue that managerial overconfidence and dividends should be negatively 
related (e.g., Ben-David et al., 2007; Cordeiro, 2009; Deshmukh et al., 2013). However, Wu 
and Liu (2008) argue that overconfidence and dividends may be positively related.   
Ben-David et al (2007) argue that overconfident CEOs are less likely to pay dividends. 
Deshmukh et al., (2013) provide a model that explains the negative relationship between 
overconfidence and dividends. In their model they show that because overconfident managers 
view external finance costly and believe their firms to be undervalued by the market, they 
reduce dividends in order to have sufficient cash flow to invest in future projects. In contrast, 
Wu and Liu (2008) provide a model that demonstrates precisely the opposite result. More 
specifically, they show that because an overconfident manager overestimates his ability to 
maintain transitory earnings, he pays more dividends. However, none of these studies consider 
the impact of agency costs on the relationship between managerial overconfidence and 
dividend policy. 
In this chapter, we contribute to this research area by developing a model of managerial 
overconfidence and dividend policy that takes moral hazard into account. We demonstrate that 
overconfidence can lead to higher dividends (when the manager is overconfident about his 
current ability) or lower dividends (when the manager is overconfident about his future ability). 
We also demonstrate that higher overconfidence may result in an increase or a decrease in firm 
                                                 
26 I would like to thank the Young Finance Scholars’ Conference and Quantitative Finance Workshop (2014) 
participants at the University of Sussex, Brighton, UK; and the South West Accounting Group, BAFA (2013) 
participants at the University of Gloucestershire, Cheltenham, UK, for their comments and suggestions. Any 
errors are our own. 
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value. Furthermore, we show that managerial bounded rationality could have an effect on this 
relation. 
In Behavioural corporate finance, there has been much work analysing the effects of 
managerial overconfidence on capital budgeting (investment appraisal) and capital structure 
(financing) decisions. In contrast, the research on managerial overconfidence and dividends is 
recently emerging, and little understood. Our model thus contributes to this area of research. 
The existing research on overconfidence in behavioural corporate finance demonstrates 
ambiguous results. In capital budgeting, overconfidence may be bad, since it may results in 
excessive risk-taking. However, Gervais et al., (2003) demonstrate that it may be beneficial in 
offsetting managerial risk aversion (risk-aversion leads to managers taking insufficient risk 
from the viewpoints of investors; overconfidence may counteract this). In terms of capital 
structure, Fairchild  (2005) demonstrates that managerial overconfidence may lead to higher 
debt, but the effect on firm value is ambiguous (overconfidence may be seen as bad, since it 
leads too much debt, which increases expected financial distress). However, overconfidence 
also drives higher effort. Thus, the effect of overconfidence on firm value depends on the trade-
off between high debt/ higher expected financial distress and higher effort. Further, Fairchild 
(2009) demonstrates that high overconfidence may actually lead to lower debt as the 
overconfident manager may overestimate the value of the future project, and hence requires 
higher current cash flow.  
Our work contributes to the emerging research on the relationship between managerial 
overconfidence, dividends and firm value. Whereas the research suggests a positive 
relationship between debt and overconfidence, the relationship between dividends and 
overconfidence is less clear. Wu and Liu (2008) suggest a positive relationship, however, 
Deshmukh et al., (2013) suggest a negative relationship. Furthermore, Bouwman (2009) 
suggests the relationship between dividends, overconfidence, and value may be ambiguous. 
Our models aim to address this by examining the conditions under which managerial 
overconfidence, dividends and firm value may be positive or negative. Furthermore, our 
models incorporate moral hazard, in terms of managerial effort shirking, and the potential for 
the manager to choose negative NPV projects, due to private benefits. Moreover, this chapter 
extends the analyses by examining the effect of managers’ and investors’ bounded rationality 
on the relationship between overconfidence and dividend policy. 
The intuition behind our models is as follows. In our first model, the overconfident manager 
exerts effort on a current project, and hopes to be able to take a future project, due to the 
associated private benefits. Moral hazard exists in the form of effort shirking on the current 
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project. The manager happens to be rewarded on current share price, and hence wishes to 
commit to a high effort on current project to boost current share price. The way that he makes 
this commitment to high effort is to announce a sufficiently high dividend. Therefore, he must 
work hard to generate sufficient expected cash flow from the current project to be able to invest 
in the new project and pay dividends. Therefore, the more overconfident he is, the higher the 
dividend. The effect of overconfidence and high dividend, on firm value, however, is 
ambiguous and depends on his true ability. 
In the second model, the overconfident CEO exerts effort only in the future project and hopes 
to take the future project to be able to obtain the associated private benefits in case of the future 
project success. Therefore, this leads the overconfident manager to reduce dividends in order 
to have sufficient cash flow to invest in the future project. The free cash flow problem (Jensen, 
1986) exists, since the overconfident manager might invest in negative a NPV project due to 
his upward assessment of his ability to affect the success of future project. Again, the 
relationship between overconfidence, dividends and firm value is ambiguous. 
The final model presents a bounded rationality case where the manager does not fully 
understand the conditions surrounding the dividend announcement (he does not know if he is 
in Model 1 or 2). Therefore, the manager calculates his expected payoff based on probability 
of each model. Similarly, investors face the same problem of not understanding the reason for 
the dividend announcement and assign different weights to each outcome. 
This chapter is organised as follows. The first section discusses the difference between 
optimism and overconfidence. The following section presents our model. Section 4.4 presents 
the first model where the manager is overconfident about his current ability. The second model 
that is reported in section 4.5 analyses the case where the manager is overconfident about his 
future ability. The impact of manager and investor bounded rationality is stated in section 4.6. 
Each of these sections is followed by numerical example. 
4.2 Optimism vs. overconfidence 
The economic and psychology literatures show that optimism and overconfidence are 
characteristic traits of human beings. These literatures view optimism as generalized positive 
expectations about future events  (Scheier and Carver, 1985; Scheier et al., 1994; Puri and 
Robinson, 2007). It is more related to overestimation of exogenous outcomes such as economic 
growth (Malmendier and Tate, 2005). 
The psychology literature distinguishes between three types of overconfidence:(i) the tendency 
to overestimate human ability (better than the average), (ii) to believe that they have more 
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control over events than it is in reality (illusion of control); (iii) and to think that their 
knowledge is more accurate than it really is (miscalibration) (De Paola et al., 2014). 
Despite the relevant role of optimism and overconfidence in corporate financial policies , there 
is no uniform definition of these terms in the behavioral corporate finance literature. For 
example, Heaton (2002) states that optimistic managers overestimate (underestimate) the 
probability of good (bad) future performance of their firms. His theoretical model incorporates 
managerial optimism in the form of overestimating the probability of future project success 
and underestimating the probability of failure.  
A study of Ben-David et al. (2007) refers to an optimistic manager as one who overestimates 
his firm’s future cash flow while Malmendier et al. (2011) use this definition to define 
overconfident managers. Ben-David et al. (2007) employee miscalibration, i.e. underestimation 
of the volatility of future cash flow by managers, to defined overconfidence. The recent works 
of Gervais et al. (2011) and Deshmukah et al. (2013) theoretically attach overconfidence to a 
manager who overestimates of the private signal relative to public information.  
Apparently, discussions of optimism and overconfidence have tended to be context dependent 
in behavioral corporate finance literature, and defined in the empirical studies using, in most 
cases, the exact proxies such as CEO unexercised option moneyness, survey and media press 
to define the psychological biases of managers: optimism or overconfidence. Malmendier and 
Tate (2005,a) use unexercised in the money options by CEOs to measure overconfidence while 
Campbell et al (2011) use the same definition to term optimism. 
Brown (2012) states that the two terms: optimism and overconfidence, are the same in cases 
where future events depend on an individual’s current actions. According to Malmendier and 
Tate (2005, p2662): “Upward bias in the assessment of future outcome is sometime referred to 
as “overoptimism” rather than “overconfident”. We follow the literature on self-serving 
attribution and choose the label “overconfident” in order to distinguish the overestimation of 
one’s own ability (such as IQ or managerial skills) and outcomes relating to one’s own personal 
situation from the general overestimation of exogenous outcomes.” 
A very recent study by Pikulina et al (2014) use individual belief about his ability to measure 
overconfidence. Their results reveal that people who overestimate their ability to be higher than 
it actually is, exert more effort. In this study the term overconfidence stems from “better the 
average” effects, and is defined as an overestimation of individual ability relative to the average 
ability level in the economy (Van den Steen, 2011; Fast et al., 2012). Specifically, an 
overconfident manager is defined as the one who overestimates his ability to affect the success 
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of current/future project(s). This will drive overconfident manager to exert higher effort than 
rational peers (similar to Gervais et al. (2011)). 
4.3 The Model 
We consider a self-interested risk-neutral corporate manager who exerts effort in running a 
current project. At the same time, a new project becomes available. Hence, we consider two 
possible moral hazard problems: managerial effort-shirking on the current project, and possible 
free cash-flow problems if the future project is negative NPV (see Jensen, 1986).  
The manager is rewarded based on current market value (short-term-compensation scheme).  
We consider the impact of managerial overconfidence.  
The manager is currently deciding on his firm’s dividend policy (specifically, he is deciding 
whether to announce a low or high dividend). The dividend level affects his ability to take the 
new project. In our model, he may decide to choose to announce a high dividend as a 
commitment to exert high effort on the current project.   
We consider two different versions of the model. In the first version, the manager is 
overconfident about his ability to affect the success of the current project.  Furthermore, the 
second project unambiguously has a positive NPV. In the second version, the manager is 
overconfident about his ability to affect the success of the future project, if taken.  We 
demonstrate that this difference between the manager’s overconfidence (about the present or 
the future) crucially affects the relationship between overconfidence and dividends. In the 
former case (overconfidence about the present) it is positive (there is a critical level of 
overconfidence at which the manager increases dividends: to commit to higher current effort). 
In the latter case (overconfidence about the future), it is negative (there is a critical level of 
overconfidence at which the manager decreases dividends: in order to be able to take the second 
project, which may, or may not, be positive NPV). 
Note that in the first model, we consider a commitment problem over the manager’s effort 
level. The manager is rewarded on current share price. Furthermore, the market “sets” the 
current value of the firm, and then the manager subsequently exerts unobservable (and hence 
non-monitored) effort. Since the manager is rewarded on current share price, before he exerts 
efforts, he would like to promise the investors high effort. So thus the investors would pay high 
current price. However, the investors pay, and then the manager exerts effort. Hence, if the 
dividend is low, such that the manager can take the new project regardless of realisation of 
current project. Then, once he has received his compensation from the investors, it is optimal 
for him to then exert zero effort. This is the nature of the commitment problem in relation to 
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moral hazard. Hence, the manager may wish to use the dividends to commit to high effort, so 
that investors pay more today.27 
In the second model, the manager continuous to be rewarded on short-term share value but now 
he may need cash flow to invest in a future project. Hence, now overconfidence may lead to 
him reducing the current dividend level. The next section analyses Model One in more detail.  
4.4 Model 1: Manager is overconfident about current ability: second project has positive 
NPV. 
The timeline of the game is as follows. 
Date 0:  The firm has a current project in place (project 1). Also, a new future project appears 
(project 2). This project will be available at date 2, and will require investment .0I  At date 
0, the manager makes a dividend announcement. The market observes the announcement and 
values the firm accordingly. The manager receives compensation. Since the manager receives 
compensation first and then exerts (unobservable) effort, therefore, there is a commitment 
problem. The manager may then use dividends as a commitment to high effort. 
Date 1: The manager runs the firm’s current project (project 1).  This project is risky (facing 
two possible outcomes): it may succeed in the future (with probability ]),1,0[1p  in which 
case it provides income .0HR  Alternatively, it may fail with probability )1( 1p  in which 
case, it provides income ,LR  where .0 LH RR  The manager exerts effort 1e  into project 1, 
and faces cost of effort28 )( 21ce .   Managerial effort affects the probability of success as follows: 
,111 ep   where 1  represents managerial ability.  An overconfident manager believes that his 
ability is ,1ˆ  where .ˆ 11    A rational, well-calibrated manager understands his true ability: 
that is, for a rational manager, .ˆ 11     
Date 2:  The manager pays the dividend announced at date 0, and then invests the required I  
into the new project if these funds are available for the remaining cash flow after paying the 
dividend. If taken, the new project succeeds with exogenously given probability, ]1,0[2 p , in 
                                                 
27 Grossman and Hart (1982) look at this commitment in terms of debt: high debt commits the manager to high 
effort due to bankruptcy threat.  In our model, high dividends commits him to higher effort in order to increase 
the probability of being able to take the new project. 
28 
Since investors have already compensated the manager effort is only driven by his ability in generating sufficient 
cash flow to take future project. If dividend is low he can take project regardless of cash flow. If dividend is 
high, he cannot take it regardless of cash flow. In either case (high and low dividends), I demonstrate that this 
optimal effort is zero. in the medium dividends case, he can only take new project (achieve private benefit) in 




which case it will provide date 3 income of 0x , and it fails with probability )1( 2p in which 
case it will provide income of zero. Thus, the expected cash flow is Xxp 2 . 
Also, if project two succeeds, it gives manager date 3 private benefits 0b  , but he gets zero 
private benefits in the case of failure. Thus, if the manager takes the project at date 2, his 
expected private benefits are bpB 2 . 
In our current version of the model, project 2 has positive NPV: in which case, investors are 
happy for the manager to invest in the project. 
Date 3: The game ends. 
Throughout our analysis, the manager is rewarded on a short-term basis (he is myopic). His 
date 0 expected payoff is: 
2
10 )(
ˆ ceBEVM         (4.1)   
Where 
0V  is the way that the market values the firm given the announcement of dividends. As 
he has been rewarded already at date 0, then at the effort stage, 
0V  is given.  His optimisation 
focuses on the latter two terms (his current effort and his expected private benefit) 
2
1)( ceBE  . 
where the ‘hat’ represents his perceived payoff (due to overconfidence).  Moving back to date 
0, the market values the firm at date 0 as follows: 
)()(110 NERRReV LLH        (4.2) 
where 1e  is the investors’ expectation of subsequent effort 
Furthermore, in Eq. (4.2) )(NE is the expected net present value of the new project. Therefore, 
the manager’s choice of dividend announcement will affect the market’s date 0 valuation 0V ,  
due to two reasons. First, his dividend announcement will affect his ability to take project 2. 
Second, it may affect his optimal effort in project 1. For example, a high dividend may commit 
him to a higher effort, which will then result in the market providing a higher date 0 valuation 
.0V  
We solve by backward induction.  First, we consider the manager’s project 2 decision at date 
2, given the realisation of project 1’s income (recalling that the probability of project 1 success 
is affected by the manager’s date 1 effort).  Then we move back to date 1 to solve for the 
manager’s date 1 effort decision, given the date 0 dividend announcement. Finally, we move 
back to date 0 to solve for the manager’s optimal date 0 dividend announcement. 
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4.4.1 Date 2 Project 2 decision 
We first take as given the cash flow achieved at date 1, and consider the manager’s decision to 
invest in new project. 
We consider three possible levels for the manager’s date 0 announcement as follows: 
4.4.1.1 In the case of low dividend announcement, IRD LL   
In this case, the manager will be able to pay the dividend and invest in the new project 
regardless of the date 1 realisation of project 1’s income ( thus, in Eq. (4.1), BBE )(   
regardless of effort). 
4.4.1.2 In the case of medium dividend announcement, ],( IRIRD HLM   
Given the medium dividend announcement, the manager will only be able to invest, after 
paying the dividend, in the good state of project 1 BeBpBE 111)(  .  
4.4.1.3 In the case of high dividend announcement, .IRD HH   
Within the dividend announcement, the manager will not be able to pay the dividend and invest 
in the new project, regardless of the date 1 realisation of project 1’s income .0)( BE  
Obviously, we do not need to consider the manager’s decision (whether to take new project or 
not) in the case where he cannot take the new project (medium dividend, with bad state 
realisation of project 1, or high dividend, with either realisation). 
We therefore focus on the case where the manager can invest in the new project (low dividend, 
with either realisation of project 1, or medium dividend, with high realisation of project 1).   
Lemma 1: Since the manager is myopic, receiving his monetary reward at date 0, he will invest 
in the new project if he can, regardless of whether it is value-increasing )( IX   or value-
reducing ),( IX   since he obtains private benefits 0B  from the new project.  Hence, in the 
case that ),( IX   I face the Jensen’s free cash flow problem (not a problem in this version, 
but a problem in our second version). 
4.4.2 Date 1 effort level 
Having established that the manager will invest in the new project at date 2 if he can, we now 




4.4.2.1 In the case of low dividend announcement, IRD LL   
First, we take as given that the manager chose IRD LL   at date 0. Therefore, the manager 
will be able to invest in the new project at date 2, regardless of the realisation of project 1’s 
income.  Note that, the only factor driving managerial effort is his desire to take the second 
project at date 2 (given he has been already received his compensation from the investors before 
he exerts effort: commitment problem). There is a moral hazard problem. The market values 
the project, and then the manager exerts (unobservable) effort.  Hence, since he can take the 
new project regardless of effort, his optimal date 0 effort level is 0*1 e  , because effort is 
costly. 
Formally, when IRD LL  , the manager’s date 1 payoff is 
2
10
ˆ ceBVLM   , where  .)(110 LLH RIXRReV    









, .e  
Optimal effort is .0*1 e   
Initiatively, the manager has already been compensated by the market )( 0V  and now he exerts 
effort. He can take the second project regardless of date 1 income realisation. Thus, he does 
not need to exert any effort in the current project. 
Hence, date 0 firm value (from Eq. (4.2)) becomes: 
 
.0 IXRV L          (4.3) 





       (4.4) 
4.4.2.2 In the case of high dividend announcement 
Here we consider the case where the manager chose IRD HH   at date 0. In this case, he 
will be unable to invest in the new project at date 2, regardless of the realisation of project 1’s 
income. Therefore, again, his optimal effort level is .0*1 e  
Formally, when  IRD HH   
The manager’s date 1 expected payoff is  
2
10









, .e  
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Optimal effort is .0*1 e   
Intuitively, again manager already paid. Cannot take new project regardless of the realisation. 
Now, the firm value becomes: 
.0 LRV           (4.5) 
Therefore, his date 1 expected payoff becomes: 
L
H
M Rˆ          (4.6) 
4.4.2.3 In the case of medium dividend announcement 
Finally, consider the case where the manager chooses the medium dividend 
],( IRIRD HLM   at date 0.  Now he can take the new project only following the good 
realisation of project 1 at date 2.   
The manager chooses his date 1 effort level to maximise 
2
1110



















         (4.8) 
Note the comparison between medium, high or low dividends. In the case of high and low 
dividends, it is optimal for manager to exert zero effort (since in the first case, he can take new 
project regardless of realisation. in the second case he cannot take new regardless of the 
realisation). Thus, he is only committed to exert effort with the medium dividend. 
The date 0 market value of the firm is  .)(110 LLH RIXRReV    where 1e , is the 
investors
 
anticipation of effort given dividend announcement.
 









      (4.9) 
Substituting Eq. (4.8) and (4.9) into Eq. (4.7), I obtain the manager’s perceived payoff at date 

















    (4.10) 
From this point on, we simplify the analysis with the following assumption.  When choosing 
his dividend announcement, the manager is not only overconfident about his ability ),ˆ( 11    
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but he believes that the market recognises his (perceived) ability (he is overconfident about 
how the market will react to his announcement). Thus, he believes that the market also assigns 
a value of 1ˆ  to his ability. Hence, replacing 1  with 1ˆ  in Eq. (4.10), the manager’s date 0 


















1        (4.11) 
At this stage, we recognise that we need to place parameter restriction to ensure 10 1  p . 
Recall that 111 ep  , but overconfident manager perception is 111 ˆˆ ep  . In the case of low and 
high dividend, 0ˆ0 11
*





































1       assumption (A:1)
29 
The perceive ability maxˆ  is affected by c  and B . If c  is low (easy project), the perceive ability 
is low and if B  is high, the perceive ability is low (that restrict the range of the perceive ability). 
4.4.3 Manager’s Date 0 choice of Dividend Announcement 
The manager makes his date 0 dividend announcement by comparing LMˆ , 
H
Mˆ  and 
M
Mˆ  in 
Eq. (4.4), (4.6) and (4.11), respectively. First, I note that, since the new project has a positive 





ˆˆ  for sure. That is, the manager will not choose the high dividend ( both high and low 
dividends reveal to the market that the manager will exert zero effort, but under the high 
dividend, he is unable to take the new project, so losing the positive NPV and the private 
benefits). Therefore, the high dividend is dominated. 
Initiatively, the manager will prefer to announce low rather than high dividend in case he does 
not want to use dividend to commit high effort, where only medium dividend could be used by 





                                                 
29 In a future version I will lift this restriction, and allow corner solutions. 
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Table 4.1: Dividend announcement, market perception of managerial effort and manager 
payoff following the dividend announcement
 
Date 0 announcement 
Market knows that this 
commits manager to optimal 
date 1 effort. 
Manager date 0 payoff following dividend announcement. 
Low 0*1 e  
2
10



























1    
High 0*1 e  L
H
M Rˆ  
 
Therefore, the manager compares his expected payoff in the low dividend versus the medium 
dividend case.  The manager chooses the medium dividend iff LM
M
M 
ˆˆ  .  Defining the critical 
level of overconfidence 'ˆ  which LM
M
M 
ˆˆ , I state the following:  











       (4.12) 
If ,'ˆ1ˆ     the manager increases his dividend announcement to the medium dividend. 
Next, we compare the effect of overconfidence on firm value, by comparing )( LDV  and
)( MDV  in Eq. (4.3) and (4.9), respectively.  Defining the critical level of overconfidence ''ˆ  
at which )()( ML DVDV   , we state the following: 
Lemma 3:  Firm value is higher under the low dividend announcement (compared to the 












        (4.13) 
If ,''ˆ1ˆ     firm value is higher under the medium dividend announcement (compared to the 
low dividend). 
We note that it is ambiguous whether ,''ˆ'ˆ    or vice versa. In proposition 1, we consider both 
cases.  In section 4.3.4, we analyse the relationship between these critical values in-depth. 
Furthermore, it is ambiguous whether 'ˆ  and ''ˆ are in the meaningful range of perceived 
abilities ]ˆ,[1ˆ MAX  (such that the perceived probability cannot exceed unity; see assumption 
A:1). In proposition 1, we consider “unrestricted” cases for  'ˆ  and '.'ˆ  In section 4.3.4, we 
consider the effect of the restriction.   
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We pull lemmas 1 and 2 together to state the main result: 
Proposition 1: When the manager is overconfident about his current ability, and the future 
new project has a positive NPV, the effect of overconfidence on dividend choice and firm value 
is as follows: 
i) If ,''ˆ'ˆ    then: 
If ,'ˆ1ˆ    the manager chooses the low dividend, and firm value is higher under this 
announcement than it would have been under the medium dividend: 
'.ˆˆ)()( 1   ML DVDV  
If ],''ˆ,'ˆ[1ˆ    the manager switches to the medium dividend, and firm value falls: it is 
then lower under this announcement than it would have been under the low dividend: 
].''ˆ,'ˆ[ˆ)()( 1   ML DVDV  
If ,''ˆ1ˆ    the manager chooses the medium dividend, and firm value rises above the 
value under the low dividend: '.'ˆˆ)()( 1   LM DVDV  
 
ii) If ,'ˆ''ˆ    then: 
If ,''ˆ1ˆ    the manager chooses the low dividend, and firm value is higher under this 
announcement than it would have been under the medium dividend: 
'.'ˆˆ)()( 1   ML DVDV  
If ],'ˆ,''ˆ[1ˆ    the manager continues to choose the low dividend.  Firm value is lower 
under this announcement than it would have been under the medium dividend: 
].'ˆ,''ˆ[ˆ)()( 1   ML DVDV  
If ,'ˆ1ˆ    the manager switches to the medium dividend, and firm value immediately rises 
above the value under the low dividend: '.'ˆˆ)()( 1   LM DVDV  

















Figure 4.1:  Effect of Managerial Overconfidence on Dividends.   
Note that at critical level of 'ˆ , the manager increases dividend from low to medium level.  The manager uses 
the medium dividend as a commitment to higher current effort (in order to increase the probability of having 
sufficient cash flow to be able to invest in the new project). He only does so if he is sufficiently overconfident 
in his ability.   
 
 
Figure 4.2:  Effect of Managerial Overconfidence on Firm Value.   
Note that at critical level of 'ˆ , the manager switches from low to medium dividend announcement. The 
effect of this announcement on firm value depends on relationship between ''ˆ,'ˆ   and 'ˆ  as stated in 





4.4.4 The effect of private benefits 
As noted, the relationship between the critical overconfidence parameters  ˆ and  ˆ is 
ambiguous.  ˆ may exceed, or be less than,  ˆ (see proposition 1 i and ii for the effect   ˆˆ
or   ˆˆ on the overconfident manager’s dividend decision, and firm value). Furthermore, it 
is not clear whether  ˆ and  ˆ lie in the critical range ]ˆ,[1ˆ MAX  to ensure the perceived 
probability cannot exceed unity. In this section, I analyse these relationships in more detail. 
Particularly, I analyse the effect of managerial private benefits B  on these relationships.  
We define a critical level of private benefits Bat which   ˆˆ . Therefore, I derive the 
following result: 















   (4.14) 
How does managerial equity ownership affect this? When 0 , then 0B . Since 0B , 
then BB  . Therefore, from Lemma 4,   ˆˆ for sure. 
When 1 , it is ambiguous whether BB   or vice versa. We state the following: 
Proposition 2 
if ),1(  BB then   ˆˆ  ]1,0[ .Therefore proposition 1 (ii) applies ]1,0[  
if ),1(  BB then there exists a critical )1,0(C  for which; 
when ],0[ C  ,   ˆˆ . Proposition 1 (ii) applies. 
when ]1,[ C ,   ˆˆ . Proposition 1 (i) applies. 
Intuitively, if the manager has high private benefits he is more interested in these benefits than 
his current equity value. Therefore, he is more likely to choose low dividend. If he has low 
private benefits, his current equity level is crucial. For low equity level, he is more likely to 
choose low dividend whilst for high equity level he will switch to medium dividend for high 
perceived ability.   
Next, we consider the conditions for  ˆ and  ˆ  to lie in the meaningful interval ]ˆ,[ MAX to 





. Therefore,  
MAX ˆˆ   iff  0)(2]1)(2[2
2  IXRRBIXB LH      
























       (4.16) 
Thus, we observe that the relationship between the critical values ( ˆ and  ˆ ) and gamma max 
( MAXˆ ) is complex. In the following tables, we consider the various combinations that can 
occur, and the effects on the results in proposition 2. 
 
In the following tables, we draw these results together. 
Table 4.2: The relationship between critical  ˆ ,  ˆ and MAXˆ  
If   ˆˆ  then; 
If 
MAX ˆˆˆ   Proposition 1 i), a)-c) applies. 
If   ˆˆˆ MAX  Proposition 1 i), a)-b) applies. 
If   ˆˆˆMAX   Proposition 1 i), a) applies. 
If   ˆˆ  then; 
If 
MAX ˆˆˆ   Proposition 1 ii), a)-c) applies. 
If   ˆˆˆ MAX  Proposition 1 ii), a)-b) applies. 
If   ˆˆˆMAX   Proposition 1 ii), a) applies. 
In the following section, we present a numerical example for Model 1 where the private benefits 
are such that
MAX ˆˆˆ  . 
4.4.5 Numerical example for Model 1 
We illustrate model 1 by way of a numerical example with the following parameter values: 













Table 4.3. The effort and, the manager’s true and perceived probability for given 1ˆ , for the three levels of 
dividends. 
1ˆ   



















0.1  0.1 0.01 0.01  0 0 0  0 0 0 
0.2  0.2 0.02 0.04  0 0 0  0 0 0 
0.3  0.3 0.03 0.09  0 0 0  0 0 0 
0.4  0.4 0.04 0.16  0 0 0  0 0 0 
0.5  0.5 0.05 0.25  0 0 0  0 0 0 
0.6  0.6 0.06 0.36  0 0 0  0 0 0 
0.7  0.7 0.07 0.49  0 0 0  0 0 0 
0.8  0.8 0.08 0.64  0 0 0  0 0 0 
0.9  0.9 0.09 0.81  0 0 0  0 0 0 
 
 Table 4.4 Manager perceived payoff and firm value for given 1ˆ , for the three levels of dividends. 
1ˆ   
















0.1  11 110  15 150  10 100 
0.2  13 119  15 150  10 100 
0.3  15 129  15 150  10 100 
0.4  17 138  15 150  10 100 
0.5  20 148  15 150  10 100 
0.6  23 157  15 150  10 100 
0.7  26 167  15 150  10 100 
0.8  30 176  15 150  10 100 
0.9   35 186   15 150   10 100 
 
As it can be seen from the Table 4.4, the manager will never choose high dividend. When the 
level of overconfidence 3.0ˆ1  , the manager perceived payoff is exactly the same from 




M DD ) representing the critical  ˆ . 
In this case the firm value under low dividend is higher than under the medium dividend
)()( ML DVDV  . Note that, when 4.0ˆ1  the manager perceived payoff is higher under the 
medium dividend than the low dividend, but the firm value is lower under the medium 
dividend. This presents a case where manager might switch from low to medium dividend in 
order to maximise his payoff, while reducing the firm value (see proposition 1-(i)-(b)). As 
3.0ˆ1  the manager’s perceived payoff increases under the medium dividend compared with 
the low dividend, and the firm value only rises under the medium dividend when 5.0ˆ1   (see 
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proposition 1-(i)-(c)). For clarity, we have inserted these numerical values into Figures 4.3 to 
4.6.  
 
Figure 4.3 Manager’s perceived payoff for given dividend policy. 
 
 

































































Figure 4.5:  Effect of Managerial Overconfidence on Dividends. 




4.5 Model 2: The manager is overconfident about his ability on the future project, and 
the project may have positive or negative NPV 
In the model 1, we considered a case where managerial overconfidence led to higher dividends, 
and the manager used dividends to commit to higher effort on current project. Recalling the 
existing research is ambiguous about whether overconfidence leads to higher or low dividends. 
We now wish to consider how overconfidence leads to lower dividends. 
In this case, the timeline is as follows: 
Date 0: The firm has a current risky project. It may succeed in (with probability ),1p  in which 
case it provides income IRH   , where I is the amount needed for investing in new project 2. 
Alternatively, it may fail (with probability ]),1,0[1p  in which case, it provides income LR , 
where 0 LH RR .  
At this stage, the manager makes a dividend announcement: either IRD LL   (low dividend), 
],( IRIRD HLM   (medium dividend) or IRD HH   (high dividend).  Note that, in the 
case of the low (high) dividend, the manager is able (unable) to invest in the new project. 
Further, in the case of medium dividend, the manager is able to invest in new project in the 
case of success in current project (project 1). 
Date 1:  If the manager is able to (that is, in the case of the low dividend and in the case of 
medium dividend following the success of current project), he chooses whether to invest in the 
new project.  
Date 2: if the new project has been taken, the manager exerts effort in the project. It succeeds 
at date 3 with probability 222 ep  , where ]1,0[2 p . The overconfident manager believes that 
it succeeds with probability ,ˆˆ 222 ep   where ]1,0[ˆ 2 p , with .ˆ 22    If it succeeds, it 
provides income .0X  if it fails, it provides zero income.  Also if project 2 is successful, it 
provides private benefits of .0B  There are no private benefits in the case of failure.  
Date 3: the game ends. 
Note that, since the manager receives his monetary reward at date 0, he will take the new project 
at date 1 if he can (that is, under the low dividend, or medium dividend following the success 




0        (4.17) 
where C is his expected effort costs in the second project as viewed from date 0. If the manager 
takes the second project, 22ceC  and 0C  in the case he does not take the second project. 
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Furthermore, in Eq. (4.13), 
0V   is the market value of the firm given the announcement of 
dividends.  
The market values the firm at date 0 as follows: 
)()1( 110 NERpRpV LH         (4.18) 
where, )(NE  is the expected net present value of the new project given manager date 0 
dividend announcement. Hence, the manager choice of dividends will affect the value of the 
firm 
0V   at date 0, since the manager’s dividend announcement will affect his ability to take 
the new project which affects the date 0, )(NE . For example, the manager may announce high 
dividend to commit to the market not to take the new project (due to the negative NPV), which 
will then result in the market providing a higher date 0 valuation
0V .   
Solving backwards, we first consider the manager’s choice of effort in date 2, given the 
manager’s decision whether to invest in new project in date 1. Then we move back to date 0 to 
solve for the manager’s optimal date 0 dividend announcement. 
4.5.1 Manager’s date 2 effort choice 
At this stage we take as given that the manager is able to take the second project which in the 
case of low dividend with either realisation of project 1, or medium dividend with good 
realisation of project 1. He then exerts effort to maximise 
2
2220
ˆˆ ceBeVM          (4.19) 









          (4.20) 
The date 0 market value of the firm is IXeRpRpV LH  22110 )1(  , where 2e is the 
market anticipation of the manager’s effort given dividend announcement. 














2 ) is positive, this confirms that the manager will take the new project at date 2 if 
he can (in the case of low dividend with either realisation of project 1, or medium dividend 
with good realisation). 











       (4.22) 












       (4.23) 
4.5.2 The manager’s date 0 dividend choice. 
We now move back to date 0 to solve for the manager’s optimal dividend announcement. The 
manager compares his expected payoff in the case that he chooses the high, medium or low 
dividend as follows: 
4.5.2.1 In the case of high dividend announcement 
Here we consider the case where the manager chooses high dividend at date 0. In this case, he 
will be unable to invest in the new project (project 2), regardless of the realisation of the current 
project. 
Hence, the market value of the firm becomes: 
LH RpRpV )1( 110         (4.24) 
Therefore, his expected payoff at date 0 is: 
])1([)(ˆ 11 LHH
H
M RpRpD         (4.25) 
4.5.2.2 In the case of medium dividend announcement 
In the case where manager announces medium dividend, he will be able (unable) to invest in 
the new project in the case of good (bad) realisation of the current project (project one). 
Hence, the market value of the firm becomes: 
LH RpIXeRpV )1()( 12210        (4.26)
 
Therefore, his expected payoff at date 0 is: 
)ˆ(])1()([)(ˆ 222211221 ceBepRpIXeRpD LHM
M
M     (4.27) 
Substituting Eq. (4.17) into Eq. (4.24), we obtain the manager’s perceived payoff at date 0, 






















     (4.28) 
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4.5.2.3 In the case of low dividend announcement 
Given that the manager chooses low dividend at date 0, he will be able to take the new project 
(project 2), regardless of the realisation of project’s 1 income. 
Hence, the market value of the firm becomes: 
IXeRpRpV LH  22110 )1(        (4.29) 





M      (4.30) 
Substituting Eq. (4.17) into Eq. (4.27), we obtain the manager’s perceived payoff at date 0, 





















      (4.31) 





ˆˆ,ˆ in Eq. (4.25), (4.28) and 
(4.31) respectively, given the dividend announcement, reveals the following result: 
Lemma 5:  











        (4.32) 
b) If ,ˆˆ2
C   the manager chooses the low dividend. 
and the manager never chooses the medium dividend. 






ˆˆ,ˆ  reveals that  
If 










M DD  . Thus the manager 
maximising his payoff by choosing low dividend. 
If 















M DD   . 
Therefore, it is optimal for manager to choose high dividend. The manager never chooses 
medium dividend.  
Note that low and high dividend dominate medium dividend. For example, if the manager 
wants to use dividend to commit not to take the new project (due to negative NPV), then high 
dividend is definitely better than medium dividend (as that gives manager a chance of taking 
the new project). Also, if the manager wants to take the new project (due to private benefits), 
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he definitely chooses low dividend (as medium dividend means that there is a chance of not 
being able to take the new project). 



















Defining the critical level of overconfidence Cˆ  at which )()( HL DVDV  , we are able to state 
the next result. 
Lemma 6: Firm value is higher under the low dividend announcement (compared to the high 









          (4.33) 
If   C ˆˆ2  , firm value is higher under the high dividend announcement (compared to the low 
dividend) 
Drawing lemmas 3 and 4 together, we obtain our second major result: 
Proposition 3: When the manager is overconfident about his future ability (and the future new 
project may have a positive or negative NPV, depending on the manager’s effort and ability), 
the effect of overconfidence on dividend choice and firm value is as follows: 
i) If ,ˆˆ C
C    then: 
If ,ˆˆ2
C   the manager chooses the high dividend, and firm value is higher under this 
announcement than it would have been under the low dividend: .ˆˆ)()( 2
C
LH DVDV    
If ],ˆ,ˆ[ˆ2 C
C    the manager switches to the low dividend, and firm value falls: it is then lower 
under this announcement than it would have been under the high dividend: 
].ˆ,ˆ[ˆ)()( 2 C
C
HL DVDV    
If ,ˆˆ2 C   the manager continues to choose the low dividend, and firm value rises above the 
value under the high dividend: .ˆˆ)()( 2 CLH DVDV    
ii) If ,ˆˆ CC    then: 
If ,ˆˆ2 C   the manager chooses the high dividend, and firm value is higher under this 





C    the manager continues to choose the high dividend. Firm value is lower under 
this announcement than it would have been under the low dividend: 
].ˆ,ˆ[ˆ)()( 2
C
CLH DVDV    
If ,ˆˆ2
C   the manager switches to the low dividend, and firm value immediately rises above 
the value under the high dividend: .ˆˆ)()( 2 CHL DVDV    
Figures 4.7 and 4.8 clarifies proposition 2. 
 
Figure 4.7: Effect of Managerial Overconfidence on Dividends. 
Note that this diagram represents a Potential free cash flow problem: future project may have a negative or positive NPV, 
depending on managerial ability and effort.  If the manager expects the future project to have negative NPV (and his private 
benefit from the new project is low), he announces high dividend as a commitment not to take new project. At critical level 







4.5.3 The effect of private benefits 
In this section we examine the effect of private benefits on the relationship between
C















    (4.34) 
What is the effect of managerial equity ownership   on the critical private benefits B  ? 










We note that 0B  when 0 . Furthermore, we note that the shape of the function depends 
crucially on the relationship between 
22
2 X  and cI . Particularly, when cIX 
22
2 , the function 
is downward sloping for all  . Therefore, when cIX 
22
2 , B  is negative for all  . 
When cIX 222 , the function is downward sloping for low levels of  , but there is a point at 
which it turns to slope upwards. Therefore, there may be equity level cc  at which the function 










 , then it is unambiguous that 










, there will be a critical equity level )1,( ccccc   , at 
which .BB    
Therefore, we can state the following: 
Proposition 4:  
When cIX 222 , then C
C  ˆˆ   ]1,0[  
when cIX 222 , if ,1
ccc  then
C
C  ˆˆ   ]1,0[  
when cIX 222 , if )1,(
ccccc    then 
If ],0[
ccc   then 
C




ccc   then C











Next, we need to consider the conditions for the critical values to lie in the meaningful range 
]ˆ,[ MAX . 
We note that MAX
C  ˆˆ  when )(2 XIB  
 








Thus, we observe that the relationship between the critical values )ˆˆ( C
Cand  and gamma max 
( MAXˆ ) is complex. In the following tables, we consider the various combinations that can 
occur, and the effects on the results in proposition 3. In the following tables, we draw these 
results together. 
 
Table 4.5: The relationship between critical Cˆ , Cˆ and MAXˆ   
If 
C
C  ˆˆ   then; 
If 
MAXC
C  ˆˆˆ   Proposition 3 i), a)-c) applies. 
If 
CMAX




MAX  ˆˆˆ    Proposition 3 i), a) applies. 
If C




C  ˆˆˆ   Proposition 3 ii), a)-c) applies. 
If C
MAXC  ˆˆˆ   Proposition 3 ii), a)-b) applies. 
If C
CMAX  ˆˆˆ    Proposition 3 ii), a) applies. 
In the appendix (A2), we present a numerical example for model 2 where the private benefits 
are such that 
MAXC
C  ˆˆˆ  .  
Note that one potential problem in our models is that if the constrains of private benefits B 
from both models are imposed, a common solution to both models may not exist. However, the 






4.5.4 Numerical example for Model 2 
We illustrate model 2 by way of a numerical example with the following parameter values: 
,5.01 p  1.02  , ]9.0,1.0[ˆ2  , 1.0 , 1000HR , 100LR , 50I , 100X , 40B and 
20c .  



























0.1  0.1 0.01 0.01  0.1 0.01 0.01  0 0 0 
0.2  0.2 0.02 0.04  0.2 0.02 0.04  0 0 0 
0.3  0.3 0.03 0.09  0.3 0.03 0.09  0 0 0 
0.4  0.4 0.04 0.16  0.4 0.04 0.16  0 0 0 
0.5  0.5 0.05 0.25  0.5 0.05 0.25  0 0 0 
0.6  0.6 0.06 0.36  0.6 0.06 0.36  0 0 0 
0.7  0.7 0.07 0.49  0.7 0.07 0.49  0 0 0 
0.8  0.8 0.08 0.64  0.8 0.08 0.64  0 0 0 
0.9   0.9 0.09 0.81   0.9 0.09 0.81   0 0 0 
 
Table 4.7. Manager perceived payoff and firm value for given 2ˆ , for the three levels of 
dividends. 
 2ˆ  
















0.1  53 529  51 508  55 550 
0.2  54 533  52 516  55 550 
0.3  55 537  54 524  55 550 
0.4  56 541  56.4 532  55 550 
0.5  57 545  59 540  55 550 
0.6  59 549  62 548  55 550 
0.7  60 553  65 556  55 550 
0.8  62 557  69 564  55 550 
0.9   64 561   73 572   55 550 
 
This numerical example in table 6 shows that manager will never choose medium dividend. 
For a level of overconfidence ]3.0,1.0[ˆ2   manager chooses high dividend as it yields more 
expected payoff than under low dividend.  Also, at this range the firm value is higher under the 
announcement of high dividend than it is under the low dividend announcement 
)()( LH DVDV  which is in line with our proposition 2 (i ,a) and (ii, b). However, when 
4.0ˆ2   manager switches from high to low dividend due to the expected payoff (which is 
higher in the case of low dividend that it would be in the high dividend) and firm value is lower 
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under this announcement than it would have been under the low dividend )()( LH DVDV  , 
again consistent with our proposition 2 (i ,b). The figures 3 and 4 clarify this example. 
 
 





Figure 4.11 presents the relationship between overconfidence and firm value for given levels 


































































4.6 Overconfidence, bounded rationality, and dividend policy 
 
Previous sections analyse the impact of a managerial cognitive bias, overconfidence, on 
dividend policy, without considering managerial bounded rationality. In other words, those 
models assume that there is no limit on manager’s ability to realise the way that the dividend 
announcement is used for: either to commit to higher effort on current project which leads 
overconfident manager to announce sufficiently high dividends as in Model 1; or to pay low 
dividends to enable manager to take the future project as in Model 2.  
Simon (1978) introduces the concept of bounded rationality into the economic literature.  
Guesnerie and Oddou (1988) consider the limited ability of managers to process information 
when modelling the conflict between factors that lead to an increased return to size. Thus, the 
purpose of this section is to study the effect of overconfident manager on dividend policy when 
he has bounded capacity to understand under which regime he is. In other words he believes 
that his payoff of a given dividend announcement moves between the two states. Hence, the 
transition probability between the two states, as well as his overconfidence could have an 
impact on corporate dividend policy. 
Barberis et al. (1998) theoretically demonstrate the important of considering investors’ 
bounded rationality to explain overreaction and underreaction of stock prices. Specifically, they 
assume that investors fail to understand that earnings of assets follow a random walk. Rather 
investors believe earnings are mean-reverting or follow a trend (i.e., earnings increase after an 
increase). Similarly, our model how a manager fails to judge the use of dividend announcement. 
Similar to Barberis et al. (1998) model we assume that manager forms his expectation by given 
probability to each state. 
Recall from the previous two models that the manager’s expected payoff drives the level of 
dividend announcement. Firm value is also affected by the choice of dividend level.  
Managerial bounded rationality also is more likely to have an impact on manager expected 
payoff.  The bounded rationality exists in the form that the manager does not have enough 
information to decide how the dividend announcement is to be used. The limited information 
that manager has lead him to calculate his expected payoff based on the outcome of the two 
states. Given that manager does not fully understand under which models he is, managers 













M DqDqE       (4.35) 
and firm expected value is the weighted average of firm’s value for given choice of dividends 
announcement: 
)()1()()( ,,2,0,,1,00 HMLiMHMLiM DVqDqVVE       (4.36) 
where q is the probability that manager believes he is in Model 1; MM1ˆ and 
M
M 2ˆ are manager 
perceived payoff from Models 1 and 2, respectively for given dividend announcement;  
)( ,, HMLiD  is the announcement of dividend levels either low, medium or high; and 1,0 MV  and 
2,0 MV  are firm expected value in Models 1 and 2, respectively. 
Note that managerial bounded rationality affects his expected payoffs. For example, when 
manager believes that 0q , thus represents a case where the manager fully believes that his 
expected payoff generated from regime 2: Model 2. His expected payoff and firm expected 
value will be as Model 2. However, when the manager assigns probability for Models 1 and 2
)01(  q , his expected payoff and firm expected value are the weighted average of the 
expected managerial payoff and expected firm value from the two models. Therefore, the 
manager bounded rationality affects his expected payoff and firm expected value as follows: 
 
 In the case of low dividends: 
Under the announcement of low dividend, the manager’s perceived payoff is the weighted 
average of his expected payoff from Models 1 and 2 from announcing low dividends. Hence, 






M DqDqDE       (4.37) 
Firm value becomes 
)()1()())(( 2,01,00 LMLML DVqDqVDVE       (4.38) 
where )(ˆ 1 L
M




M D are the manager’s expected payoff from announcing low 
dividends in Model 1 and 2, respectively. )(1,0 LM DV  and )(2,0 LM DV are firm expected value for 






 In the case of medium dividends: 






M DqDqDE      (4.39) 
Firm expected value becomes 
)()1()())(( 2,01,00 MMMMM DVqDqVDVE      (4.40) 
 In the case of high dividends: 






M DqDqDE      (4.41) 
Firm expected value becomes 
)()1()())(( 2,01,00 HMHMH DVqDqVDVE       (4.42) 
4.6.1 Numerical examples 
This section numerically illustrates how managerial bounded rationality could have an impact 
on his expected payoff which perhaps leads manager to change the choice of dividends 
announcement. The parameter values are: ]1,0[q ; ]1,0[ˆˆˆ 21  q ; 1.021   ; 
1.0 ; 1000HR ; 100LR ; 50I ; 100X ; 40B ; and 20c .
30 
Note that 1q represents a case where manager is fully understand that he uses dividends 
announcement to commit to high current effort (as in Model 1) whilst 0q demonstrates a 
case where manager is overconfident about his future ability to affect the success of future 
project (as in Model 2). These two cases reveal that the manager has no bounded rationality. 
However, managerial bounded rationality exists when manager does not have sufficient 
information to decide whether he uses dividend announcement to commit a high current or 
future effort. Thus, the limited information that manager has lead him to form his expectation 
based on the two payoffs from Models 1 and 2: 10  q . 
Table 4.8 summarises managerial decision on dividend announcement level and firm expected 
value for a given level of overconfidence ]1,0[ˆ q  and ]1,0[q . Each panel reports the 
optimal dividend level that manager chooses in order to maximise his expected payoff, i.e., 
)|ˆ(( },,{ HMLi
M DEMax  . The second row of each panel presents that best dividend decision 
that manager should take in order to maximise firm value, i.e., )|(( },,{0 HMLiDVEMax  . 
                                                 
30 Those parameters are the same as in Models 1 and 2. 
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Panel A of Table 4.8 shows that when 1q , the manager is fully understand that he use 
dividends to commit to higher current effort (as in Model 1). Thus, there is no bounded 
rationality in this case. Manager will never announce high dividends as this announcement 
yields manager with the lowest payoffs. At low level of overconfidence 1.0ˆ3.0  q , 
managers chooses low dividends due to the high expected payoff that the manager could obtain 
from this announcement and firm value is higher under this announcement. At level of 
overconfidence where 3.0ˆ q , manager switches from low to medium dividends at which the 
firm value is lower under medium dividend announcement that it would be under the low 
dividend announcement at the overconfident level 6.0ˆ4.0  q . Manager continues to 
choose medium dividends when  6.0ˆ q  where firm value is higher than under the low 
dividends (for more details see appendix A). 
 
Panel B shows the case where managerial bounded rationality exists in the form that his 
expected payoff is generated based on probability of 9.0q  to Model 1. The results show that 
again manager will never choose high dividend announcement. At low level of overconfidence 
1.0ˆ3.0  q  manager’s expected payoff is higher under the announcement of low dividends 
and firm value is greater under this announcement than it would be under other dividend 
announcements. For a level of overconfidence ( 3.0ˆ q ), the expected payoff of manager is 
the same under the announcement of low and medium dividends representing the critical value, 
however, firm expected value is higher under the announcement of the former. Manager 
switches from low to medium dividend when the overconfident parameter exceeds 0.3 (i.e., 
3.0ˆ9.0  q ). However, firm expected value continues to be lower under the announcement 
of medium dividend for an overconfident level 3.0ˆ6.0  q . At a high level of managerial 
overconfidence 6.0ˆ q , the expected firm value is higher under this announcement than it 
would be under the announcement of low dividends (for more details see appendix B). 
Panel C shows the case where manager still assigns more probability to the first regime, i.e., 
8.0q . Comparing manager’s expected payoffs from the three dividend announcements 
reveal that the decision to announce high dividend is dominated. Thus, the manager announces 






Table 4.8: The relationship between managerial overconfidence, bounded rationality, dividend policy and firm value 
 
   ]9.0,1.0[ˆ q  
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Panel ]1,0[q   
A 1 
)|ˆ(( },,{ HMLi
M DEMax   LD   LD   ML DD    MD    MD   MD  MD   MD   MD   

















M DEMax    LD  LD   ML DD    MD    MD   MD  MD   MD   MD   

















M DEMax    LD  LD   ML DD    MD    MD   MD  MD   MD   MD   

















M DEMax    LD  LD   ML DD    MD    MD   MD  MD   MD   MD   

















M DEMax    LD   LD  ML DD    ML DD     MD   MD  MD   MD   MD   
)|(( },,{0 HMLiDVEMax    LD   LD  LD   LD    MD   MD  MD   MD   MD   
F 0.5 
)|ˆ(( },,{ HMLi
M DEMax    HL DD    LD   ML DD    ML DD    MD   MD  MD   MD   MD   
)|(( },,{0 HMLiDVEMax    LD   LD  LD   LD    MD   MD  MD   MD   MD   
G 0.4 
)|ˆ(( },,{ HMLi
M DEMax   HD   LD   MD   MD    MD   MD  MD   MD   MD   
)|(( },,{0 HMLiDVEMax    HD   HD  LD   MD    MD   MD  MD   MD   MD   
H 0.3 
)|ˆ(( },,{ HMLi
M DEMax    HD   HD  MD    LM DD   LM DD   LM DD   LM DD   LM DD   LD   





Table 4.8: Continue… 
 
   ]9.0,1.0[ˆ q  
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Panel ]1,0[q   
I 0.2 
)|ˆ(( },,{ HMLi




MD   LM DD    LM DD    LD   LD   LD   LD   
)|(( },,{0 HMLiDVEMax    HD  HD   H
D  
 
 MH DD   M
D  
 
 MD  




 LD  
J 0.1 
)|ˆ(( },,{ HMLi
M DEMax    HD  HD   MH DD    LM DD    LD   LD   LD   LD   LD   
)|(( },,{0 HMLiDVEMax   HD    HD  
 HD  
 HD  MH












M DEMax   HD    HD  MH DD    LM DD    LD   LD   LD   LD   LD   
)|(( },,{0 HMLiDVEMax   HD    HD  H
D  
 
 HD  H
D  
 







This table presents manager decisions on the level of dividend: },,{|
ˆ(( HMLi
M DEMax  ), and the optimal decision that the manager should take to 
maximise firm’s value:𝐴 )|(( },,{0 HMLiDVEMax  , for a given level of qˆ  and q . 
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This numerical illustration demonstrates that at low level of managerial overconfidence, i.e., 
1.0ˆ3.0  q , manager chooses to announce low the dividend as it yields more payoff and firm value 
is higher under this announcement. The level of overconfidence equals to 0.3 (i.e., 3.0ˆ q ), represents 
the critical level of overconfidence at which his expected payoff from announcing low and medium 
dividends are the same. Beyond the critical value (i.e., 3.0ˆ9.0  q ) manager’s expected payoff is 
higher under the announcement of medium dividends which leads him to switch his announcement to 
this level: announcing medium dividends. The firm expected value drops and continues to be lower 
under this announcement that it would be under the announcement of low dividends for a level of 
overconfidence 3.0ˆ6.0  q . When the overconfident level equals or above 0.6 (i.e., 6.0ˆ q ), firm’s 
expected value is higher under this announcement (for more details see appendix C). 
In Panel D of Table 4.8, the manager continues to put more weight on Model 1 (i.e., 7.0q ). The 
results reveal that, again, manager will never chose to announce high dividend.  For a range of 
managerial overconfidence between 0.1 and 0.3 (i.e., 3.0ˆ1.0  q ) manager announces low dividend 
and he switches to medium dividend when the level of overconfidence exceeds 0.3 (i.e., 3.0ˆ q ). 
Similar to Panel A to C, the critical level of overconfidence is 0.3. Furthermore, the firm expected 
value is higher under the low dividend announcement. Hence, by announcing low dividends manager’s 
payoff and firm expected value is greater than announcing medium or high dividends. However, at the 
level of overconfidence, i.e., 4.0ˆ6.0  q , where manager has already switched to medium 
dividends, the expected firm value is lower under this announcement than it would be under the 
announcement of low dividends. The level of overconfidence that is equal to 0.5 the expected value of 
the firm is the same under the announcement of low and medium dividends. However, at a high level 
of managerial overconfidence (i.e., 6.0ˆ q ) firm value is higher under the announcement of medium 
dividend that it would be under low dividend announcement (for more details see appendix D). 
When manager assigns probability of 0.6 (i.e., 6.0q ) to Model 1 as in Panel E, he will never choose 
to announce high dividends: high divided announcement is dominated. For a level of overconfidence 
( 1.0ˆ3.0  q ) manager chooses to announce low dividend because this announcement yields more 
expected payoff to the manager. Further, firm expected value is higher under this announcement than 
under the medium dividend announcement. Interestingly, at an overconfidence level ( 3.0ˆ4.0  q ) 
manager expected payoffs are the same from announcing low or medium dividend, while the expected 
firm value is higher under the low dividend announcement than it would be under the announcement 
of medium dividends. This represents a situation where manager is indifferent between announcing 
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low or medium dividend. Given that manager is more reluctant to change dividend and there is no 
additional payoff he could obtain from changing dividend level, he is more likely to continue 
announcing low dividends. Manager switches from low to medium dividend at an overconfidence level 
greater than 0.4 (i.e., 4.0ˆ q ) to maximise his expected payoff and this improving firm expected 
value.   Overall, this example shows that although manager decides the level of dividends to maximise 
his payoff, he is also works unintentionally toward maximising shareholder value (for more details see 
appendix E). 
This illustration shows that manager’s expected payoff is generated equally by Models 1 and 2 (i.e., 
5.0q ). Unlike the previous examples (Panels A to D), Panel F reveals that manager might consider 
the announcement of high dividend at a very low of managerial overconfidence (i.e., 1.0ˆ q ). In this 
case, manager maximises his expected payoff by either announce low or high dividends while firm 
value is higher under the announcement of the former. For a level of overconfidence ( 1.0ˆ3.0  q ), 
manager chooses to announce low dividends as it yields more expected payoff and this announcement 
increases firm expected value. At a level of managerial overconfidence ( 3.0ˆ4.0  q ), interestingly, 
manager’s expected payoff is identical under the announcement of low or medium dividends. However, 
firm expected value is higher under the announcement of low dividends. As 4.0ˆ q , medium dividend 
announcement seems to be the best choice for manager in order maximises his expected payoff and 
this rises the expected value of the firm (for more details see appendix F). 
Panel G reveals that, interestingly, in the case manager assigns more weight of being under regime 2: 
Model 2 (i.e., 4.0q ), none of the dividend announcement levels are dominated. As 1.0ˆ q , 
manager chooses to announce high dividend as it yields more expected payoff and firm expected value 
is higher under this announcement compared with the announcement of low or medium dividends. The 
manager switches to low dividend announcement at a level of overconfidence equal to 0.2, while this 
reducing firm expected value. At an overconfidence of 0.3, manager, again, switches to announce 
medium dividends in order to maximise his payoff while this decision drops firm expected value. As 
3.0ˆ q , manager continues to announce medium dividends and firm expected value increases (for 
more details see appendix G).  
Table 4.8, Panel H illustrates a case where manager assigns a probability of 0.7 as being in regime 2 
(Model 2). Low overconfident manager announces high dividend ( 1.0ˆ2.0  q ) due to his expected 
payoff. Manager switches to medium dividend announcement when 3.0ˆ q , while this reducing firm 
expected value. For a level of overconfidence ( 4.0ˆ8.0   ), manager expected payoff from the 
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announcement of medium and low dividends are the same. However, firm value is higher if he 
continues to announce medium dividends. At a high level of overconfidence, 9.0ˆ q , manager 
switches from medium to low dividends while this lead  a drop in firm expected value (for more details 
see appendix H). 
In Panel I manager assigns probability of 0.8 to regime 2, i.e., Model 2.  The numerical example reveals 
that at a level of overconfidence equals to 0.1 managers maximises his expected payoff from 
announcing high dividends. When overconfidence level is equal to 0.2 (i.e., 2.0ˆ q ), manager 
expected payoff from announcing high or medium dividend is the same, representing a critical value. 
Manager switches to medium dividend announcement at overconfident level equals to 0.3, while this 
switching reduces firm value. For a level of overconfidence ( 4.0ˆ5.0  q ), manager expected payoff 
from announcing medium or low dividend are identical: revealing another critical point. When an 
overconfident level is in the range of 6.0ˆ7.0  q , manager switches from medium to low dividend 
announcement, while this drops firm expected value. As 7.0ˆ q manager continues to announce low 
dividend and firm expected value increases (for more details see appendix I). 
The example represents a case where manager believes that he is more likely to work under regime 2 
by assigning probability of 0.9 to Model 2 is presented in Panel J of Table 4.8. The results show that 
manager announces high dividends at an overconfident level 3.0ˆ1.0  q . The critical value is shown 
at an overconfident level equals to 0.3, where the announcement of high or medium dividend yield the 
same expected payoff to the manager. Further, when 4.0ˆ q manger never chooses high dividend 
announcement, and he can shift to either medium or low dividend announcement as they obtain the 
same expected payoff. The switching from high dividend, to the medium or low dividends, reduces 
firm expected value. At a level of overconfidence 5.0ˆ6.0  q , manager announces low dividend 
while this drops firm expected value. As 6.0ˆ q manager continues to choose low dividend 
announcement, while this continuation increases the expected of firm value (for more details see 
appendix J) 
Panel K shows that manager has no bounded rationality, i.e., 0q . The example illustrates a case 
where manager is fully understand that he works under regime 2. The manager will never choose 
medium dividend announcement. Manager obtains maximum payoff from announcing high dividend 
for an overconfident level 1.0ˆ3.0  q  while firm expected value is higher under this announcement.  
Over the range of overconfidence 4.0ˆ6.0  q  manager announces low dividends and this reducing 
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firm expected value.  At an overconfidence level 7.0ˆ q  manger continues on announcing low 
dividend and firm expected value is higher than would be under the medium or high dividend (for more 
details see appendix K). 
Overall the results in Table 4.8 demonstrate the impact of bounded rationality of overconfident 
managers on dividend policy. The study of Brav at al. (2005) reports that firm’s dividend policy varies 
across firms, in spite of the extensive research on this area. This example reveals that bounded 
rationality and overconfidence of a manager might provide additional explanation to the variation in 
dividend policy.  
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter presents theoretical models on the relationship between managerial overconfidence and 
corporate dividend policy. The recent theoretical studies provide inconclusive results on the impact of 
managerial overconfidence on dividend. Wu and Liu (2008) demonstrate that CEO overconfidence 
leads to an increase in dividends, while Deshmukh et al. (2013) show that managerial overconfidence 
tends to reduce dividends.   
This study aim to address this gap by showing under which conditions the relationship between 
managerial overconfidence and dividend can be positive or negative. The paper demonstrates that CEO 
overconfidence increases dividends when he is overconfident about his current ability (in line with Wu 
and Liu, 2008). This leads an overconfident manager to announce sufficiently high dividends to commit 
to investors that he will exert high effort on the current project. The second model shows that when an 
overconfident manager exerts effort on a future project, dividends become negatively correlated with 
overconfidence (consistent with Deshmukh et al., 2013).  
This chapter further investigates the impact of managers’ and investors’ bounded rationality on the 
relationship between overconfidence and dividends. The findings demonstrate that bounded rationality 
could influence the relationship between overconfidence and dividends.  The next chapter will 
empirically investigate the relationship between managerial overconfidence and corporate dividend 







5. Chapter 5: Managerial Overconfidence, Payout Policy and Corporate 
Governance: Evidence from UK Companies31 
5.1 Introduction 
Although many theoretical and empirical studies have been carried out over the last six decades, 
explanations for the variations in dividend policy over time and across firms remains unresolved (Brav 
et al., 2005). Under the assumption of managers’ and investors’ rationality, the earlier studies show 
that dividends can be used as a signalling device (e.g., Miller and Rock, 1985); and to mitigate the 
problem of free cash flow (e.g., Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986). When investors are irrational and 
managers are rational, Baker and Wurgler (2004) demonstrate that rational managers cater for investors 
demands for dividends when those investors place a premium on dividend paying firms. On the other 
hand, Breuer et al. (2014) reveal the importance of behavioral patterns of investors, such as bounded 
rationality, patience and loss aversion regarding their dividend preferences.  
The research on the link between managerial overconfidence and payout policy has been a recently 
emerging area, and hence understudied. In the US, Cordeiro (2009) shows that overconfidence is 
negatively correlated with the propensity to pay dividends, but not with the amount of dividends, when 
using exercisable stock options to proxy managerial overconfidence. Using the same sample and 
measure of overconfidence, Deshmukh et al. (2013) find a negative association between 
overconfidence and the level of dividends. Wu and Liu (2008) theoretically demonstrate that 
overconfident managers are more likely to increase dividends. 
As a consequence, this chapter analyses the impact of overconfidence on both the level of dividends 
and the propensity of firms to pay dividends, as well as the share repurchase policies in the UK, using 
various proxies to quantify these policies. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first that 
examines the association between overconfident CEOs and payout policy outside of the US32, focusing 
on the more recent period of 2000-2012.  The data has been collected from firms’ annual reports and 
other databases, which enables us to obtain a wide range of corporate governance information and CEO 
                                                 
31 We would like to thank participants at the 50th FEBS Conference; and the 50th British Accounting and Finance 
Association (BAFA) Conference for their valuable comments and suggestions. 
32 The literature (see e.g., Aguilera et al., 2006, Farinha, 2003, Franks et al., 2009, Pinkowitz et al., 2006 and Yoshikawa et 
al., 2014) reveals that there are clear differences between the US and the UK regarding corporate governance systems, 
executive compensation policies, cash flow and voting rights, board structure and ownership structure, which has 
implications on issues such as the severity of agency conflicts (free cash flow problems), signalling mechanisms and 
monitoring of management. The literature implies that the UK has stronger corporate governance mechanisms with higher 
influence of institutional investors and has stronger chairmen, compared to the US (see Denis and McConnell, 2003 and 
references therein). These issues are not independent from how CEOs determine their corporate payout policies. Probably 
as a reflection, when our UK results are compared to those of Deshmukh et al. (2013) for US firms, we observe salient 
differences, which we highlight throughout the paper. 
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characteristics, in addition to firm level factors that have not yet been considered when investigating 
the influence of overconfident CEOs on payout policy in the earlier studies. 
These findings make several contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, this study is the first paper 
that considers the effect of overconfident CEOs on payout policy in the UK. I show that overconfident 
managers affect the level of, and the propensity to pay dividends. That is, firms with overconfident 
CEOs pay less and are more likely to reduce dividends compared to those managed by non-
overconfident peers. This key finding is robust to alternative measures of dividend policy, as well as 
considering a number of control variables and different model specifications. The results also reinforce 
the importance of firm characteristics in determining corporate dividend policy in the UK. That is, 
dividends are positively correlated with size, profitability and cash flow; and negatively correlated with 
leverage and investment.  
A second contribution is that, whilst the literature mostly links firm undervaluation to share buybacks 
and generally argues that undervaluation is one of the major determinants of share repurchases, 
virtually no attention has been paid to its effect on corporate dividend policy. In fact, this study is the 
first that associates undervaluation of company shares with dividend policy and demonstrates that 
undervaluation could be considered as an additional factor that influences dividend policy. Specifically, 
we show that firms with a potential for undervaluation pay less dividends and the likelihood of firms 
to pay dividends is decreased in such firms. 
Moreover, neither the amount of, nor the propensity to pay dividends in the UK is affected by the 
dividend premium, which is inconsistent with the catering theory of dividends (Baker and Wurgler, 
2004). Also, corporate governance factors (e.g., board size, institutional holdings and ownership 
concentration) are shown to have a positive impact on the level of dividend payments. However, none 
of these factors influences the propensity of firms to pay dividends. Additionally, we show that CEO 
characteristics, such as age and time in role, can also affect the amount of, and the propensity to pay 
dividends. 
This paper further investigates the influence of managerial overconfidence on the relationship between 
dividends and firm-specific factors (i.e., cash flows, profitability, and growth). The findings reaffirm 
the result that when managerial overconfidence is not considered, higher cash flows lead to higher 
dividend payments. However, the presence of overconfident CEOs reduces this positive association (in 
contrast to Deshmukh et al., 2013). This suggests that overconfident CEOs in the UK may prefer to 
accumulate more cash to avoid relying on external finance (Malmendier and Tate, 2005a; Hackbarth, 
2008) and hence distribute less dividends. A similar result is obtained for the effect of CEO 
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overconfidence on the relationship between dividend policy and profitability. Additionally, I show a 
negative association between dividends and firm growth. However, this link is statistically insensitive 
to managerial overconfidence, and again contradicts the findings of Deshmukh et al. (2013) in the US. 
Furthermore, I find that CEOs stock ownership and option holding are insignificantly correlated with 
the amount of, and the propensity to pay dividends (which is inconsistent with the empirical findings 
of Deshmukh et al., 2013). 
The results also show that overconfident managers in undervalued firms reduce dividends less 
compared to when managers are rational for the same types of firm. This finding seems to go against 
the argument that overconfident CEOs always believe that their stocks are undervalued, even if they 
are not (e.g., Malmendier and Tate, 2005a; Hackbarth, 2008) and hence reduce dividends further. 
Moreover, the impact of CEO overconfidence on the relationship between dividends and corporate 
governance (i.e., board size, ownership concentration and institutional holdings) is examined. The 
results suggest that board size is positively linked with dividends, which is consistent with earlier 
studies. However, this association appears statistically to be the same in firms managed by moderate 
and overconfident managers. Also, the findings reveal that ownership concentration and institutional 
holdings have a positive impact on the amount of dividends. Interestingly, this relationship is stronger 
in firms with overconfident CEOs. These results suggest that investors with large ownership and high 
institutional holdings may force overconfident managers to distribute excess cash to avoid the 
overinvestment problems of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986). Finally, our empirical analysis suggests that 
higher managerial overconfidence leads to more frequent share repurchases and higher amounts spent 
on share buybacks, the effect being statistically significant for the former. Similarly, the effect of 
overconfidence on overall payout policy is negative in terms of its presence and the amount of total 
payouts but whether this inverse relationship is statistically significant depends on how we measure 
this policy. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 briefly discusses the relevant literature. Section 5.3 
presents the development of hypotheses along with variable definitions. Data collection and univariate 
analysis are discussed in section 5.4. and the methodology is described in section 5.5. Section 5.6 
reports the empirical results and various robustness checks. In section 5.7, we provide further evidence 





5.2 Literature review 
Although dividend policy has been extensively studied, its variations over time and across firms 
remains unexplained (Brav et al., 2005). For example, the signalling theory suggests that dividends are 
used as a communication device between insiders and outsiders (Bhattacharya, 1979; John and 
Williams, 1985; Miller and Rock, 1985). Much of the research supports this proposition when testing 
stock market reactions to dividends changes (e.g., Pettit, 1972; Charest, 1978; Asquith and Mullins, 
1983; Bajaj and Anand, 1995). However, studies of the relationship between dividend changes and 
future earnings produce mixed conclusions.33  
According to agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), dividend policy can potentially align the 
interests of managers to those of shareholders. Managers distribute dividends as a commitment not to 
use firms’ free cash flows for private benefits, to eliminate the overinvestment problem and to seek 
external funds for financing new projects, which imposes further monitoring by the capital markets 
(e.g., Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986; Jensen et al., 1992). 
Other studies also investigate the link between corporate governance and dividend policy, arguing that 
strong corporate governance should mitigate agency problems through encouraging managers to pay 
more dividends (e.g., Rozeff, 1982; Dempsey and Laber, 1992; Holder et al., 1998; Michaely and 
Roberts, 2012). However, Grinstein and Michaely (2005) find that institutional holdings are not related 
to dividend policy, and dividends are not used by institutions to control and monitor management 
actions (this is consistent with the results of Brav et al., 2005).34  
In the behavioural finance literature, the catering theory of dividends suggests that firms change their 
dividend policy according to the shareholders’ demand for dividends (Baker and Wurgler, 2004; Li 
and Lie, 2006). However in contrast to these studies, Denis and Osobov (2008) find weak support for 
the catering theory outside of the US.  
Studies have also shown that managerial incentives are related to corporate payout policy (e.g., 
Lambert et al., 1989; Jolls, 1998; Weisbenner, 2000; Fenn and Liang, 2001). Managerial cash 
incentives are found to be positively associated with higher payouts (Lewellen et al., 1987), while 
managerial stock options are found to be negatively correlated with dividends (Lambert et al., 1989; 
Liljeblom and Pasternack, 2006). Fenn and Liang (2001) and Aboody and Kasnik (2001) show that 
                                                 
33 Gonedes (1978), DeAngelo et al. (1996), Benartzi et al. (1997) and Grullon et al. (2005) find that dividend changes have 
no power to predict future earnings. However, in line with the signalling hypothesis, Nissim and Ziv (2001), Chen and 
Wu (1999), Harada and Nguyen (2005) and Stacescu (2006), find a positive correlation between dividend changes and 
future earnings. 




CEOs with stock options are more likely to favour share repurchases over dividends. Cuny et al. (2009) 
report a negative relationship between executive stock options and total payouts. 
Some recent literature on behavioural corporate finance shows that managerial psychological biases, 
such as overconfidence, affect investments and capital structure decisions (e.g., Heaton, 2002; 
Malmendier and Tate, 2005a, 2008; Doukas and Petmezas, 2007; Croci et al., 2010; Malmendier et al., 
2011). 
The research on managerial overconfidence and dividends has only recently emerged, and as yet is 
little understood. Cordeiro (2009) empirically investigates the effect of irrational managers on dividend 
policy in the US during 1984-1994, and shows that overconfident CEOs are less likely to pay dividends. 
However, he finds no evidence of the impact of overconfident managers on the amount of dividends. 
Using the same data and measures of overconfidence, Deshmukh et al. (2013) show that overconfident 
CEOs pay less dividends. Wu and Liu (2008) theoretically demonstrate that overconfident managers 
are more likely to increase dividends due to the overestimation of cash flows from current investments. 
5.3 Hypothesis development 
This section develops hypotheses drawn from the literature review discussed in Chapter 2. The 
academic literature suggests that firm characteristics, corporate governance, managerial 
cognitive/psychological biases and CEO traits have explanatory power in determining corporate 
dividend policy. The empirical predictions of the link between the above factors and dividend policy 
are developed in this section. In addition, the variable definitions are also given. In the following 
sections the developed hypotheses will be empirically examined. 
5.3.1  Managerial overconfidence 
With reference to the earlier review in Chapter 2 (section 2.4.2) which concluded that overconfident 
managers are more likely to do the following: overinvest due to overestimation of the project quality 
(Deshmukh et al., 2013), overestimate a firm’s value and hence view external finance as costly 
(Hackbarth, 2008; Malmendier et al., 2011), engage more in mergers and acquisitions (Doukas and 
Petmezas, 2007; Malmendier and Tate, 2008), invest more in innovation (Hirshleifer et al., 2012).  
These findings suggest that overconfident managers are more likely not to pay or reduce cash dividends 
in order to accumulate cash for future investment. Therefore, we hypothesise that overconfident 




5.3.1.1 Overconfidence measures 
This study captures managerial overconfidence through using the well-documented measure of 
managerial overconfidence found in the literature (Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Croci et al, 2010; 
Andriosopoulos et al., 2013)35, which is based on the timing of the option exercises by firms’ CEOs. 
CEOs are classified as overconfident if they continue holding exercisable options that are in the money 
(at least 40% in the money) to the year-end before the expired year.  Non-overconfident CEOs are 
those who fail to fulfil this condition. 
The intuition behind using this proxy is that risk averse and undiversified CEOs should not hold their 
options until expiration (Carpenter, 1998; Hall and Murphy, 2002). Furthermore, a firm’s board 
prohibits its CEO from hedging the company’s stock options through short-selling and imposes a 
restriction on trading in them. Also, CEOs invest their human capital in their firms, and consequently 
they are highly exposed to firm-specific risks. Hence, it is advisable that CEOs reduce their exposure 
to firms’ risks by exercising options early, especially if they are sufficiently in the money. In contrast, 
if CEOs keep holding their exercisable options when they are sufficiently in the money until the final 
year, this indicates confidence in the future prospects of the companies that they manage.  
In the UK, information on a CEO’s stock options has been disclosed in the annual report since 1997. 
In most cases, the life of a CEO’s granted options is about 10 years, and becomes vested at the 
beginning of year 4. Also, the board’s committee imposes some restrictions on exercising the vested 
options based on certain conditions (e.g., EPS and growth rate).36 Thus, we classify options as 
exercisable if they meet two conditions: those options are vested and meet the exercise restrictions.37 
Following Malmendier and Tate (2008) overconfidence is defined as a binary variable that is equal to 
1 (for all CEO-years) if the CEO holds, at least once during his tenure, exercisable options that are 
sufficiently in the money, meaning at least 40% in the money, to the final year before the year of 
expiration. Further, the overconfidence measure is split into two other indicators, post-holder and pre-
holder, to allow for time variation over the sample period, and to eliminate forward looking information 
in the classification of a CEO  (Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Deshmukh et al., 2013). A post-holder is 
defined by a dummy variable that is 1 in all CEO-years after the CEO, for the first time, holds an option 
                                                 
35 Croci et al. (2010) and Andriosopoulos et al. (2013) use UK data to construct this measure 
36 The four times emoluments rule in the UK restrict the value of options held by CEOs to four times (base salary plus 
bonus) (Kyriacou et al., 2010). However, this would not have an impact on our measure of managerial overconfidence. 
Specifically, our measure depends on whether a CEO holds in the money options (even a signal option) to the last year 
before expiration year (see Malmendier and Tate, 2008). 
37 We find many cases where options were vested but cannot be exercised by CEO dues to the fact that CEO does not meet 
firm’s restriction on those options. In this case we classify those options as non-exercisable. 
123 
 
package until the expiration. A pre-holder is an indicator variable that is 1 if overconfidence is equal 
to 1 and a post-holder is equal to 0. 
5.3.2 CEO traits 
Earlier studies have shown that CEO power, age and nationality affect corporate financial policy (e.g., 
Malmendier et al., 2011; Cronqvist et al., 2012).38 As an extension of this finding, it could be argued 
that overconfident CEOs with more power are more likely to reduce dividends since they believe their 
firms are undervalued, perceive external finance as costly and overestimate the quality of future 
projects. The CEO power is captured by the CEO’s time in the role (measured as the number of years 
that the CEOs have served in their position) and CEO tenure (measured as number of years that the 
CEO has worked in the firm). 
Moreover, the dummy variable, ‘Founder’, is included which is equal to one if the CEO is the firm’s 
founder and 0 otherwise. Furthermore, as this study focuses on listed firms in the UK, a dummy 
variable of the CEO’s nationality is considered which takes the value of 1 if the CEO has British 
nationality and 0 otherwise, similar to the recent study of Andriosopoulos et al. (2013). 
5.3.3  Corporate governance 
5.3.3.1 Board structure 
Section 2.3.2.1 reviews the literature on the crucial role of the board size and board composition in 
aligning the manager’s interest to those of shareholders, which in turn mitigates the free cash flow 
problems, however, no conclusion is made with regard to the association of these factors with dividend 
policy. Thus, this study has no clear prediction on the link between board size and board composition, 
and dividend policy. In this study board size is measured as the sum of outside and inside directors on 
the board, while board composition is defined as the fraction of outside directors with regard to the 
total number of board members (Veprauskaitė and Adams, 2013). 
5.3.3.2 Ownership structure 
Ownership structure (i.e., ownership concentration and institutional holdings) are shown to have a 
significant impact on monitoring internal management and influencing corporate financial policy.39 
Thus, we expect a negative correlation between dividends and ownership concentration, and dividends 
and institutional investors. Ownership concentration is measured by the sum of the stake of all 
shareholders with ownership greater than 3% (Veprauskaitė and Adams, 2013). Institutional holdings 
                                                 
38 As discussed in Chapter 2 section 2.3.1. 
39 As discussed in Chapter 2 section 2.3.2.2. 
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are measured by the sum of the stake of all institutional holding (greater than 3%) scaled by the firms' 
total shares outstanding (Grinstein and Michaely, 2005). 
5.3.4  Firm characteristics 
5.3.4.1 Potential undervaluation 
Recent studies examining the impact of managerial overconfidence on payout policies assume that 
overconfident managers believe their firms to be undervalued (e.g., Cordeiro, 2009; Burg et al., 2012; 
Deshmukh et al., 2013).40 However, none of these studies have paid attention to the influence of 
overconfidence on payout policy in firms with a potential for undervaluation. The influence of 
managers with an overconfidence bias on dividend policy should be more apparent in undervalued than 
non-undervalued firms. Overconfident managers tend to believe their firm to be undervalued, although 
it may not be the case. Then it would be expected that the influence of managerial overconfidence on 
dividend policy is more apparent for firms that are undervalued at low levels compared to the same 
type of firms with rational managers. Following Gong et al. (2008), Barth and Kasznik (1999) and 
Chan et al. (2010), the ratio of book equity to market equity is used as an undervaluation proxy in this 
study.  
5.3.4.2 Ownership of stocks and options by CEOs 
The studies on the relationship between CEO stock and options ownership, and payout policy reveal 
mixed conclusions (as in Chapter 2 section 2.2.3). CEO stock ownership is measured as the total stock 
owned by the CEO as a fraction of total stocks in issue, while CEO option ownership is measured as 
the total number of exercisable options held by the CEO relative to the total stocks in issue (Deshmukh 
et al., 2013).41 
5.3.4.3 Other firm characteristics  
The literature (e.g., Fama and French, 2001, 2002; Denis and Osobov, 2008) affirms that some firm-
specific factors such as size, profitability, cash flow, growth, investment and leverage affect dividend 
policy. The firm size measure is based on either total sales (Size (Sales)) as in Denis and Osobov (2008) 
or total assets (Size (Assets)) as in Fama and French (2001), which is expected to be positively related 
to dividend payments. We measure profitability (ROA) as the ratio of earnings before interest but after 
                                                 
40 As discussed in Chapter 2 section 2.4.2.2. 
41 We also tested for the presence of such a non-linear relationship regarding stock and options ownership but obtained 
insignificant coefficients. However, it should be noted that Farinha (2003) uses share ownership by all directors and 
families as a proxy for insider ownership whereas we use only CEOs’ ownership of stock or options. 
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tax to total assets, and expect it to positively affect dividends. Cash flow (Cash Flow) is measured as 
the ratio of pre-tax profits plus depreciation to total assets. Firms with a high cash flow are expected to 
pay more dividends. Leverage is measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets and it is expected to 
have a negative link with dividends due to its role in mitigating agency conflicts (e.g., Margaritis and 
Psillaki, 2010). The growth rate (Current Growth) is measured as the percentage change in total assets, 
following Fama and French (2001) and Denis and Osobov (2008). It is expected that growth is 
negatively related to dividend policy. Investment is measured as the ratio of the sum of capital 
expenditure plus research and development to total assets (Deshmukh et al., 2013). Investment 
spending is expected to have an inverse relationship with the dividend payments. 
Following Deshmukh et al. (2013), the level of asymmetric information is measured by Tangibility, 
which is fixed assets scaled by total assets (higher tangibility implies lower information asymmetry). 
Signalling theory suggests that firms with more asymmetric information should pay higher dividends.42 
Furthermore, there is no clear prediction on the link between the dividend payment and dividend 
premium outside the US.43 The Dividend Premium is measured by the natural logarithm of the average 
market-to-book ratio of dividend payers minus non-dividend paying firms (Baker and Wurgler, 2004). 
5.4 Data  
5.4.1  Sample construction 
The initial sample covers all non-financial firms in the FTSE All Share Index from 1997 to 2012.44 
Firms not using stock options as a part of CEO compensation package are excluded. Information on 
the number of CEOs granted stock options, the date they were granted, and the strike/exercise price are 
essential components for the construction of the Overconfidence measure (Malmendier and Tate, 
2008). 
A very similar proxy can be constructed using the ExecuComp database (see Campbell et al., 2011; 
Malmendier et al., 2011; Hirshleifer et al., 2012). However, this database does not cover firms in the 
UK. To the best of our knowledge, the only database that provides such information for UK firms is 
BoardEx. However, this source covers the period starting from 1999 and there is a significant amount 
of missing data. For example, for all firms in the FTSE All Share Index from 1999 to 2012 we could 
obtain approximately 530 firm-year observations. We overcome this limitation through using company 
                                                 
42 However, Deshmukh et al. (2013) find that firms with low asymmetric information pay higher dividends, which is 
consistent with Myers and Majluf (1984) and Li and Zhao (2008).  
43 See Chapter 2 section 2.1.3.6.  
44 Banks, insurance firms and other financial firms are excluded from the study sample due to their difference in the financial 
reporting standards from the rest of the sample. Further, utilities firms are excluded because their payout polices and the 
access to external financing are regulated (Renneboog and Trojanowski, 2011). 
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annual reports. This information is collected from annual reports for the years 1997 to 2012. The annual 
reports are either found on Northcote Internet45 or on the company’s website. For firms with no annual 
reports, a direct request (by phone or email) was made to them to provide their annual reports in either 
hard or soft copy format. The initial sample consists of 588 firms. 219 firms from the financial, 
insurance and investment trust sectors are excluded. A further 266 firms were dropped as they had no 
options data or no data for over a one year for any of the variables. All (non-dummy) variables are 
winsorized at 1% and 99% to eliminate outliers. The final sample consists of 103 non-financial 
companies with 972 firm-year observations. Table 5.1 provides the definitions of the variables and the 
data sources. 
5.4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5.2 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables, and the frequency of overconfidence across 
years. Panel A reports five different measures of dividend policy as well as proxies for the policies of 
share buybacks and total payouts. It shows that UK firms distribute the equivalent of 2.9% of their total 
assets as cash dividends (Dividends/TA). The average dividend yield (Dividends/MV) is about 3%, 
which indicates that firms pay 3% relative to the share price as dividends. Also, firms distribute around 
35% of their earnings as dividends (Dividends/Earnings), which is similar to Chay and Suh’s (2009) 
UK study for the period 1994-2005. On the other hand, repurchases (total payouts) are, on average, 1% 
(4%) of total assets, and 6% (30%) of earnings. 
Panel B, Table 5.2 presents firm characteristics that have been documented in the literature to influence 
dividend policy decisions. The entire sample covers a wide range of firm sizes with a mean (median) 
of 13.2 (13.1). The cash flow (Cash Flow) is about 13% and profitability (Profitability) is around 14%. 
The undervaluation indicator, which is the ratio of total assets to the market value of equity, is 
approximately 70%, which is close to Jategaonkar’s (2013) finding for US firms.  
The corporate governance factors are shown in Panel C, which shows that the average board size 
(Board Size) is about 8.5, which is comparable to the previous UK studies (e.g., Conyon and Peck, 
1998; Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998). However, US firms seem to have greater board size (of 9) as 
reported by Combs et al. (2007). Similarly, Veprauskaite and Adams (2013) show that board size is 
about 9 in the UK. The fraction of non-executive directors on the board (Board Composition) is about 
50%, which is identical to what Florackis and Ozkan (2009) reported for UK firms. In Vafeas and 
Theodorou (1998), one-third of UK board directors are independent.  
                                                 
45 See www.northcote.co.uk. 
127 
 
Table 5.1. Definitions of variables and source of data 
Panel A: Dependent variables                                                               Definitions 
Dividends/Assets Ratio of total cash dividends on common stocks to book value of total assets 
Dividends/MV Ratio of total cash dividends on common stocks to market value of equity 
Dividends/Sales Total cash dividends on common stocks scaled by net sales 
Dividends/EBITDA Cash dividends on common stocks scaled by operating income before depreciation and amortization 
Dividends/Earnings Ratio of cash dividends on common stocks to net income minus preferred dividends 
Dividends (Dummy) Dummy variable: 1 if firm pays dividends and 0 otherwise 
Repurchases/Assets Ratio of the amount of share repurchases to the book value of total assets 
Repurchases /MV Ratio of the amount of share repurchases to the market value of equity 
Repurchases /Earnings Ratio of the amount of share repurchases to net income minus preferred dividends 
Repurchases (Dummy) Dummy variable: 1 if the firm repurchased its stocks in the relevant year, 0, otherwise 
Payout/Assets 
The amount of cash dividends on common stock plus the amount of share repurchases scaled by the book value of total 
assets 
Payout/MV The amount of cash dividends on common stock plus the amount of share repurchases scaled by market value of equity 
Payout/Earnings 
The amount of cash dividends on common stock plus the amount of share repurchases scaled by net income minus preferred 
dividends 
Payout (Dummy) Dummy variable:1 if total payout (i.e., dividends plus repurchases) is non-negative; 0, otherwise 
 
Panel B: Firm-specific factors  
Size (Assets) Natural logarithm of total assets (in thousands) in 2000 prices  
Size (Sales) Natural logarithm of total sales (in thousands) in 2000 prices 
Cash Flow Ratio of pre-tax profit plus depreciation to book value of total assets  
Cash Flow 2 Ratio of operating income before depreciation less capital expenditures to book value of total assets 
Cash Holdings Ratio of cash and cash equivalent to book value of total assets 
Profitability Ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to book value of total assets  
ROA Ratio of net income to book value of total assets  
RE/TA Ratio of retained earnings to book value of total assets 
Undervaluation Ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity 
Leverage Ratio of long-term debt plus long term debt in short term liability to the book value of assets 
Leverage 2 Ratio of total debt to market value of equity 
Market-to-Book  
Ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets, where market value of assets is book value of assets plus market 
value of equity minus book value of equity 
Current Growth  Change in total assets divided by total assets in the previous year 
Future Growth  Ratio of market value of equity to book value of total assets 
Capex Ratio of capital expenditures to book value of total assets  
Tangibility Ratio of plant, property and equipment to book value of total assets 
Dividend Premium The difference between the natural logarithm of average market-to-book-ratio of dividend payers and non-dividend payers  
Stock Return Change in annual stock returns divided by stock returns in the previous year 
Investment Ratio of sum of capital expenditures and research and development expenses to book value of total assets 
 
Panel C: Corporate Governance   
Board Size Total number of board members (both insider and outsider) 
Board Composition Ratio of the number of independent members in the board to the total board members 
Institutional 3% The amount of all institutional holdings (greater than 3%) scaled by firms' total shares outstanding 
Institutional 5% The amount of all institutional holdings (greater than 5%) scaled by firms' total shares outstanding 
Concentration 3% The sum of stakes of all shareholders with ownership greater than 3% 
Concentration 5% The sum of stakes of all shareholders with ownership greater than 5% 
Largest Three The sum of stakes of the largest three shareholders scaled by the firm's total shares outstanding 
 
Panel D: CEO Characteristics  
Overconfidence 
Dummy variable: 1 if the CEO holds stock options, at least once during his tenure, until the expiry date or until the last year 
before the expiry date and the options held are at least 40% in the money entering its final year; 0, otherwise 
Post-Holder Dummy variable: 1 if the CEO, for the first time, held option package until expiration; 0, otherwise 
Pre-Holder Dummy variable: 1 if Overconfidence is 1and Post-Holder is 0; 0, otherwise 
Option Ownership Ratio of the number of exercisable options owned by the CEO to the total shares outstanding 
Stock Ownership Ratio of the number of stocks owned by the CEO to the total shares outstanding 
Age Age of the CEO  
CEO Tenure Number of years that the CEO worked for the firm 
CEO in Role Number of years that the CEO served in their position 
Founder Dummy variable: 1 if the CEO is the founder of the company, 0, otherwise 
Duality Dummy variable: 1 if the CEO also serves as the board chair, 0, otherwise 
British  Dummy variable: 1 if the CEO holds the British nationality, 0, otherwise 
Notes: The source of data is i) Thomson DataStream for the variables in Panels A and B; ii) BoardEx and company annual reports for the variables ‘Board 
Size, Board Composition, Option Ownership, Stock Ownership, Age, CEO Tenure, CEO in Role, Founder, Duality and British; iii) Thomson One for 




The recent increase in independent directors might be attributed to the recent corporate governance 
initiatives (Higgs, 2003), which recommends at least 50% of the board should be independent. In the 
US, board composition provides a different picture: Combs et al. (2007) find that US firms have about 
43% of outside directors on their boards. These differences between the US and the UK might be 
attributed to different corporate governance codes. Institutional ownership (Institutional 3%) is about 
83%, reflecting the fact that the major UK investors are institutional rather than small or individual (as 
in Veprauskaitė and Adams, 2013). Besides, the sum of stakes of all investors with greater than 3% 
(Concentration 3%) and 5% (Concentration 5%) equity ownership is about 27% and 20% respectively.  
Panel D, Table 5.2 reports the statistics for CEO characteristics. Over one-third of the CEOs in our 
sample are classified as overconfident (Overconfidence). This is similar to Croci et al.’s (2010) UK 
study of takeovers, but much higher than the findings of Andriosopoulos et al. (2013) and Deshmukh 
et al. (2013) for the UK and the US respectively. Andriosopoulos et al. (2013) report that 11% of the 
CEOs are overconfident based on a much smaller sample, and Deshmukh et al. (2013) focus on 
different markets and cover an earlier period (1984-1994). The mean proportion of exercisable options 
owned by CEOs (Option Ownership) is 0.2%, and the mean share ownership level by CEOs (Stock 
Ownership) is 2.4% with a maximum of 40%46. The average CEO age (Age) is 52 and lies within the 
range of 38-67 years. The average CEO tenure (CEO Tenure) is about 14 years; the average CEO time 
in the role (CEO in Role) is about 8 years; 15% of the CEOs (Founder) are also the founders. Finally, 
80% of CEOs in our sample are British citizens (British).  
5.4.3 Pairwise correlations 
Table 5.3 presents the pairwise correlations among the variables. Panel A shows that Overconfidence 
is negatively (positively) correlated with all the dividend and payout (repurchases) policy proxies. 
Moreover, Overconfidence is positively correlated with the firm-specific characteristics of Size, Capex, 
Tangibility and Investment. These results suggest that overconfident managers buy back more shares, 
pay less dividends (Deshmukh et al., 2013) and invest more (e.g., Malmendier and Tate, 2005a). Panel 
B reveals that overconfidence is positively correlated with the board size and negatively correlated 
with the rest of  corporate governance variables ;and Panel C shows that all CEO traits are significantly 
associated with overconfidence, which contrasts with Malmendier and Tate’s (2005a) study based on 
US firms. This difference prompts us to re-examine the relationship between overconfidence and 
dividend policy in the UK. 
                                                 
46 The large number of CEO stock ownership might due to some of the CEOs being the founders of firms they manage. For 
example, R.S Kelvin in Ted Baker plc.; Charles Wigoder in Telecom Plus plc.; and Zvi Marom in Batm Advanced plc. 
are both the CEOs and the founders.  
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Table 5.2. Descriptive statistics   
Panel A. Mean Median SD Min Max   Panel B. Mean Median SD Min Max 
Dividends/Assets 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.20  Size (Assets) 13.24 13.06 1.70 10.09 18.41 
Dividends/MV 0.03 0.03 0.28 0.00 0.17  Size (Sales) 13.10 13.00 1.76 9.04 18.61 
Dividends/Sales 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.30  Cash Flow 0.13 0.12 0.09 -0.13 0.44 
Dividends/EBITDA 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.00 0.97  Cash Flow 2 0.09 0.09 0.08 -0.19 0.39 
Dividends/Earnings 0.35 0.34 0.23 0.00 0.99  Cash Holdings 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.00 0.56 
Dividends (Dummy) 0.89 1.00 0.31 0.00 1.00  Profitability 0.14 0.13 0.08 -0.07 0.45 
Repurchases/Assets 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.22  ROA 0.07 0.06 0.07 -0.20 0.32 
Repurchases /MV 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.14  RE/TA 0.20 0.24 0.33 -1.53 0.99 
Repurchases /Earnings 0.06 0.00 0.18 0.00 2.85  Undervaluation 0.70 0.89 0.87 0.11 4.32 
Repurchases (Dummy) 0.33 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00  Leverage 0.29 0.14 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Payout/Assets 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.30  Leverage 2 0.86 0.59 0.86 0.02 4.74 
Payout/MV 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.25  Market-to-Book 1.89 1.47 1.35 0.66 9.58 
Payout/Earnings 0.30 0.25 0.24 0.00 2.63  
Current 
Growth  
0.15 0.08 0.30 -0.27 1.70 
Payout (Dummy) 0.90 1.00 0.29 0.00 1.00  Future Growth  1.33 0.89 1.41 0.16 9.56 
       Capex 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.25 
Panel C. Mean Median SD Min Max  Tangibility 0.30 0.25 0.25 0.01 0.92 
Board Size 8.5 8.0 2.7 4.0 19.0  
Dividend   
Premium 
-0.14 -0.01 0.44 -2.23 0.14 
Board Composition 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.8  Stock Return 0.16 0.10 0.48 -0.72 1.98 
Institutional 3% 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.8  Investment 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.49 
Institutional 5% 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.7        
Concentration 3% 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.8  Panel E. Overconfidence across years 
Concentration 5% 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.8  Year OC NOC Total   
Largest Three 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.7  2000 10 14 24   
       2001 18 26 44   
Panel D. Mean Median SD Min Max  2002 24 38 62   
Overconfidence 0.35 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00  2003 26 48 74   
Post-Holder 0.16 0.00 0.37 0.00 1.00  2004 26 49 75   
Pre-Holder 0.18 0.00 0.38 0.00 1.00  2005 30 54 84   
Option Ownership 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03  2006 30 57 87   
Stock Ownership 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.40  2007 30 60 90   
Age 51.82 52.00 6.57 38.00 67.00  2008 30 61 91   
CEO Tenure 14.23 12.80 8.64 0.60 36.90  2009 31 57 88   
CEO in Role 7.90 6.70 5.85 0.20 25.90  2010 31 58 89   
Founder 0.15 0.00 0.36 0.00 1.00  2011 27 61 88   
Duality 0.22 0.00 0.42 0.00 1.00  2012 24 52 76   
British  0.80 1.00 0.40 0.00 1.00  Total 337 635 972   
             
Panel F.                     
Year Div TA Payout% No. of firms pay Div 
No. of firm not 
paying Div 
Total      
2000 4.4 112.3 3.9 22 2 24     
2001 5.3 152.1 3.5 39 5 44     
2002 6.7 165.3 4.1 54 8 62     
2003 7.0 203.4 3.4 64 10 74     
2004 8.1 214.6 3.8 67 8 75     
2005 8.6 225.4 3.8 77 7 84     
2006 9.7 266.3 3.6 78 9 87     
2007 10.1 271.7 3.7 80 10 90     
2008 12.4 394.4 3.2 82 9 91     
2009 14.2 415.4 3.4 75 13 88     
2010 9.8 433.0 2.3 73 16 89     
2011 10.9 446.0 2.4 78 10 88     
2012 11.7 450.5 2.6 69 7 76     
Notes: N is 972 for all variables in panels A to F; the panel titles are as in Table 5.1. In Panel E, OC (NOC) means overconfidence (non-overconfidence); overconfidence 
indicates that the manager holds in the money vested options (at least 40% in the money) at least once during his tenure as a CEO to the last year before the expiry date and non-
overconfidence represents a manager who is not classified as overconfident. In Panel D, the median values for some variables are (very close to) 0 or 1 as they are binary dummy 
variables. Our descriptive statistics regarding Option Ownership and Stock Ownership are very similar to those reported by Malmendier and Tate (2005a, 2011), noting that 
they multiply the figures of the former by 10 to compare the mean of both factors. See Table 5.1 for the definitions of variables. Panel F reports the amount of dividend (Div), 
Total assets (TA), payout (Div/TA) in percentage and number of firms that pay and don’t pay dividend (Div and TA are in millions). 
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5.5 Methodology  
5.5.1 The Regression Model 
The earlier studies have shown that managerial overconfidence, firm-specific factors, corporate 
governance and CEO characteristics can significantly explain corporate payout policies. We examine 
the effect of these factors on payout policy using the following model:  
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +  Σ𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + Σ𝜔𝜙𝑖,𝑡−1 + Σψ𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡        (5.1)               
where Payout is the proxy for dividends, share buybacks or total payout policy for firm i at time t; 
Overconfidence is a dummy variable that is 1 if the CEO is classified as overconfident; 0, otherwise; 
X, ϕ, and Z are sets of firm-specific, corporate governance, and CEO characteristics, respectively; β's, 
ω and ψ are estimable parameters and ε is the error term. All explanatory variables are lagged by one 
year to partially account for the potential endogeneity problem. Year and industry dummies are 
included in all models. The definitions of variables are presented in Table 5.1. Equation (5.1) is used 
as the basis to consider different combinations of the explanatory variables. 
5.5.2 Estimation Methods 
Previous studies that have investigated the determinants of dividend policy have employed various 
estimation methods (e.g., GLS, LSDV, Fixed effects and Tobit).  The estimation methods such as 
generalised least square with respect to the random effects model (GLS) and the least squares with 
dummy variables model (LSDV) exclude firms that do not pay dividends from the sample. In this 
context, Kim and Maddala (1992) argue that eliminating firms with zero dividend observations causes 
selection biases, particularly, when there are many firms in the sample exhibiting this phenomena. 
Similarly, Deshmukh (2003) states that ignoring non-dividend-paying firms from the empirical 
analysis leads to inconsistent estimates of the underlying parameters. Furthermore, dropping firms that 
do not pay dividends will reduce the number of observations in the regression by almost 11%.47 
 Additionally, fixed effects regressions using panel data can be employed to explain the variation about 
the mean of the dependent variable (i.e., dividends) in terms of the variations about the mean of the 
predictors’ variables for the group of observations relating to a given firm. This approach tackles 
unobserved heterogeneity bias. However, the feature of our main independent variable: overconfidence 
which is a dummy variable, does not vary much within a firm. Therefore, identifying the effect of 
overconfidence on dividend policy from time-series variation within the firm is not feasible in this 
study. 
                                                 
47 In this study sample, we have identified that around 11% of firms do not pay dividends.  
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The Tobit estimation method has been used in this study with a left-censoring limit at zero for two 
main reasons. Firstly, in paying dividends, firms have two options either to pay or not. Hence, the 
observed dependent variable, i.e. the dividends, exhibits special features as it takes values which are 
positive or zero and not negative (a censored dependent variable). Second, this estimation method does 
not exclude non-paying dividend firms in the sample which eliminates the selection biases and 
increases the sample size for this study.48 This method has been extensively used in recent studies of 
the determinants of dividend policy (e.g., De Cesari, 2012; De Cesari and Ozkan, 2015; Deshmukh et 
al., 2013). The model would be 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑖,𝑡
∗ =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +  Σ𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + Σ𝜔𝜙𝑖,𝑡−1 + Σψ𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡        (5.2) 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑖,𝑡
∗       𝑓𝑜𝑟    𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑖,𝑡
∗ > 0 
 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 0                     𝑓𝑜𝑟     𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑖,𝑡
∗ ≤ 0 
It is worth noting that the estimated coefficients from equation (5.2) measure the partial effects of the 
independent variables on 𝐸(𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡∗|𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠), where 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡∗ is the latent variable. 
However, this study aims to explain the observed outcome, i.e. 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡: 𝐸(𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡|𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 >
0, 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠). This tells us, for given values of the independent variables, the expected value of 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 for the subsample where 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 is positive. Hence, the marginal effects at the mean (MEMs) are also 
computed for the observed 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 (Wooldridge, 2006, p595-604). 
This study also investigates the impact of managerial overconfidence on the propensity to pay 
dividends. Earlier studies use either logit or probit estimation methods to assess the impact of various 
variables on the probability of paying dividends. For instance, the impact of cash-flow uncertainty 
(Chay and Suh, 2009); the life cycle theory (Brockman and Unlu, 2011); and corporate governance 
(Jiraporn et al., 2011) on the likelihood of paying dividends are examined using one of these estimation 
methods. This study follows the same approach to assess the influence of managerial overconfidence 
on the likelihood of paying dividends by employing probit estimation methods with panel data. The 
dependent variable is Dividend payment (dummy) which takes the value of 1 if the firm pays a dividend 
and 0 otherwise. Similar to the Tobit model, the marginal effects at the means are also estimated. It 
measures the change in the probability of 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 for a change in the independent variable, holding all other 
variables at their mean values. 
5.5.3 Collinearity and Model Specifications 
A strong relationship between independent variables in the regression creates collinearity which can 
lead to a reduction in the stability of the estimated parameters, inflating the standard errors and lowering 
                                                 
48 This argument can also be applied to repurchases and total payout. 
132 
 
the power to measure the effect. This study primarily uses the correlation matrix to detect this problem 
and, hence, will not be including two highly correlated variables in the same model. In this section, a 
more advanced collinearity diagnostic is calculated based on the variance inflation factor (VIF).  
The VIF examines how the collinearity affects the variance of the estimated coefficients. The 
collinearity can be a problem when the VIF is greater than 10 (Belsley et al., 2005). The VIF is 
computed for all estimated models in order to check if collinearity is a major concern in the sample. In 
all the models the highest value of the VIF is 2.31 and the average VIF is 1.44. These findings indicate 
that collinearity is not a major problem in this study. 
Furthermore, in all Tobit models, the likelihood-ratio tests are performed to compare the Tobit model 
using a panel with the Tobit model using pooled data. The results in all models strongly favour the 
random effects Tobit model.49 However, an option to cluster standard errors is not available when using 
the Tobit random effects model. Nevertheless, the estimated results of the Tobit random effects model 
are not expected to be affected by the clustering for two reasons. Firstly, the number of firms (103) 
exceeds the number of years (12) in the study sample. Secondly, all the reported results control for year 
and industry fixed effects. For a robustness check, all regressions are carried out using Tobit models 





                                                 
49 It is worth mentioning that estimation of conditional fixed effects for Tobit models is not possible because sufficient data 




Table 5.3. Correlation matrix 
Panel A. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) 
(1) Overconfidence                            
(2) Dividends/Assets -0.20                           
(3) Dividends/MV -0.17 0.44                          
(4) Dividends/Sales -0.01 0.57 0.33                         
(5) Dividends/Earnings -0.13 0.66 0.60 0.58                        
(6) Dividends/EBITDA -0.10 0.20 0.23 0.16 0.26                       
(7) Repurchases/Assets 0.03 0.34 -0.02 0.21 0.08 -0.01                      
(8) Repurchases /MV 0.09 0.15 0.09 0.11 0.04 -0.01 0.80                     
(9) Repurchases /Earnings 0.06 0.16 -0.01 0.14 0.04 -0.01 0.86 0.82                    
(10) Repurchases (Dummy) 0.10 0.17 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.03 0.43 0.49 0.47                   
(11) Payout/Assets -0.10 0.81 0.29 0.48 0.49 0.14 0.79 0.59 0.61 0.37                  
(12) Payout/MV -0.06 0.40 0.77 0.30 0.44 0.16 0.48 0.68 0.43 0.33 0.57                 
(13) Payout/Earnings -0.11 0.47 0.51 0.26 0.59 0.55 0.39 0.37 0.44 0.29 0.55 0.59                
(14) Payout (Dummy) -0.01 0.30 0.37 0.26 0.41 0.15 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.23 0.26 0.32 0.42               
(15) Size (Assets) 0.08 -0.08 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.15 0.21 0.22 0.30 0.07 0.19 0.21 0.22              
(16) Cash Flow  -0.02 0.56 0.04 0.25 0.19 0.03 0.30 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.52 0.12 0.17 0.26 -0.14             
(17) Profitability  -0.05 0.58 0.05 0.19 0.13 0.03 0.29 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.51 0.11 0.17 0.22 -0.12 0.87            
(18) ROA  0.01 0.53 0.04 0.31 0.22 0.00 0.29 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.48 0.11 0.14 0.25 -0.09 0.91 0.76           
(19) RE/TA 0.05 0.18 0.10 0.19 0.10 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.10 0.12 0.32 0.14 0.31 0.29 0.32          
(20) Undervaluation -0.02 -0.34 0.18 -0.20 -0.14 0.02 -0.18 -0.08 -0.14 -0.12 -0.32 0.09 -0.07 -0.06 0.08 -0.50 -0.42 -0.45 -0.07         
(21) Leverage  0.02 -0.23 0.13 -0.09 -0.15 0.03 -0.11 -0.02 -0.08 -0.08 -0.21 0.09 -0.07 -0.03 0.19 -0.36 -0.26 -0.33 -0.13 0.70        
(22) Current Growth  -0.03 0.40 -0.18 0.14 0.02 -0.05 0.27 0.07 0.12 0.04 0.37 -0.08 -0.03 -0.14 -0.23 0.49 0.49 0.47 -0.12 -0.53 -0.33       
(23) Capex 0.11 0.02 -0.07 -0.07 -0.11 0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.06 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.28 0.22 0.14 0.11 -0.16 -0.05 0.12      
(24) Tangibility 0.14 -0.07 0.04 -0.04 -0.11 0.01 0.03 0.15 0.08 0.16 -0.01 0.11 0.03 0.11 0.25 0.06 0.06 -0.04 0.11 0.08 0.31 -0.15 0.59     
(25) Future Growth -0.01 0.38 -0.22 0.16 0.01 -0.06 0.27 0.07 0.12 0.04 0.36 -0.10 -0.05 -0.17 -0.26 0.50 0.48 0.48 -0.06 -0.56 -0.38 0.98 0.13 -0.16    
(26) Dividend Premium -0.04 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.07 -0.13 -0.11 -0.09 0.04 0.15 0.10 -0.20 -0.14 -0.08 -0.19   
(27) Stock Return 0.04 -0.02 -0.23 0.02 -0.10 -0.06 0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.17 -0.12 -0.01 -0.13 0.14 0.09 0.15 -0.03 -0.33 -0.22 0.32 -0.02 -0.03 0.33 -0.11  
(28) Investment 0.07 -0.04 -0.21 -0.09 -0.19 -0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.13 -0.14 -0.30 -0.16 0.17 0.11 0.04 -0.21 -0.30 -0.19 0.45 0.61 0.22 0.48 -0.12 0.06 
                             
Panel B. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  Panel C.   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)        
(1) Overconfidence         (1) Overconfidence                
(2) Board Size 0.16        (2) Option Ownership 0.14               
(3) Board Composition -0.18 -0.09       (3) Stock Ownership -0.02 0.02              
(4) Institutional 3% -0.05 -0.10 -0.04      (4) Age 0.08 0.07 -0.05             
(5) Institutional 5% -0.07 -0.08 -0.09 0.94     (5) CEO Tenure 0.08 -0.11 -0.01 0.23            
(6) Concentration 3% -0.07 -0.21 -0.10 0.81 0.78    (6) CEO in Role 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.37 0.53           
(7) Concentration 5% -0.09 -0.19 -0.14 0.72 0.79 0.95   (7) Founder 0.12 0.19 0.56 -0.03 0.16 0.30          
(8) Largest Three -0.10 -0.17 -0.17 0.64 0.68 0.91 0.94  (8) Duality 0.20 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.06 -0.02 0.00         
          (9) British  0.13 -0.14 -0.01 -0.08 0.15 -0.02 -0.04 0.03        
Notes: This table reports the pairwise correlations among the variables for the firm-specific factors (Panel A), corporate governance factors (Panel B) and CEO characteristics (Panel C). The figures in bold indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 1% significance level. The 




5.6 Empirical results 
5.6.1 Overconfidence and dividend levels 
Table 5.4 investigates the impact of overconfidence, firm characteristics, corporate governance 
and CEO traits on dividend payments relative to total assets. In all models Overconfidence 
coefficients are negative and statistically significant, indicating that firms with overconfident 
managers pay less dividends compared to their rational peers. This key finding is robust to 
whether the model excludes or includes explanatory variables other than Overconfidence. This 
confirms that the effect of managerial overconfidence on dividend policy is not exclusive to 
US firms (Deshmukh et al., 2013) and should be recognized as an important determinant in the 
UK as well. 
The results in models 2 to 5 in Table 5.4 show that Cash Flow, Size and ROA have positive and 
significant coefficients, indicating that large and profitable firms and those with high cash 
flows pay more dividends compared to their counterparts, which are in line with Fama and 
French (2001) and Deshmukh et al. (2013). On the other hand, Leverage, Current Growth and 
Investment are significant and negatively related to dividends, implying that firms with high 
leverage, more growth opportunities and more investments pay less dividends, which confirms 
other results such as, Jiraporn et al. (2011). 
Furthermore, Tangibility and Dividend Premium50 are insignificantly related to dividends. 
These findings imply that the level of asymmetric information is not related to dividends, which 
is inconsistent with both the signalling hypothesis and Deshmukh et al.’s (2013) findings. The 
dividend premium results are in line with Denis and Osobov (2008) in the UK, and Baker and 
Wurgler (2004) in the US, and Li and Lie (2006). Moreover, the estimates regarding 
Undervaluation are negative and highly significant, indicating that (potentially) undervalued 
firms pay less dividends. One possible interpretation of this finding is that managers in such 
firms may view their company as undervalued and prefer to distribute cash to shareholders 
through alternative payout channels (e.g., share repurchases). This would suggest that 
dividends are not used to convey to the market that a firm’s stock is undervalued and hence 
could not be used as a signal for undervaluation. This, to some extent, supports previous work 
                                                 
50 In a separate set of regressions in this table and the others, we excluded Dividend Premium as it may be an 
endogenous factor. However, our analyses show that we do not suffer from this issue as the results are 
qualitatively the same. 
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which shows that firms use share buybacks rather than dividends as a signal for undervaluation 
(e.g., Dann, 1981; Wansley et al., 1989; Ikenberry et al., 1995). 
Table 5.4. Overconfidence and dividend levels 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Overconfidence -0.007* -0.009** -0.009** -0.008* -0.009** -0.007* -0.007* -0.009** -0.012*** -0.011***  
 (-1.71) (-2.33) (-2.46) (-1.92) (-2.35) (-1.74) (-1.72) (-2.11) (-2.82) (-2.78)  
Pre-Holder           -0.012*** 
           (-2.72) 
Post-Holder           -0.011** 
           (-2.52) 
Cash Flow  0.117*** 0.108***         
  (9.39) (8.58)         
Leverage  -0.006**   -0.006**       
  (-2.24)   (-2.37)       
Size (Assets)  0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003** 0.003**    0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 
  (3.00) (3.00) (2.11) (2.52)    (1.99) (2.03) (2.03) 
Current Growth  -0.005** -0.005** -0.006** -0.006**    -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** 
  (-1.99) (-2.29) (-2.46) (-2.39)    (-2.38) (-2.37) (-2.37) 
Tangibility  -0.009 -0.010 -0.0005 -0.004    -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
  (-1.29) (-1.42) (-0.06) (-0.60)    (-0.75) (-0.87) (-0.87) 
Stock Return  -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001    -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  (-0.72) (-1.53) (-1.23) (-0.74)    (-1.50) (-1.51) (-1.51) 
Dividend Premium  -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.001 -0.001    -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0006 
  (-0.20) (-0.05) (-0.66) (-0.48)    (-0.34) (-0.25) (-0.28) 
Undervaluation   -0.004*** -0.006***     -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
   (-4.17) (-6.37)     (-4.66) (-4.64) (-4.64) 
Investment    -0.047**        
    (-2.35)        
ROA     0.122***    0.116*** 0.117*** 0.116*** 
     (8.22)    (7.63) (7.65) (7.62) 
Board Size      0.001* 0.001**  0.001* 0.001** 0.001** 
      (1.93) (2.00)  (1.95) (2.03) (2.02) 
Board Composition      0.005 0.005  0.004 0.005 0.005 
      (0.57) (0.59)  (0.53) (0.57) (0.57) 
Institutional 3%      0.010   0.019***   
      (1.44)   (2.76)   
Concentration 3%       0.0001   0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
       (1.50)   (2.89) (2.89) 
Option Ownership        -0.264 -0.214 -0.221 -0.214 
        (-1.49) (-1.25) (-1.29) (-1.24) 
Stock Ownership        -0.044 -0.010 -0.018 -0.018 
        (-1.05) (-0.25) (-0.46) (-0.47) 
Duality        0.0002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
        (0.05) (-0.63) (-0.63) (-0.63) 
Age        0.0007*** 0.0005** 0.0005** 0.0005* 
        (2.60) (1.96) (1.96) (1.88) 
CEO Tenure        0.00002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
        (0.09) (-0.77) (-0.83) (-0.84) 
CEO in Role        -0.0007*** -0.0006** -0.0006** -0.0006** 
        (-2.66) (-2.42) (-2.38) (-2.36) 
Founder        0.007 0.004 0.003 0.003 
        (0.80) (0.52) (0.43) (0.43) 
British        0.005 0.007 0.007* 0.007* 
        (1.09) (1.62) (1.67) (1.67) 
Constant 0.026*** -0.036* -0.030 -0.002 -0.023 0.013 0.012 -0.005 -0.051** -0.052** -0.052** 
 (4.86) (-1.95) (-1.62) (-0.07) (-1.22) (1.53) (1.39) (-0.37) (-2.15) (-2.21) (-2.17) 
            
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
χ2 20.23 134.8*** 148.6*** 74.48*** 112.6*** 26.13* 26.30* 35.63** 154.3*** 155.0*** 155.2*** 
Log likelihood 2021.2 2075.8 2082.0 2047.9 2066.3 2024.1 2024.2 2028.9 2085.4 2085.8 2085.8 
Firms 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 
Observations 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 
Notes: This table reports outputs from a random-effects Tobit model on panel data. The dependent variable is Dividends/Assets. See Table 5.1 for the definition of 
variables. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. The variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. z values are reported in the parentheses. ***, 
**, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Model 6 in Table 5.4 shows that Board Size has a positive and significant coefficient. This 
result may suggest that firms with more directors on the board force managers to pay more 
dividends to mitigate the agency costs of free cash flow (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The 
coefficient on Institutional 3% is insignificant indicating that institutional holdings do not exert 
any significant influence over dividends (as in Grinstein and Michaely, 2005). In model 7, 
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Institutional 3% is replaced by Concentration 3%51, ownership concentration not related to 
dividends. Model 8 shows that the coefficient of Age is positive and significant, which implies 
that as a CEO becomes older, they pay more dividends. It may be that older CEOs prefer not 
to accumulate cash for future investments such as for mergers and acquisitions (Yim, 2013). 
Hence, they may prefer to pay more dividends in order to boost the market price. Model 8 also 
shows that CEO in Role is negatively related with dividends. This might occur because, as a 
CEO’s tenure increases, so does his power over the board, and hence he forces a reduction in 
dividends to fund new projects internally.  
In the more comprehensive models 9 and 10 of Table 5.4, the negative coefficient on 
Overconfidence increases in magnitude, being significant at the 1% level. Institutional 3% has 
a positive and highly significant coefficient at the 1% level, indicating that institutional 
holdings are closely associated with dividends. This is consistent with Short et al. (2002) who 
report that dividend policy is positively correlated with institutional holdings in the UK, which 
is in contrast to Grinstein and Michaely (2005) in the US. Concentration 3% also has a positive 
coefficient that is significant at the 1% level, indicating that firms with higher concentrated 
ownership pay more dividends. This result is in line with Holder et al. (1998) but inconsistent 
with Oswald and Young (2008) where they find that firms with large outside shareholders do 
not use dividends as a monitoring device. Furthermore, the coefficient estimates on British 
becomes significantly positive, showing that British CEOs pay higher dividends than their 
peers. All other variables retain their signs and significance levels.  
In model 11 of Table 5.4, Pre-Holder and Post-Holder replace Overconfidence to allow for 
time variation in the sample and eliminate forward looking behaviour in the CEO 
classifications. The findings reveal that the coefficients for both factors are significantly 
negative, suggesting the impact of managerial overconfidence on dividends is persistent and 
does not vary overtime once the CEOs become overconfident. This finding is in line with 
Malmendier and Tate (2008), and Deshmukh et al. (2013) for US firms. All other results remain 
qualitatively the same, indicating the robustness of the impact of managerial overconfidence 
on dividend policy.52 
                                                 
51 We avoided including both factors in the same model due to the multicollinearity issue. 
52 For robustness, the analyses of models 2 to 9 of Table 5.4 are repeated by including Pre-Holder and Post-




In addition to statistical significance, the results in Table 5.4 are economically significant. 
Focusing on models’ 9 and 10 results (Appendix L Table A.5.4), for example, fixing all other 
variables at their mean values, firms with overconfident CEOs predicted decreases in dividends 
(measured as dividends to total assets) by approximately 0.9% (in models 9 and 10), which is 
quite significant given the sample mean of 3%. Overall, the results in Table 5.4 confirm the 
fact that firms managed by overconfident managers tend to pay out less cash dividends. 
5.6.2 Overconfidence and the propensity to pay dividends  
In Table 5.5, the estimated coefficient of Overconfidence in all models is negative and 
significant, indicating that firms run by overconfident managers exhibit a higher probability of 
not paying dividends, which confirms our main hypothesis. Models 1 to 4 reveal that the 
coefficients pertaining to the variables cash flow, firm size and profitability are positive and 
significant at the 1% level.53 This implies that any increase in these variables heightens the 
likelihood of paying dividends. The coefficient on Leverage is significantly negative, which 
may suggest that debt ratios can be used to mitigate agency conflicts via the restrictions 
imposed by debt holders about dividend payments. These results are in line with e.g., Fama 
and French (2001), Chay and Suh (2009) and Jiraporn et al. (2011). Furthermore, the 
Undervaluation coefficient is significantly negative, which implies that the potential 
undervaluation of stocks reduces the propensity of firms to pay dividends. Moreover, the 
coefficient on Tangibility is positive and significant, suggesting that firms with lower 
asymmetric information (i.e., with higher tangible assets) are more likely to pay dividends, 
which is in line with Myers and Majluf (1984) and Deshmukh et al. (2013). 
The corporate governance variables and CEO characteristics are considered in models 5 and 6 
of Table 5.5. The results show that Age, CEO Tenure and British have significant and positive 
effects on the propensity to pay dividends. These findings indicate that CEO characteristics not 
only influence the amount of dividends paid (as reported in Table 5.4), but also the propensity 
to pay dividends (consistent with Hu and Kumar, 2004; Jiraporn et al., 2011). However, the 
coefficients on the corporate governance variables turn out to be statistically insignificant in 
models 5 and 6 compared with the results reported in Table 5.4. These findings imply that the 
corporate governance mechanism does not affect the propensity to pay dividends in the UK.  
 
                                                 





Table 5.5. Overconfidence and the propensity to pay dividends 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Overconfidence -1.119* -1.057* -1.293* -1.233* -2.822** -2.812** 
 (-1.70) (-1.82) (-1.80) (-1.81) (-1.98) (-2.15) 
Cash Flow 14.06***  13.44***    
 (6.06)  (5.83)    
Leverage -1.820***   -1.991***   
 (-3.01)   (-3.21)   
Size (Assets) 2.899*** 2.724*** 3.394*** 3.348*** 2.781*** 2.791*** 
 (5.51) (7.87) (8.07) (7.48) (5.41) (5.47) 
Current Growth  -0.392 -0.130 -0.686 -0.789 -0.639 -0.645 
 (-0.73) (-0.26) (-1.14) (-1.43) (-0.95) (-0.96) 
Tangibility 2.853* 3.045** 3.952*** 4.313*** 5.819*** 5.707** 
 (1.78) (2.54) (2.80) (2.93) (2.66) (2.25) 
Stock Return 0.240 -0.114 0.0255 0.227 0.364 0.363 
 (0.80) (-0.41) (0.08) (0.77) (0.88) (0.85) 
Dividend Premium -0.538 -0.763 -0.874 -0.851 -1.483 -1.471 
 (-0.71) (-0.93) (-0.77) (-1.14) (-1.05) (-1.06) 
Profitability  10.86***     
  (4.47)     
Undervaluation  -0.733*** -0.697***  -0.621** -0.617** 
  (-4.59) (-3.56)  (-2.52) (-2.49) 
ROA    16.87*** 16.34*** 16.35*** 
    (6.09) (4.91) (4.96) 
Board Size     0.0974 0.102 
     (0.50) (0.50) 
Board Composition     -4.918 -5.118 
     (-1.59) (-1.38) 
Institutional 3%     2.356  
     (1.00)  
Concentration 3%      0.0207 
      (0.82) 
Option Ownership     12.49 13.94 
     (0.19) (0.19) 
Stock Ownership     6.744 4.606 
     (0.87) (0.59) 
Duality     -0.747 -0.794 
     (-0.78) (-0.84) 
Age     0.208** 0.210** 
     (2.42) (2.52) 
CEO Tenure     0.271** 0.269** 
     (2.38) (2.28) 
CEO in Role     -0.114 -0.112 
     (-1.20) (-1.18) 
Founder     -3.296* -3.297 
     (-1.66) (-1.61) 
British     5.015*** 5.233*** 
     (3.51) (3.48) 
Constant -30.00*** -27.38*** -35.07*** -34.18*** -42.99*** -43.33*** 
  (-4.75) (-6.30) (-6.57) (-6.27) (-5.43) (-5.87) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
χ2 47.96*** 86.50*** 93.11*** 70.31*** 128.5*** 131.8*** 
Log likelihood  -118.4 -128.1 -116.3 -116.9 -102.4 -102.4 
Firms 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Observations 888 888 888 888 888 888 
Notes: This table reports outputs from a Probit model on panel data. The dependent variable is Dividends (Dummy). See Table 5.1 for the 
definition of variables. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. The variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. z values 




This finding is inconsistent with Jiraporn et al. (2011) who find a positive association between 
corporate governance and the likelihood of paying dividends in the US but are in line with 
Mancinelli and Ozkan (2006) for Italy. 
These results show that the probability of firms paying dividends is affected by the type of 
CEO (overconfident vs. non-overconfidence). The estimated marginal effects reveal that in 
Models 5 and 6 (Appendix L Table A.5.5), for example, amongst firms that paying dividends 
the predicted probability of paying dividends is lower in firms run by overconfident managers 
by about 4%, holding all other independent variables at their mean values. 
5.6.3 The relevance of interaction effects for dividends 
In Table 5.6, we examine some key factors which have been interacted with managerial 
overconfidence and then check their relevance to dividends through estimating the marginal 
effects (Appendix L Table A.5.6). Model 1 of Table 5.6 shows that the coefficient of Cash 
Flow is positive but Overconfidence*Cash Flow generates a negative coefficient, both 
statistically significant. In terms of the marginal effects, the results are economically significant 
as stated in Model 1 of Table A.5.6 in Appendix L. 
These findings imply that higher cash flows lead to higher dividend payments but the 
magnitude of this direct link reduces in firms with overconfident managers (from 0.12 to 0.07). 
In other words, overconfident managers pay less cash dividends than their rational peers, 
implying that they prefer to accumulate more cash to avoid relying on external finance for 
future investments (Malmendier and Tate, 2005a; Hackbarth, 2008). This finding contrasts 
with Deshmukh et al., (2013) who find that the relationship between cash flow and dividends 
is stronger for overconfident managers.  
Model 2 of Table 5.6 shows that the coefficient of ROA is positive but Overconfidence*ROA 
has a negative coefficient, both statistically significant. In economic terms as reported in Model 
2 (Appendix L Table A.5.6), the results suggest that although higher profitability leads to 
higher dividend payments, for overconfident managers the magnitude of this positive 
association is reduced from 0.12 to 0.05. An explanation for this result might be that 
overconfident managers prefer to retain cash for future investment and perceive external 
finance as costly and, thus, pay lower dividends than rational counterparts. 
 In model 3 (Table 5.6), the negative and significant coefficient on Current Growth suggests 
that firms with higher growth pay less dividends. The coefficient of Overconfidence*Current 
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Growth is negative, which implies that the negative correlation between dividends and growth 
becomes more apparent for firms run by overconfident managers.  
However, this increase in negativity by 0.002 is statistically insignificant as reported in model 
3 (Appendix L Table A.5.6). Nevertheless, this finding contradicts Deshmukh et al. (2013) who 
demonstrated that the influence of managerial overconfidence on dividends is mitigated in high 
growth firms, as we have found an increasing effect for the UK counterparts. 
Model 4 of Table 5.6 reveals that the Undervaluation coefficient is significantly negative but 
the significant coefficient estimate on Overconfidence*Undervaluation has the opposite sign. 
The marginal effects in model 4 (Appendix L Table A.5.6) reveal similar results, implying that 
higher undervaluation of shares causes lower dividend payments but this negative link is 
mitigated from -0.005 to -0.001 for firms with overconfident managers. This indicates that 
overconfident managers in undervalued firms reduce dividends less compared to rational 
managers. Therefore, this finding seems to go against the theory that overconfident managers 
always believe that their stocks are undervalued and hence reduce dividends further (e.g., 
Malmendier and Tate, 2005a; Hackbarth, 2008).  
Model 5 of Table 5.6 shows that the coefficient of Board Size is significantly positive, and the 
coefficient estimate on Overconfidence*Board Size is negative. Economically, these findings 
suggest that larger boards pay more dividends, but this positivity is reduced (albeit 
insignificantly) with overconfident managers as revealed in model 5 of Appendix L Table 
A.5.6.  
In model 6 (Table 5.6), both coefficients for Concentration 3% and 
Overconfidence*Concentration 3% are significantly positive. In addition to statistical 
significance, the results are economically significant as reported in model 6 (Appendix L Table 
A.5.6). The results indicate that higher ownership concentration is associated with more 
dividend payments, and this positive effect gets larger with overconfident managers. One 
possible explanation for this heightened positivity is that, in the presence of larger shareholders, 
overconfident CEOs might face a threat of dismissal from those shareholders especially when 
their power is high. This in turn motivates overconfident CEOs not to waste firms’ financial 
resources and hence increase dividend payments. Fluck (1999) shows that CEOs distribute 
more dividends in firms with large outside shareholders in order not to use the firms’ resources 
for private benefits and hence avoid the threat of dismissal. Finally, in model 7, both 




Table 5.6.  Overconfidence and dividend levels: the interaction effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Overconfidence -0.002 -0.004 -0.011*** -0.017*** -0.010 -0.016*** -0.017*** 
 (-0.39) (-0.80) (-2.67) (-3.69) (-1.10) (-3.53) (-3.55) 
Cash Flow 0.145***       
 (9.80)       
Overconfidence * Cash Flow -0.062***       
 (-3.03)       
ROA  0.153*** 0.117*** 0.119*** 0.117*** 0.118*** 0.118*** 
  (8.18) (7.66) (7.81) (7.65) (7.75) (7.74) 
Overconfidence * ROA  -0.098***      
  (-3.44)      
Current Growth  -0.003 -0.005** -0.005* -0.005** -0.005** -0.006** -0.006** 
 (-1.42) (-2.12) (-1.71) (-2.15) (-2.37) (-2.57) (-2.56) 
Overconfidence *Current  Growth   -0.002     
   (-0.41)     
Undervaluation  -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
  (-4.71) (-4.66) (-5.36) (-4.64) (-4.60) (-4.60) 
Overconfidence * Undervaluation    0.004***    
    (2.72)    
Leverage -0.006**       
 (-2.22)       
Size (Assets) 0.004** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 
 (2.50) (2.16) (2.05) (1.99) (2.04) (2.18) (2.08) 
Tangibility -0.011 -0.008 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 
 (-1.52) (-1.16) (-0.85) (-0.76) (-0.86) (-0.99) (-0.83) 
Stock Return -0.0009 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (-0.59) (-1.64) (-1.50) (-1.50) (-1.51) (-1.46) (-1.42) 
Dividend Premium -0.0006 -0.001 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.28) (-0.45) (-0.28) (-0.26) (-0.26) (-0.46) (-0.47) 
Board Size 0.001* 0.0009 0.001** 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 
 (1.92) (1.62) (2.00) (1.92) (1.79) (1.90) (1.85) 
Overconfidence * Board Size     -0.0001   
     (-0.13)   
Board Composition 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.008 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.72) (0.74) (0.59) (0.96) (0.58) (0.69) (0.63) 
Concentration 3% 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0001*  
 (2.78) (2.77) (2.90) (2.93) (2.90) (1.70)  
Overconfidence * Concentration 3%      0.0002**  
      (2.26)  
Institutional 3%       0.012 
       (1.57) 
Overconfidence * Institutional 3%       0.024** 
       (2.23) 
Option Ownership -0.253 -0.236 -0.214 -0.212 -0.223 -0.231 -0.211 
 (-1.49) (-1.39) (-1.24) (-1.24) (-1.30) (-1.36) (-1.23) 
Stock Ownership -0.004 -0.014 -0.018 -0.018 -0.017 -0.015 -0.009 
 (-0.11) (-0.39) (-0.46) (-0.49) (-0.45) (-0.40) (-0.23) 
Duality -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (-0.63) (-0.89) (-0.65) (-0.86) (-0.63) (-0.61) (-0.64) 
Age 0.0004* 0.0005** 0.0005* 0.0005* 0.0005** 0.0005* 0.0005* 
 (1.87) (2.09) (1.95) (1.93) (1.96) (1.88) (1.85) 
CEO Tenure -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 
 (-0.90) (-0.92) (-0.83) (-0.83) (-0.81) (-0.79) (-0.69) 
CEO in Role -0.0006** -0.0006** -0.0006** -0.0006** -0.0006** -0.0006** -0.0006** 
 (-2.18) (-2.41) (-2.37) (-2.50) (-2.37) (-2.21) (-2.33) 
Founder 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 
 (0.31) (0.29) (0.43) (0.40) (0.43) (0.37) (0.47) 
British 0.008** 0.007* 0.007* 0.008* 0.007* 0.007* 0.007* 
 (1.99) (1.86) (1.68) (1.89) (1.67) (1.73) (1.72) 
Constant -0.075*** -0.056** -0.053** -0.050** -0.053** -0.053** -0.050** 
  (-3.22) (-2.40) (-2.22) (-2.14) (-2.19) (-2.25) (-2.13) 
        
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
χ2 173.5*** 167.7*** 155.2*** 162.8*** 155.0*** 160.5*** 159.7*** 
Log likelihood  2092.5 2091.7 2085.9 2089.5 2085.8 2088.4 2087.9 
Firms 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 
Observations 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 
Notes: This table reports outputs from a random-effects Tobit model on panel data. The dependent variable is Dividends/Assets. See Table 5.1 for the definition 
of variables. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. The variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. z values are reported in the 





significant for the latter. Economically, the outputs in model 7 (Appendix L Table A.5.6) imply 
that institutional ownership alone does not have any notable influence on dividends (as in 
Grinstein and Michaely, 2005). However, higher institutional ownership with overconfident 
managers leads to more dividend payments, i.e., institutional investors seem to prefer more 
dividends from overconfident CEOs. This result strengthens the role of institutional holdings 
in forcing agents to discharge their free cash flow and seek external finance from capital 
markets, which implies further monitoring of them. (Easterbrook, 1984). 
5.6.4 Robustness tests 
5.6.4.1 Another proxy of managerial overconfidence 
The managerial overconfidence proxy used in Table 5.4 to 5.6 is based on Malmendier and 
Tate (2008), where a manager is identified as overconfident when they hold vested options that 
are at least 40% in the money. A further measure of managerial overconfidence is employed in 
this study following the approach of Campbell at al. (2011) and Hirshleifer et al. (2012). 
Under this measure overconfidence takes the value of one once a CEO holds exercisable 
options that are at least 67% in the money, and zero otherwise. A CEO who is classified as 
overconfident by this measure remains so for the rest of the period. Malmendier et al. (2011) 
show the robustness of this measure after controlling for past stock returns.  
In untabulated analyses, a random effects Tobit model is estimated using this measure of 
managerial overconfidence. The results reveal that the negative relationship between 
overconfidence and dividends remains robust to the inclusion of this measure. 
5.6.4.2 Alternative measures of dividend policy 
When dividend yield (Dividends/MV) is used as a dependent variable (Francis et al., 2011; 
Deshmukh et al., 2013) in models 1 and 2 of Table 5.7, managerial overconfidence is still 
negatively and significantly correlated with dividends. A similar result is obtained when Pre-
Holder and Post-Holder are used instead of Overconfidence. This suggests that the negative 
impact of managerial overconfidence on dividend payments is persistent, as in Malmendier and 
Tate (2005a). The second alternative measure of dividends is Dividends/Sales (Chay and Suh, 
2009) in models 3 and 4; the third definition is Dividends/EBITDA in models 5 and 6; and the 
fourth alternative is  
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Dividends/Earnings54 in models 7 and 8. In all cases, the three different managerial 
overconfidence proxies are significantly and negatively correlated with dividend payments. 
Furthermore, in all models of Table 5.7, the coefficients of other variables are materially the 
same, indicating the robustness of the findings in the previous tables.55 
In economic terms as reported in Appendix L Table A.5.7, setting all other variable at their 
mean value, overconfident managers reduce dividends (measured as dividends to market value) 
by approximately 1.2% in Model 1 which is significant compared to the sample mean of 3%. 
When the dividend ratio is measured as dividends to sales (in Model 3), firms managed by 
overconfident CEOs predict a decline in dividends by about 1.3%. Dividends are predicted to 
be reduced by 4.8% (measured as dividends to EBITDA) in Model 5 and 8.1% (measured as 
dividend to Earnings) in Model 7 in firms run by overconfident managers, which are significant 
considering the sample means for dividends-to-EBITDA and dividend-to-Earnings are 20% 
and 35%, respectively.  
5.6.4.3 Different definitions of explanatory variables  
This section reruns the models using different measures of explanatory variables: Size (Sales) 
for firm size, Leverage 2 for capital structure, Concentration 5% and Largest Three for 
concentration of stock ownership, Institutional 5% for institutional ownership, Cash Flow 2 
and Cash Holdings for the cash positions, Tangibility for investment levels, RE/TA for 
profitability, Future Growth and Market-to-Book for growth opportunities. All definitions are 
provided in Table 5.1. Furthermore, a new measure of board composition is employed: a 
dummy variable that is 1 if the proportion of outside directors is greater than 50% and 0 
otherwise (Chen et al., 2005). In untabulated outputs (available upon request), the results 
remain robust to these alternatives by being qualitatively the same with the effect of managerial 
overconfidence on dividends continues to be significant and negative. 
In addition I have re-estimated the models using the alternative proxy for undervaluation. I 
have constructed a dummy variable that is 1 for the top quintile based on the Undervaluation 
factor defined in Table 5.1; 0, otherwise (Ikenberry et al., 1995). The results confirm our 
findings that managerial overconfidence and stock undervaluation are negatively related to 
dividends. We also use the lower quintile to construct another dummy variable and find a 
                                                 
54 This measure has some values that are negative or greater than 1, which are dropped from the sample. 
55 The results are replicated using Institutional 3% instead of Concentration 3% in Table 5.7. The findings do not 
alter any of the conclusions. 
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positive association between dividends and this dummy. This result thus provides further 
evidence that Undervaluation seems appropriate for detecting potentially undervalued stocks. 
Table 5.7. Robustness checks: overconfidence and alternatives proxies of dividend policy 
Dependent 
variables 
Dividends/MV Dividends/Sales Dividends/EBITDA Dividends/Earnings 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Overconfidence -0.014***  -0.017***  -0.056**  -0.091**  
 (-3.50)  (-2.73)  (-2.40)  (-2.43)  
Pre-Holder  -0.015***  -0.021***  -0.055**  -0.088** 
  (-3.38)  (-3.14)  (-2.16)  (-2.22) 
Post-Holder  -0.013***  -0.013**  -0.059**  -0.095** 
  (-3.03)  (-1.97)  (-2.28)  (-2.34) 
ROA 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.109*** 0.106*** 0.419*** 0.420*** 0.511*** 0.513*** 
 (4.46) (4.43) (4.92) (4.81) (4.34) (4.34) (3.55) (3.56) 
Undervaluation 0.0006 0.0006 -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.020** -0.020** 
 (0.52) (0.53) (-3.81) (-3.81) (-3.96) (-3.96) (-2.18) (-2.19) 
Size (Assets) 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 
 (3.93) (3.93) (5.92) (5.92) (3.48) (3.48) (3.36) (3.36) 
Current Growth -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008** -0.008** -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.034 -0.034 
 (-2.76) (-2.76) (-2.37) (-2.38) (-2.59) (-2.58) (-1.48) (-1.47) 
Tangibility -0.0028 -0.003 -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.110*** -0.109** -0.010 -0.009 
 (-0.39) (-0.41) (-2.96) (-3.01) (-2.58) (-2.57) (-0.13) (-0.12) 
Stock Return -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.028** -0.028** -0.032** -0.032** 
 (-3.70) (-3.70) (-0.66) (-0.65) (-2.56) (-2.57) (-2.11) (-2.11) 
Dividend Premium -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 0.005 0.005 -0.021 -0.020 
 (-1.10) (-1.14) (-1.15) (-1.35) (0.33) (0.36) (-0.96) (-0.92) 
Board Size -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.003 0.003 0.015*** 0.015*** 
 (-0.22) (-0.23) (0.30) (0.23) (0.78) (0.79) (2.58) (2.59) 
Board 
Composition 
-0.013 -0.013 0.002 0.002 0.014 0.014 -0.014 -0.015 
 (-1.36) (-1.36) (0.15) (0.14) (0.26) (0.26) (-0.19) (-0.19) 
Concentration 3% 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (2.17) (2.17) (2.82) (2.78) (3.08) (3.09) (3.44) (3.45) 
Option Ownership -0.236 -0.225 -0.013 0.059 -2.420** -2.454** -1.044 -1.111 
 (-1.11) (-1.05) (-0.05) (0.23) (-2.07) (-2.08) (-0.60) (-0.63) 
Stock Ownership -0.023 -0.023 -0.012 -0.015 -0.066 -0.065 -0.260 -0.256 
 (-0.67) (-0.68) (-0.20) (-0.26) (-0.33) (-0.33) (-0.79) (-0.78) 
Duality 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 -0.012 -0.012 -0.039 -0.039 
 (0.97) (0.98) (0.99) (1.00) (-0.63) (-0.63) (-1.40) (-1.40) 
Age 0.0004* 0.0004* 0.0005 0.0004 0.003* 0.003** 0.005** 0.005** 
 (1.73) (1.65) (1.48) (1.14) (1.96) (1.96) (2.05) (2.06) 
CEO Tenure -0.00007 -0.00008 -0.0003 -0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.001 0.001 
 (-0.34) (-0.36) (-1.08) (-1.15) (0.22) (0.23) (0.61) (0.62) 
CEO in Role -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (-1.04) (-1.02) (-1.44) (-1.34) (-3.23) (-3.23) (-2.78) (-2.79) 
Founder -0.006 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 0.044 0.043 -0.026 -0.027 
 (-0.82) (-0.81) (-0.18) (-0.13) (1.09) (1.08) (-0.37) (-0.38) 
British 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.009 0.055** 0.055** 0.062 0.063 
 (1.20) (1.19) (1.39) (1.36) (2.29) (2.29) (1.62) (1.62) 
Constant -0.070*** -0.069*** -0.184*** -0.177*** -0.380*** -0.383*** -0.720*** -0.726*** 
 (-3.03) (-2.99) (-5.03) (-4.83) (-2.80) (-2.80) (-3.23) (-3.23) 
         
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
χ2 170.5 170.8 131.0 135.3 120.2 120.1 94.59 94.55 
Log likelihood 1890.8 1890.8 1730.4 1731.9 403.7 403.8 98.32 98.35 
Firms 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 
Observations 972 972 971 971 972 972 834 834 
Notes; This table reports outputs from a random-effects Tobit model on panel data. The dependent variable is one of the proxies shown 
as above. See Table 5.1 for the definition of variables. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. The variables are winsorized at 




5.6.4.4 Tobit model on pooled data 
As a further robustness check, all models in Table 5.4 are re-estimated using Tobit models with 
pooled data and by clustering the standard errors at the firm level. The results are reported in 
Table 5.8. In models 1 to 10, Overconfidence coefficients are consistently negative and 
statistically significant. Furthermore, the coefficients on Pre-Holder and Post-Holder are 
statistically negative in model 11. 
Table 5.8. Overconfidence and dividend levels: pooled Tobit estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Overconfidence -0.013** -0.010*** -0.010** -0.011*** -0.012** -0.012*** -0.013** -0.012** -0.011* -0.011***  
 (-2.44) (-2.76) (-2.50) (-2.78) (-2.58) (-3.34) (-2.39) (-2.24) (-1.68) (-2.65)  
Pre-Holder           -0.012*** 
           (-2.70) 
Post-Holder           -0.010** 
           (-2.09) 
Cash Flow  0.238***  0.221***        
  (5.92)  (5.40)        
Leverage  0.0004    -0.004      
  (0.10)    (-1.05)      
Size (Assets)  0.0008 0.0004 0.0007 -0.002 0.0002    -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.72) (0.35) (0.62) (-0.92) (0.17)    (-0.69) (-0.68) 
Current Growth  -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.012***    -0.012*** -0.012*** 
  (-2.85) (-2.86) (-3.02) (-3.66) (-3.60)    (-4.05) (-4.05) 
Tangibility  -0.014* -0.012* -0.013* 0.007 -0.003    -0.005 -0.005 
  (-1.82) (-1.71) (-1.75) (0.75) (-0.49)    (-0.75) (-0.78) 
Stock Return  -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.009***    -0.009*** -0.009*** 
  (-3.71) (-3.18) (-4.17) (-4.33) (-4.45)    (-3.92) (-3.92) 
Dividend Premium  0.003 0.004* 0.003 0.002 0.002    0.002 0.002 
  (1.18) (1.69) (1.36) (0.72) (0.69)    (0.74) (0.59) 
Profitability   0.241***         
   (5.38)         
Undervaluation   -0.003** -0.002 -0.014***     -0.004** -0.003** 
   (-2.16) (-1.58) (-5.66)     (-2.53) (-2.51) 
Investment     -0.108**       
     (-2.23)       
ROA      0.297***    0.265*** 0.264*** 
      (5.44)    (5.05) (5.02) 
Board Size       0.001 0.002**  0.002** 0.002** 
       (1.41) (2.17)  (2.16) (2.17) 
Board Composition       0.012 0.019  0.005 0.005 
       (0.74) (1.18)  (0.42) (0.45) 
Institutional 3%       0.019     
       (1.13)     
Concentration 3%        0.0003**  0.0002** 0.0002** 
        (2.53)  (2.42) (2.46) 
Option Ownership         -1.162*** -0.880** -0.872** 
         (-2.75) (-2.45) (-2.40) 
Stock Ownership         0.103** 0.0255 0.0251 
         (2.54) (0.79) (0.78) 
Duality         -0.003 -0.006 -0.006 
         (-0.40) (-1.24) (-1.22) 
Age         -0.0002 -0.000007 -0.00001 
         (-0.62) (-0.02) (-0.04) 
CEO Tenure         0.00006 -0.0003 -0.0003 
         (0.21) (-1.35) (-1.36) 
CEO in Role         -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 
         (-0.56) (-1.10) (-1.08) 
Founder         -0.001 0.001 0.001 
         (-0.09) (0.16) (0.18) 
British         0.002 0.007 0.007 
         (0.28) (1.44) (1.41) 
Constant 0.028*** -0.005 0.0002 0.002 0.079*** 0.012 0.010 -0.004 0.041** 0.015 0.015 
 (6.07) (-0.35) (0.01) (0.14) (2.86) (0.83) (0.69) (-0.26) (2.03) (0.61) (0.60) 
            
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prob > F 0.091 0 0 0 0 0 0.015 0 0 0 0 
Log likelihood 1622.5 1846.0 1855.9 1849.1 1718.4 1831.4 1629.0 1639.4 1658.0 1879.2 1879.4 
Firms 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 
Observations 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 
Notes: This table reports outputs from a pooled Tobit model on panel data. The dependent variable is Dividends/Assets. See Table 5.1 for the definition of variables. All 
explanatory variables are lagged by one year. The variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at firm level, 
which are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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These results again indicate the robustness of the findings. That is, overconfident CEOs pay 
less dividends compared with rational CEOs.  
The results in all models show that, generally, firm-specific variables continue to hold their 
association with dividends. The relationship between corporate governance and managerial 
overconfidence also remains the same: Board Size and Concentration 3% are positively 
correlated with dividend payments. However, the relationship between CEOs characteristics 
and dividends differs significantly compared with the results in Table 5.4. The coefficient on 
Option Ownership becomes negative and significant. These findings confirm De Cesari and 
Ozkan (2015) who report a negative link between dividends and CEO options in the UK using 
pooled Tobit regressions. The results also show that the factors Age, CEO in Role and British 
are not correlated with dividend policy. Although there are slight changes in the correlation 
between dividends and these explanatory variables, most of the other coefficients hold their 
signs and significance levels. 
Economically, in Model 10 (Appendix L Table A.5.8) for example, overconfident managers 
decreases dividends by 0.9% compared to rational manager (holding all other variables at their 
mean values). Overall the results confirm that CEO overconfidence plays a role in reducing 
dividend payments. 
5.7 Overconfidence, share repurchases and total payout 
5.7.1.1 Managerial overconfidence and share repurchases 
This section examines the relationship between managerial overconfidence and share 
repurchases. The dependent variables are Repurchases/Assets, Repurchases/MV, 
Repurchases/Earnings and Repurchases (Dummy), which are defined in Table 5.1. The results 
are provided in Table 5.9. The estimated coefficients for Overconfidence are positive but 
insignificant in models 1 to 6, indicating that share repurchases in firms managed by 
overconfident CEOs are not significantly different from those managed by rational peers. The 
results are in line with Deshmukh et al. (2013).  
The Undervaluation coefficient is negative in models 1 to 6 but significant only in models 5 
and 6. This negative relationship suggests that (potentially) undervalued British firms do not 
use open market share repurchases to signal their undervaluation and hence transfer wealth to 
shareholders.56 This finding is inconsistent with the undervaluation hypothesis (Dann, 1981; 
                                                 
56 The results hold when we use alternative measures of stock undervaluation as explained in the previous section. 
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Ikenberry et al., 1995) but confirm Haw et al. (2013) who find that managers tend to use open 
market share repurchases without signalling implications. Also, our findings are in agreement 
with Crawford and Wang (2012), who report that UK firms that repurchase their shares do not 
suffer from undervaluation, but rather do it to distribute excess cash. In addition, the coefficient 
on Tangibility is positive in models 1 to 6, but significant only in models 3 to 6.  
Table 5.9. Overconfidence and share repurchases  
Dependent variables Repurchases/Assets Repurchases/MV Repurchases/Earnings Repurchases (Dummy) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Overconfidence 0.010 0.010 0.006 0.006 0.067 0.068 0.501* 0.505* 
 (0.98) (1.02) (0.82) (0.84) (1.41) (1.44) (1.75) (1.76) 
ROA 0.210*** 0.213*** 0.141*** 0.143*** 0.998*** 1.009*** 3.987*** 4.060*** 
 (4.45) (4.52) (3.79) (3.85) (4.15) (4.20) (3.03) (3.07) 
Undervaluation -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.030* -0.030* -0.165* -0.164* 
  (-1.05) (-1.06) (-0.83) (-0.82) (-1.84) (-1.84) (-1.93) (-1.91) 
Size (Assets) 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.067*** 0.070*** 0.298*** 0.311*** 
 (2.75) (2.92) (3.53) (3.68) (3.92) (4.05) (3.00) (3.12) 
Current Growth  -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.187*** -0.186*** -0.603** -0.600** 
  (-3.62) (-3.60) (-2.92) (-2.90) (-3.65) (-3.63) (-2.39) (-2.38) 
Tangibility 0.018 0.017 0.023* 0.024* 0.139* 0.137* 0.757 0.756 
 (1.04) (1.01) (1.84) (1.86) (1.66) (1.65) (1.62) (1.62) 
Stock Return -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.028 -0.028 -0.164 -0.163 
  (-0.90) (-0.92) (-1.25) (-1.26) (-1.04) (-1.04) (-1.12) (-1.12) 
Dividend Premium 0.002 0.002 -0.0004 -0.001 -0.008 -0.010 0.155 0.139 
 (0.35) (0.27) (-0.07) (-0.17) (-0.22) (-0.30) (0.84) (0.76) 
Board Size 0.002 0.002 0.0006 0.0006 0.006 0.006 0.037 0.037 
  (1.12) (1.16) (0.46) (0.47) (0.69) (0.73) (0.79) (0.79) 
Board Composition 0.019 0.020 0.002 0.002 0.062 0.067 0.375 0.392 
 (0.78) (0.82) (0.10) (0.12) (0.50) (0.54) (0.55) (0.57) 
Institutional 3% 0.014  -0.0002  0.058  0.007  
 (0.61)  (-0.01)  (0.49)  (0.01)  
Concentration 3%  0.0002  0.0001  0.001  0.003 
  (1.18)  (0.55)  (0.92)  (0.46) 
Option Ownership 0.204 0.215 -0.256 -0.247 0.0469 0.4945 11.56 11.89 
 (0.39) (0.41) (-0.58) (-0.56) -1.48 -1.51 (0.75) (0.77) 
Stock Ownership -0.012 -0.024 -0.003 -0.006 0.135 0.091 0.618 0.517 
 (-0.15) (-0.29) (-0.05) (-0.11) (0.34) (0.23) (0.27) (0.22) 
Duality -0.007 -0.007 -0.002 -0.002 -0.007 -0.007 -0.125 -0.128 
 (-0.83) (-0.84) (-0.27) (-0.27) (-0.17) (-0.18) (-0.56) (-0.57) 
Age -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.001** -0.001** -0.005 -0.005 -0.026 -0.026 
 (-1.19) (-1.19) (-2.34) (-2.35) (-1.60) (-1.61) (-1.54) (-1.55) 
CEO Tenure -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
 (-1.12) (-1.19) (-0.87) (-0.90) (-0.51) (-0.57) (-0.18) (-0.19) 
CEO in Role 0.0008 0.0009 0.001* 0.001** 0.004 0.004 0.022 0.023 
 (1.15) (1.19) (1.96) (1.97) (0.97) (1.00) (1.08) (1.10) 
Founder 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.0009 -0.047 -0.049 -0.241 -0.241 
 (0.30) (0.27) (0.08) (0.08) (-0.60) (-0.63) (-0.54) (-0.54) 
British 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.013* 0.014* 0.112** 0.114** 0.723** 0.727** 
 (3.12) (3.17) (1.81) (1.83) (2.32) (2.37) (2.50) (2.51) 
Constant -0.202*** -0.216*** -0.136*** -0.146*** -1.136*** -1.194*** -5.011*** -5.307*** 
  (-3.66) (-3.86) (-3.26) (-3.44) (-4.12) (-4.25) (-3.22) (-3.35) 
         
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
χ2 134.2*** 135.2*** 122.5*** 123.0*** 137.8*** 138.5*** 99.92*** 99.93*** 
Log likelihood  310.2 310.7 363.5 363.7 -216.6 -216.3 -432.2 -432.1 
Firms 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 
Observations 972 972 972 972 958 958 972 972 
Notes; This table reports outputs from a random-effects Tobit model on panel data. The dependent variable is one of the proxies shown as above. 
See Table 5.1 for the definition of variables. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. The variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. z values are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
The significant association implies that UK firms with lower information asymmetries engage 
more in share repurchases than those with higher asymmetric information, which is consistent 
with Barth and Kasznik (1999) in the US. However, this finding contradicts the argument that 
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a high degree of asymmetric information should be positively correlated with share 
repurchases. 
The coefficients on Size and ROA in models 1 to 6 are positive and highly significant, which 
indicates that larger and more profitable UK firms acquire more shares than their peers, which 
is in line with Dittmar (2000) and Jagannathan and Stephens (2003). The literature suggests 
that growth based firms tend to accumulate more cash for their investments and hence reduce 
the payouts (Dittmar, 2000; Grullon and Michaely, 2004). Open market share repurchases 
would represent one of the distribution mechanisms that lower growth firms may use to 
distribute their excess cash to shareholders. The results in Table 5.9 are consistent with this 
hypothesis as the coefficients on Current Growth are negative and significant in all models.     
The corporate governance variables in Table 5.9 are statistically insignificant, which rule out 
the influence of share repurchases in mitigating the agency costs in the UK, being consistent 
with Haw et al. (2013). These findings may refer to the role of corporate governance with 
respect to share repurchases in the UK, as CEOs are given the right, but not the obligation, by 
the board of directors to buy back a certain amount of the company’s shares through open 
market repurchases, which has to be approved and disclosed in the annual report in the 
preceding year; this task can be accomplished within one year. This flexibility might rule out 
the influence of corporate governance on CEOs to engage in open market repurchases.  
Furthermore, the significantly positive coefficients for British in Table 5.9 reveal that UK 
CEOs engage more in open market share repurchases relative to non-British CEOs. The 
findings also show that Age (CEO in Role) is negatively (positively) correlated with share 
repurchases in the UK, which are significant in models 3 and 4. Models 7 and 8 in Table 5.9 
report the estimates for the influence of managerial overconfidence on the likelihood of open 
market share repurchases. The results reveal that firms with overconfident managers are more 
likely to engage in open market share repurchases compared with those with non-overconfident 
managers. The rest of the explanatory variables continue to retain their signs and significance 
levels. Overall, Table 5.9 implies that managerial overconfidence is more likely to influence 
the propensity to conduct share repurchases rather than affecting the amount of share 
repurchases.57 
                                                 
57 Ben-David et al. (2007) find that overconfident CFOs are more likely to pay less dividends and more likely to 
repurchase shares. The latter finding is in line with our results. 
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In economic terms, setting all variables at their mean values, the predicted probability of a 
repurchase is 12% greater in firms run by overconfident managers than for those managed by 
rational peers (in Model 7 and Model 8 of Appendix L Table A.5.9). 
5.7.1.2 Managerial overconfidence and total payout 
This section investigates the relationship between managerial overconfidence and total payout 
(cash dividends and share repurchases). The dependent variables are Payout/Assets, 
Payout/MV, Payout/Earnings and Payout (Dummy) (Fenn and Liang, 2001; Grullon and 
Michaely, 2002). The results are presented in Table 5.10. The coefficients on Overconfidence 
are negative but insignificant in models 1, 2, 5 and 6. However, when the dependent variable 
is Payout/MV, the results reveal that higher overconfidence is negatively and significantly 
associated with total payouts. Furthermore, we find no evidence on the effect of managerial 
overconfidence on the propensity of firms to change their total payout, as shown in models 7 
and 8. The rest of the explanatory variables continue to hold their signs in all models. 
Deshmukh et al. (2013) find no relationship between overconfident CEOs and payout policy. 
The less significant results in our study regarding the relationship between overconfidence and 
total payout might be attributed to the differences between dividends and share repurchases as 
documented in the literature. Firms tend to be more reluctant to reduce dividends than 
repurchase shares. Jagannathan et al. (2000) report that firms use permanent earnings to pay 
dividends where share repurchases are paid out from temporary earnings. Thus, share 
repurchases are more flexible and more volatile than dividends. Other studies show that firms 
engage in share repurchases due to other factors such as when the stock price is low and when 
there is excess cash (e.g., Grullon and Michaely, 2004; Brav et al., 2005). These features of 
share repurchases make total payout policies less predictable, which in turn explains the weaker 
link between managerial overconfidence and payout policy. 
In addition to statistical significance in models 3 and 5, these results are economically 
significant as shown in Appendix L Table A.5.10. Fixing all other variables at their mean 
values, firms with overconfident CEOs predicted decreases in total payout (measured as payout 
to market value) by approximately 0.9% (in Model 3) and 0.9% (in Model 4), which is 






Table 5.10. Overconfidence and total payout 
Dependent 
variables Payout/Assets Payout/MV Payout/Earnings Payout (Dummy) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Overconfidence -0.007 -0.006 -0.011** -0.011** -0.038 -0.037 -1.295 -1.209 
 (-1.08) (-1.03) (-2.31) (-2.26) (-1.18) (-1.15) (-1.52) (-1.38) 
ROA 0.206*** 0.207*** 0.152*** 0.151*** 0.490*** 0.492*** 12.68*** 12.74*** 
 (7.51) (7.56) (5.87) (5.86) (3.78) (3.80) (4.02) (3.96) 
Undervaluation -0.004*** -0.004*** 0.003 0.003* -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.740*** -0.757*** 
  (-2.78) (-2.78) (1.64) (1.65) (-2.96) (-2.96) (-3.15) (-3.03) 
Size (Assets) 0.006** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 1.953*** 2.040*** 
 (2.51) (2.62) (4.57) (4.60) (3.80) (3.86) (3.90) (3.61) 
Current Growth  -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.067*** -0.066*** -1.090** -1.152** 
  (-3.27) (-3.25) (-3.33) (-3.32) (-3.18) (-3.17) (-2.07) (-2.12) 
Tangibility -0.012 -0.013 0.005 0.004 -0.049 -0.053 2.571 2.312 
 (-1.06) (-1.18) (0.57) (0.47) (-0.86) (-0.93) (1.52) (1.38) 
Stock Return -0.003 -0.003 -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.042*** -0.042*** 0.134 0.105 
  (-1.16) (-1.18) (-3.11) (-3.12) (-2.95) (-2.95) (0.39) (0.30) 
Dividend Premium -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 -0.016 -0.016 -1.001 -1.107 
 (-0.47) (-0.43) (-1.19) (-1.16) (-0.81) (-0.81) (-1.32) (-1.37) 
Board Size 0.001 0.001 -0.0007 -0.0006 0.006 0.007 -0.168 -0.186 
  (1.22) (1.32) (-0.80) (-0.71) (1.23) (1.29) (-1.02) (-1.10) 
Board Composition 0.006 0.007 -0.023* -0.022* -0.020 -0.016 -2.451 -2.521 
 (0.42) (0.49) (-1.72) (-1.65) (-0.28) (-0.23) (-1.08) (-1.11) 
Institutional 3% 0.030**  0.018  0.089  2.894  
 (2.56)  (1.52)  (1.44)  (1.56)  
Concentration 3%  0.0003***  0.0002  0.0009*  0.034* 
  (2.92)  (1.63)  (1.70)  (1.83) 
Option Ownership -0.139 -0.148 -0.495 -0.497 0.934 0.907 40.18 36.87 
 (-0.48) (-0.51) (-1.61) (-1.62) (0.60) (0.58) (0.89) (0.80) 
Stock Ownership 0.021 0.006 0.004 -0.007 -0.013 -0.057 -2.786 -4.879 
 (0.39) (0.11) (0.11) (-0.17) (-0.05) (-0.21) (-0.41) (-0.71) 
Duality -0.008* -0.008* 0.002 0.002 -0.042* -0.043* -1.116 -1.120 
 (-1.73) (-1.75) (0.41) (0.36) (-1.66) (-1.69) (-1.54) (-1.51) 
Age 0.0003 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0013 0.001 0.088 0.091 
 (0.81) (0.82) (0.45) (0.45) (0.66) (0.67) (1.55) (1.56) 
CEO Tenure -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0004 0.0003 0.237*** 0.233** 
 (-0.54) (-0.65) (-0.37) (-0.48) (0.24) (0.18) (2.80) (2.56) 
CEO in Role -0.0004 -0.0004 0.00001 0.00004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.061 -0.057 
 (-0.88) (-0.82) (0.04) (0.10) (-0.62) (-0.60) (-0.87) (-0.82) 
Founder 0.0018 0.0007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.047 -0.051 -1.526 -1.683 
 (0.17) (0.07) (-0.72) (-0.78) (-0.84) (-0.91) (-0.86) (-0.94) 
British 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.010* 0.010** 0.066** 0.067** 3.106** 3.200** 
 (2.99) (3.09) (1.88) (1.98) (2.01) (2.07) (2.19) (2.25) 
Constant -0.097*** -0.103*** -0.092*** -0.094*** -0.467*** -0.488*** -27.42*** -28.80*** 
  (-2.80) (-2.96) (-3.29) (-3.34) (-2.62) (-2.73) (-3.89) (-3.73) 
         
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
χ2 182.3*** 184.1*** 190.4*** 190.7*** 108.5*** 109.4*** 35.37 30.61 
Log likelihood  1628.8 1629.8 1557.6 1557.8 167.6 168.0 -101.7 -101.1 
Firms 103 103 103 103 103 103 94 94 
Observations 972 972 972 972 877 877 888 888 
Notes; This table reports outputs from a random-effects Tobit model on panel data. The dependent variable is one of the proxies shown 
as above. See Table 5.1 for the definition of variables. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. The variables are winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentiles. z values are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
5.8 Conclusion  
The research on managerial overconfidence and dividends has recently become more 
developed, but is little understood. We, thus, examine the influence of managerial 
overconfidence, corporate governance factors and CEO characteristics on corporate payout 
policy in the UK for the period between 2000 and 2012. We contribute to the literature in 
several ways. First, our findings add to the literature on behavioural corporate finance, and 
specifically to the emerging literature on the relationship between managerial overconfidence 
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and dividend policy. Secondly, our study focusses on dividend policy in the UK, and we 
confirm the negative impact of overconfident CEOs on both the amount of, and the propensity 
to pay dividends outside the US. Thirdly, the findings reinforce the importance of firm-specific 
factors in explaining some of the variations in dividends. That is, we demonstrate that dividends 
are positively correlated with firm size, profitability and cash flow; and negatively correlated 
with leverage and investment. Interestingly, we also find that firms which are potentially 
undervalued distribute less dividends and are less likely to pay dividends. Moreover, we find 
no support for the catering theory of dividends in the UK.   
The results further show that firms with strong corporate governance (i.e., larger board size, 
higher institutional holdings and more outside shareholders) distribute more dividends. 
However, none of these factors have an influence on the propensity to pay dividends. CEO 
traits are also shown to influence dividend levels and the likelihood of paying dividends. Our 
empirical analysis further detects that the presence of overconfident CEOs reduces the positive 
association between cash flows and dividend payments. Also, the relationship between growth 
and dividends is negative and insensitive to whether managers are overconfident. Our results 
show that overconfident managers in undervalued firms reduce dividends less compared to 
when managers are rational for the same type of firms. Moreover, larger board size is positively 
associated with dividends, and this correlation remains the same in firms run by overconfident 
managers compared to those run by rational counterparts. Finally, in the presence of 
overconfident CEOs, firms with high institutional ownership and larger outside shareholders 
distribute more cash dividends. 
A further contribution of our analysis is that, in addition to dividends, we consider the effect 
of managerial overconfidence on share repurchases and total payout. When we investigate the 
effect of managerial overconfidence on share buyback and total payout policies, the findings 
are less conclusive. Nevertheless, we showed that higher overconfidence tends to have a direct 
effect on the amount of share repurchases, and increases the probability of conducting share 
buybacks. Furthermore, the relationship between managerial overconfidence and total payout 
is negative, but it is significant only when the dependent variable is payouts scaled by the 
market value of equity. 
We suggest that studies extend this approach, and compare the market reaction to dividend 
announcements in firms with overconfident CEOs compared with those with rational peers. 
Deshmukh et al. (2013) study this relationship in cases of dividend increases in the US for the 
period from 1984 to 1994. The announcement effect of dividend decreases and no change in 
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dividends remains unexplored. Furthermore, the mixed results on the relationship between 
dividend changes and future earnings in the literature could be attributed to managerial 






6. Chapter 6: Conclusion, limitations and future research 
Corporate payout policy has continued to puzzle scholars for over five decades. Financial 
economists have extensively studied dividend policy and its effect on firm’s value, and have 
proposed different theories to explain the dividend puzzle. Prior hypotheses are developed 
based on traditional finance which assumes that agents are fully rational, self-interested and 
work towards maximizing shareholders value. In spite of the vast research in this area, no 
conclusions have been made on the signalling theory of dividends. 
Emerging research in behavioural corporate finance relaxes the assumption from traditional 
finance of rational agents, and investigates the impact of managerial cognitive biases on 
corporate dividend policy. Some recent studies in this field have emerged, but as yet are little 
understood. 
The objective of this thesis was to explore the existing puzzles in corporate payout policy in 
terms of both standard and behavioural corporate finance.  Although the thesis consists of three 
standalone, separate publishable chapters, these chapters are linked by the following common 
research theme: the impact of standard agency and information/signalling problems on 
dividend policy, together with the behavioural factor which is managerial overconfidence.    
The first empirical chapter (chapter 3) examines the signalling theory of dividends in Oman. 
Next, chapter 4 considers a theoretical model which examines the combined effects of 
managerial overconfidence and moral hazard/agency problems on dividend policy. Finally, 
chapter 5 provides an empirical analysis of managerial overconfidence and dividend policy in 
the UK. 
A prominent theory in this area of the literature is the information content or the signalling 
theory. The signalling theory is based on the notion that information is asymmetric. It suggests 
that dividends can be used as a signalling mechanism, given the assumption that investors and 
managers do not have equal access to firm’s information. Managers use dividends to convey 
information to the market about firms’ prospects (Bhattacharya, 1979; John and Williams, 
1985; Miller and Rock, 1985). The earlier works examining the signalling theory of dividends 
test the market reaction to the dividend announcement, and the relationship between dividend 
changes and future earnings. 
Several studies in developed and developing markets find evidence on the association between 
dividend announcements and stock price reactions (e.g., Aharony and Swary, 1980; Nissim 
and Ziv, 2000; Al-Yahyaee et al., 2011). However, results on the correlation between dividend 
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changes and earnings reveal mixed results. The earlier works of Nissim and Ziv (2000), Harada 
and Nguyen (2005) and Dasilas and Leventis (2011) find support for the signalling theory, 
while Benartzi et al. (1997) and Grullon et al. (2005) detect no evidence on the association 
between dividend changes and future earnings.  
Emerging research in behavioural corporate finance examines the effect of managerial 
psychological biases on corporate financial decisions. Managerial overconfidence is the 
dominant managerial bias that most of the studies focus on. An extensive body of academic 
literature studies the influence of overconfident CEOs on investment and capital structure 
decisions (e.g., Heaton, 2002; Malmendier and Tate, 2005a; Malmendier and Tate, 2005b; 
Doukas and Petmezas, 2007; Liu and Taffler, 2008; Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Croci et al., 
2010; Campbell et al., 2011; Malmendier et al., 2011). The effect of managerial overconfidence 
on corporate payout policy is now emerging but is little understood. 
The information content of dividends and factors affecting changes in dividends have been 
discussed in Chapter 3. Oman provides a unique institutional setting to re-examine the 
signalling theory of dividends. In Oman, dividends and capital gains are not taxed and firms 
tend to change their dividend levels more frequently. Furthermore, those firms depend heavily 
on banking finance and have high ownership concentrations. Unlike in the developed markets, 
Omani firms have low corporate disclosure requirements, low transparency, unpublished 
earnings forecasts and few professional analysts.  
The vast majority of theoretical and empirical studies examining the dividend signalling 
hypothesis are conducted in developed markets and have argued that taxes on dividends (Black, 
1976), as well as the poor information environment (Aggarwal et al., 2012) provide support for 
the information content of dividends. However, the high frequency of dividend changes (Chen 
et al., 2002), high ownership concentration and heavy reliance on bank financing of Omani 
firms should rule out the credibility of dividend signalling. 
This chapter provides several contributions to the existing literature. First, this study provides 
evidence on the tax-based signalling theory (Black, 1976). We find that dividends do not signal 
future profitability when investors’ dividends are not taxed. Second, the analyses reveal that in 
a poor information environment, dividend changes are not informative about future earnings 
changes (this is inconsistent with Aggarwal et al., 2012). Third, the tendency of firms to change 
their dividend policy more frequently in Oman is shown to be correlated with current earnings 
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changes. Therefore, investors should not view dividend changes as a signal of the future 
profitability of Omani firms.  
Another issue on the effect of managerial overconfidence on dividend policy was investigated 
in Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 developed theoretical models to demonstrate the relationship 
between overconfidence, dividend policy and firm value. Wu and Liu (2008) theoretically 
show that dividends and overconfidence should be positively correlated, while Deshmukh et 
al. (2013) develop a theoretical model that demonstrates that overconfidence leads to lower 
dividends. Unlike those studies, this chapter incorporated moral hazard and specifically 
investigated the conditions under which the relationship between managerial overconfidence 
and dividends would be negative or positive. Also, it demonstrated the effect of an 
overconfident CEO’s dividend announcement on firm’s value. Furthermore, it shows that 
bounded rationality does have an impact on the relationship between overconfidence and 
dividend policy. 
This paper contributes to the emerging research in behavioural corporate finance by showing 
under which conditions the relationship between managerial overconfidence and dividend 
policy could be positive and negative. An increase in dividends occurs when managers are 
overconfident about their current ability (as in Model 1) while the opposite tendency was found 
among managers who are overconfident about their future ability (as in Model 2). In both 
models, the effect on firm value is ambiguous. These findings explain the contradictory results 
in prior studies (Wu and Liu, 2008; Deshmukh et al., 2013). A further contribution of our 
analysis was to consider managerial bounded rationality. This study revealed that managerial 
bounded rationality could provide additional explanations for the variation in corporate 
dividend policy across firms. 
The third topic examined in Chapter 5 is the relationship between managerial overconfidence 
and corporate dividend policy in the UK. Investigating this issue is important because the 
majority of the earlier studies were conducted in the US; using data over the period 1980-1994; 
and do not control for corporate governance factors. Further, the corporate governance 
mechanism is better in the UK than the US. If corporate governance could mitigate problems 
associated with managerial overconfidence, we would expect our results to differ from those 
in the US (e.g., Cordeiro, 2009; Deshmukh et al., 2013). 
Chapter 5 contributes to the recent studies by showing that the impact of managerial 
overconfidence on dividend policy continues to hold outside the US. Our results showed that 
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managerial overconfidence leads to a reduction in the amount of and the likelihood of payment 
of dividends in the UK. Another contribution regards the relationship between overconfident 
CEOs and dividends in firms that exhibit potential undervaluation. The finding revealed that 
in undervalued firms, overconfident CEOs reduce dividends less compared with rational peers. 
This result is inconsistent with the assumption of earlier studies where they argue that 
overconfident managers reduce dividends because they believe that the market undervalues 
their firms (e.g., Cordeiro, 2009; Deshmukh et al., 2013). Other interesting contributions are 
shown in the relationship between corporate governance factors and dividend policy. We find 
that corporate governance factors affect the amount of, but not the propensity to pay dividends 
in the UK. Moreover, the results revealed that overconfident CEOs in firms with a high 
ownership concentration and institutional holdings pay more dividends compared with rational 
managers.    
In general, the results in this thesis provide additional contributions to the existing research on 
the information content of dividends and to the growing literature in behavioural corporate 
finance. However, we acknowledge inherent limitations within this study. 
6.1 Limitations of the thesis 
This thesis explores three different issues in corporate dividend policy. Although the best 
efforts were made to provide a rigorous investigation of those the issues, these studies possess 
some limitations, as follows: 
The first topic examines the informational content of dividends, and factors that influence 
dividend changes in a unique institutional setting: Oman. For future research, it would be 
desirable to have a higher number of observations in order to make the findings more 
generalisable to other countries. Another limitation of this chapter is related to the matching 
sample approach. Specifically, firms are matched according to their industry (similar to 
Fairchild et al., 2014). However, it would be more appropriate to match firms based on 
additional factors such as firms’ size, profitability and amount of dividend changes (e.g., 
Benartzi et al. 1997). Moreover, this study does not consider other factors that are documented 
in the literature which influence corporate dividend policy. For example, corporate governance 
and managerial compensation are not controlled for, when investigating the factors that have 
driven dividend changes in the Omani market. However, these variables are neither available 
from the Muscat Stock Market (MSM) nor in firms’ annual reports. 
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The empirical chapter that focuses on the effect of overconfidence on dividend policy in the 
UK uses a relatively small number of firm-year observations (972 observations). This was due 
to the sample selection process. Firms have to use options as a part of the CEOs compensation 
package and those options have to be exercisable to enable us to construct the managerial 
overconfidence measure. In fact, not all UK firms grant CEOs options. These obstacles are 
inherent in most of the recent studies on managerial overconfidence using UK data. For 
example, Andriosopoulos et al. (2013) studied the effect of managerial overconfidence and 
information disclosure on buyback completion rates in the UK with 400 observations. Croci et 
al. (2010) used 848 observations to examine the impact of overconfident CEOs on bidders' 
performance in the UK market. Secondly, the design of the panel in this study could produce 
market survival bias. To be in the sample, two years consecutive data is required for each firm; 
this yields an unbalanced panel. This could have an impact on the estimated regression 
coefficients and standard errors. Thirdly, the fixed effects estimation method could not be used 
as an additional robustness check in this study due to the time-invariance of the overconfidence 
measure. Nevertheless, this study employs the Tobit model on pooled data with clustering at 
the firm level and controls for industry and year fixed-effects as a robustness check. Moreover, 
this work does not consider directly other econometric issues such as endogeneity and selection 
bias. 
6.2 Future research 
Several avenues for future research based on the findings and limitations of the thesis are 
highlighted in this section. Firstly, the empirical study on the information content of dividends 
could be extended and could consider other forms of dividends such as stock and special 
dividends. Firms in Oman might use these types of dividends to signal their future prospects 
instead of regular cash dividends. 
Furthermore, the existing research on dividend policy in emerging markets, particularly, in 
Oman has been conducted based on the traditional corporate finance assumptions where agents 
are rational, self-interested and utility maximising. As an extension, scholars could examine 
the impact of investors’ irrationality on corporate dividend policy (Baker and Wurgler, 2004). 
Furthermore, the recent literature on behavioural corporate finance has not been tested in 
markets where institutional environments are significantly different from those in developed 
markets. However, this would be difficult to accomplish empirically, as options granted to 
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CEOs are not used by Omani firms, and earnings forecasts are not available in this market.58 
Nevertheless, a survey could be conducted to measure managerial miscalibration (Ben-David 
et al., 2007) or managerial attitude (Graham et al., 2013) and relate it to corporate dividend 
policy.59  
The theoretical models developed in this thesis are based on the relationship between 
overconfidence and dividend policy. It is worth extending these models to alternative payment 
mechanisms such as share repurchases. Furthermore, the combination of managerial and 
investor irrationality and their effects on corporate payout policy has not been considered thus 
far in the existing research. This can be achieved by combining managerial overconfidence 
with the catering theory of dividends or with market timing due to investors’ irrationality.  
The results of the final empirical chapter, which examines the effect of overconfident CEOs on 
dividend policy, do not consider the market reaction to the announcement of dividend changes 
in firms managed by overconfident CEOs. To the best of my knowledge, only two studies have 
been conducted examining the stock price response to dividend increases by overconfident 
managers using US data (Bouwman, 2009; Deshmukh et al., 2013) and their results reveal that 
there is a higher abnormal stock return after announcing dividend increases by overconfident 
managers compared to their rational counterparts. However, these studies test short-run market 
reactions to the announcement of dividend increases and do not consider decreases and no 
change in dividends. Further, in the UK, dividend and earnings news are announced 
simultaneously.60 Thus, future research analysing the market reaction to the joint signals 
conveyed be overconfident and rational managers could make a contribution to the signalling 
literature.  
6.3 The Implications of the Thesis 
Extensive research has been developed in the finance literature that aims to explain the 
variation in dividend policy across firms. One particular theory with extended theoretical 
underpinnings in standard corporate finance is the signalling theory of dividends. This theory 
suggests that firms use dividend changes to convey information about their future prospects 
(e.g., Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller and Rock, 1985). Scholars examine this theory by empirically 
                                                 
58 These two variables are essential to proxy managerial overconfidence. 
59 Graham et al. (2013) give us permission to use their survey in Oman. 
60 Earlier studies examine the short and long run market reaction to the joint announcement of dividend changes 




investigating the impact of the announcement of dividend changes on stock prices, and the 
relationship between dividend changes and future earnings.  
The majority of earlier studies affirm the effect of dividend change announcements on stock 
prices (e.g., Nissim and Ziv, 2001; Dasilas and Leventis, 2011). The correlation between 
dividend changes and future earnings changes are also found to be significantly related (e.g., 
Harada and Nguyen, 2005; Stacescu, 2006) and more likely to occur in a poor informational 
environment (Aggarwal et al., 2012). However, evidence from several studies, including 
Benartzi et al. (1997), Grullon et al. (2005) and this thesis, reveal that dividend changes are not 
informative about future earnings changes. This thesis uses the empirical findings in Chapter 
3 to demonstrate that investors should not view dividend changes as a signal of future earnings 
changes and trade accordingly. Rather, the change in dividends reflects current earnings 
changes.  
Emerging research in Behavioural corporate finance examines the impact of managerial 
cognitive biases, e.g. overconfidence, on corporate financial decisions. Although several 
studies analyse the effect of managerial overconfidence on financing and investment decisions, 
corporate dividend policy has received little attention in the recent literature. Wu and Liu 
(2008) theoretically show that overconfident managers are more likely to pay more dividends, 
while Deshmukh et al. (2013) detect the opposite pattern. 
The findings in Chapter 4 demonstrate that the relationship between dividends and 
overconfidence could be positively or negatively correlated, depending on whether managers 
are overconfident about current or future performance. Furthermore, this relationship might be 
affected by managers’ and investors’ bounded rationality. Therefore, firms with growth 
opportunities should recruit CEOs who are overconfident about future performance in order to 
re-invest companies’ cash flow in future projects instead of paying dividends. On the other 
hand, the board of directors in a mature firm should appoint a manager who is overconfident 
about his current ability, to prevent the CEO from investing the firm’s resources in negative 
NPV projects.  
Moreover, investors could gain a further insight into allocating their investments. For example, 
investors who prefer to invest in stocks that pay high dividends should consider investing in a 
company run by a manager who is overconfident about his current ability. Furthermore, 
researchers should benefit from these results in understanding dividend variations among firms, 
even in the same industry. That is, managerial overconfidence may provide an additional 
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explanation for these differences. The bounded rationality of managers and investors could also 
provide another explanation for these differences. 
The empirical findings in Chapter 5 examining the relationship between managerial 
overconfidence and corporate dividend policy in the UK reveal that overconfident CEOs pay 
less dividends than their rational counterparts which is in line with the earlier studies in the US 
(e.g., Deshmukh et al, 2013). Thus, this finding shows that the impact of overconfident CEOs 
on dividend policy continues to hold outside the US. Also, undervalued firms run by 
overconfident managers pay more dividends than those managed by rational managers. Hence, 
international investors should interpret the change in corporate dividend policy not only to 
well-known factors, such as a firms’ characteristics and corporate governance factors but also 
to managerial cognitive biases, i.e. overconfidence. Scholars could also benefit from our 
findings in order to understand the relative disappearance of dividends in recent years (Fama 
and French, 2001). Moreover, boards of directors should consider the overconfident bias of 



















Appendix A: Numerical example of panel A, Table 4.8 
 
 qˆ  
















0.1  11 110  15 150  10 100 
0.2  13 119  15 150  10 100 
0.3  15 129  15 150  10 100 
0.4  17 138  15 150  10 100 
0.5  20 148  15 150  10 100 
0.6  23 157  15 150  10 100 
0.7  26 167  15 150  10 100 
0.8  30 176  15 150  10 100 























































Appendix B: Numerical example of panel B, Table 4.8 
 
 qˆ  
















0.1  15 151  19 186  15 145 
0.2  17 160  19 187  15 145 
0.3  19 169  19 187  15 145 
0.4  21 178  19 188  15 145 
0.5  23 187  19 189  15 145 
0.6  26 196  20 190  15 145 
0.7  30 205  20 191  15 145 
0.8  34 214  20 191  15 145 



















































Appendix C: Numerical example of panel C, Table 4.8 
 
qˆ   
















0.1  20 193  22 222  19 190 
0.2  21 202  22 223  19 190 
0.3  23 210  23 225  19 190 
0.4  25 219  23 226  19 190 
0.5  27 227  24 228  19 190 
0.6  30 235  24 230  19 190 
0.7  33 244  25 231  19 190 
0.8  37 252  26 233  19 190 




















































Appendix D: Numerical example of panel D, Table 4.8 
  
qˆ   
















0.1  24 235  26 257  24 235 
0.2  25 243  26 260  24 235 
0.3  27 251  27 262  24 235 
0.4  29 259  27 265  24 235 
0.5  31 267  28 267  24 235 
0.6  34 275  29 269  24 235 
0.7  37 282  30 272  24 235 
0.8  40 290  31 274  24 235 





















































Appendix E: Numerical example of panel E, Table 4.8 
  
qˆ  
















0.1  28 277  29 293  28 280 
0.2  29 285  30 296  28 280 
0.3  31 292  31 300  28 280 
0.4  32 299  32 303  28 280 
0.5  35 307  33 306  28 280 
0.6  37 314  34 309  28 280 
0.7  40 321  35 312  28 280 
0.8  43 328  37 316  28 280 






















































Appendix F: Numerical example of panel F, Table 4.8 
  
qˆ   
















0.1  32 319  33 329  33 325 
0.2  33 326  34 333  33 325 
0.3  35 333  35 337  33 325 
0.4  36 340  36 341  33 325 
0.5  38 346  37 345  33 325 
0.6  41 353  39 349  33 325 
0.7  43 360  40 353  33 325 
0.8  46 367  42 357  33 325 























































Appendix G: Numerical example of panel G, Table 4.8 
  
qˆ   
















0.1  36 361  36.6 364.8  37 370 
0.2  37 367  37.4 369.6  37 370 
0.3  39 374  38.5 374.4  37 370 
0.4  40 380  39.8 379.2  37 370 
0.5  42 386  41.4 384  37 370 
0.6  44 392  43.2 388.8  37 370 
0.7  47 398  45.2 393.6  37 370 
0.8  49 405  47.5 398.4  37 370 





















































Appendix H: Numerical example of panel H, Table 4.8 
  
 qˆ  
















0.1  40 403  40 401  42 415 
0.2  41 409  41 406  42 415 
0.3  43 414  42 412  42 415 
0.4  44 420  44 417  42 415 
0.5  46 426  46 423  42 415 
0.6  48 431  48 429  42 415 
0.7  50 437  50 434  42 415 
0.8  53 443  53 440  42 415 























































Appendix I: Numerical example of panel I, Table 4.8 
  
qˆ   
















0.1  45 445  44 436  46 460 
0.2  46 450  45 443  46 460 
0.3  47 455  46 449  46 460 
0.4  48 460  48 456  46 460 
0.5  50 466  50 462  46 460 
0.6  51 471  53 468  46 460 
0.7  53 476  55 475  46 460 
0.8  56 481  58 481  46 460 























































Appendix J: Numerical example of panel J, Table 4.8 
  
qˆ   
















0.1  49 487  47 472  51 505 
0.2  50 492  49 479  51 505 
0.3  51 496  50 487  51 505 
0.4  52 501  52 494  51 505 
0.5  53 505  55 501  51 505 
0.6  55 510  57 508  51 505 
0.7  57 514  60 515  51 505 
0.8  59 519  64 523  51 505 





















































Appendix K: Numerical example of panel K, Table 4.8 
 
qˆ   
















0.1  53 529  51 508  55 550 
0.2  54 533  52 516  55 550 
0.3  55 537  54 524  55 550 
0.4  56 541  56 532  55 550 
0.5  57 545  59 540  55 550 
0.6  59 549  62 548  55 550 
0.7  60 553  65 556  55 550 
0.8  62 557  69 564  55 550 


















































Appendix L: Marginal effects at the means (MEMs) 
 
Table A.5.4. Overconfidence and dividend levels : Marginal effects at the means (MEMs) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Overconfidence --  -0.007* -0.008** -0.006* -0.007** -0.006* -0.006* -0.007** -0.009*** -0.009***  
             
Pre-Holder           -0.009*** 
             
Post-Holder           -0.009** 
             
Cash Flow  0.094*** 0.087***         
            
Leverage  -0.005**   -0.005**       
            
Size (Assets)  0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002** 0.003**    0.002** 0.003** 0.003** 
            
Current Growth  -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004**    -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** 
            
Tangibility  -0.008 -0.008 0.000 -0.004    -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 
            
Stock Return  -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001    -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
            
Dividend Premium  -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.001 -0.001    -0.001 -0.0004 -0.0005 
            
Undervaluation   -0.003*** -0.004***     -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
            
Investment    -0.036**        
            
ROA     0.098***    0.093*** 0.094*** 0.094*** 
            
Board Size      0.001* 0.001**  0.001* 0.001** 0.001** 
            
Board Composition      0.004 0.004  0.003 0.004 0.004 
            
Institutional 3%      0.008   0.015***   
            
Concentration 3%       0.0001   0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
            
Option Ownership        -0.201 -0.172 -0.178 -0.172 
            
Stock Ownership        -0.033 -0.008 -0.014 -0.014 
            
Duality        0.0001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
            
Age        0.001*** 0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0004* 
            
CEO Tenure        0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
            
CEO in Role        -0.001*** -0.0005** -0.0005** -0.0005** 
            
Founder        0.006 0.003 0.003 0.003 
            
British        0.004 0.005 0.005* 0.005* 
Notes: This table reports the marginal effects at the means from Table 5.4. The dependent variable is Dividends/Assets. See Table 5.1 for the definition of variables. 
All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. The variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. z values are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, * 









Table A.5.5: Overconfidence and the Propensity to Pay Dividend: Marginal effects at the means (MEMs). 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Dependent variable=Dividend (Dummy) 
Overconfident CEO -0.0068* -0.0078* -0.0086* -0.0053* -0.0377** -0.0385** 
       
Cash Flow 0.0855***  0.0896***    
       
Leverage -0.0111**   -0.0086**   
       
Size (Ln TA) 0.0176** 0.0200** 0.0226** 0.0145** 0.0372** 0.0382** 
       
Growth (in assets) -0.0024 -0.0010 -0.0046 -0.0034 -0.0085 -0.0088 
       
Tangible Assets 0.0174* 0.0224** 0.0264*** 0.0186*** 0.0777*** 0.0782** 
       
Stock Return 0.0015 -0.0008 0.0002 0.0010 0.0049 0.0050 
       
Dividend Premium -0.0033 -0.0056 -0.0058 -0.0037 -0.0198 -0.0202 
       
Profit  0.0799***     
       
Undervaluation  -0.0054*** -0.0047***  -0.0083** -0.0084** 
       
ROA    0.0729*** 0.2182*** 0.2239*** 
       
Board Size     0.0013 0.0014 
       
Board Compositions     -0.0657 -0.0701 
       
Institutional Ownership 3%     0.0315  
       
Concentration 3%      0.0003 
       
CEO Vested Option     0.1668 0.1910 
       
CEO Stock Ownership     0.0901 0.0631 
       
Duality     -0.0100 -0.0109 
       
CEO Age     0.0028** 0.0029** 
       
CEO Tenure     0.0036** 0.0037** 
       
CEO in Role     -0.0015 -0.0015 
       
Founder     -0.0440* -0.0452 
       
British     0.0670** 0.0717** 
              
Notes: This table reports the marginal effects from Table 5.5. The dependent variable is Dividends (Dummy). See Table 5.1 for the definition 
of variables. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. The variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. z values are reported 















Table A.5.6.  Overconfidence and dividend levels: the interaction effects (Marginal effects at the means (MEMs)) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Overconfidence -0.0016 -0.0030 -0.0089*** -0.0134*** -0.0082 -0.0132*** -0.0133*** 
        
Cash Flow 0.1182***       
        
Overconfidence * Cash Flow -0.0504***       
        
ROA  0.1241*** 0.0942*** 0.0959*** 0.0937*** 0.0948*** 0.0945*** 
        
Overconfidence * ROA  -0.0793***      
        
Current Growth  -0.0026 -0.0039** -0.0038* -0.0039** -0.0043** -0.0047** -0.0047** 
        
Overconfidence *Current  Growth   -0.0015     
        
Undervaluation 
 -0.0034*** -0.0033*** -0.0045*** -0.0033*** -0.0033*** -0.0033*** 
        
Overconfidence * Undervaluation    0.0034***    
        
Leverage -0.0048**       
        
Size (Assets) 0.0031** 0.0027** 0.0025** 0.0024** 0.0025** 0.0027** 0.0026** 
        
Tangibility -0.0088 -0.0068 -0.0050 -0.0044 -0.0051 -0.0058 -0.0049 
        
Stock Return -0.0032 -0.0117 -0.0141 -0.0147 -0.0139 -0.0123 -0.0071 
        
Dividend Premium -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0008 
        
Board Size 0.0009* 0.0007 0.0009** 0.0009* 0.0010* 0.0009* 0.0008* 
        
Overconfidence * Board Size     -0.0001   
        
Board Composition 0.0046 0.0047 0.0037 0.0061 0.0036 0.0043 0.0039 
        
Concentration 3% 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*  
        
Overconfidence * Concentration 3%      0.0002**  
        
Institutional 3%       0.0094 
        
Overconfidence * Institutional 3%       0.0190** 
        
Option Ownership -0.2063 -0.1913 -0.1718 -0.1711 -0.1793 -0.1862 -0.1691 
        
Stock Ownership -0.0032 -0.0117 -0.0141 -0.0147 -0.0139 -0.0123 -0.0071 
        
Duality -0.0014 -0.0020 -0.0015 -0.0020 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0015 
        
Age 0.0004* 0.0004** 0.0004* 0.0004* 0.0004** 0.0004* 0.0004* 
        
CEO Tenure -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
        
CEO in Role -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 
        
Founder 0.0019 0.0018 0.0027 0.0025 0.0027 0.0024 0.0030 
        
British 0.0065** 0.0061* 0.0055* 0.0062* 0.0056* 0.0057* 0.0056* 
        
Notes: This table reports the marginal effects from Table 5.6. The dependent variable is Dividends/Assets. See Table 5.1 for the definition of variables. All 
explanatory variables are lagged by one year. The variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. z values are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, * 





Table A.5.7 : Robustness Checks: Overconfidence and Alternatives Measures of Dividend Payout (Marginal effects at the means (MEMs)) 
 Model 1 Model 3 Model 5 Model 7 
Dependent variable Dividends/MV Dividends/Sale Dividends/EBITDA Dividends/Earnings 
     
Overconfident CEO -0.0118*** -0.0126*** -0.0479** -0.0813** 
     
ROA 0.0653*** 0.0800*** 0.3555*** 0.4564*** 
     
Undervaluation 0.0005 -0.0038*** -0.0205*** -0.0181** 
     
Size (Ln TA) 0.0049*** 0.0105*** 0.0255*** 0.0426*** 
     
Growth (in assets) -0.0067*** -0.0059** -0.0347*** -0.0303 
     
Tangible Assets -0.0024 -0.0243*** -0.0931*** -0.0086 
     
Stock Return -0.0061*** -0.0011 -0.0235** -0.0287** 
     
Dividend Premium -0.0025 -0.0028 0.0042 -0.0185 
     
Board Size -0.0001 0.0002 0.0025 0.0132*** 
     
Board Compositions -0.0107 0.0013 0.0115 -0.0129 
     
Concentration 3% 0.0001** 0.0002*** 0.0011*** 0.0019*** 
     
CEO Vested Option -0.1976 -0.0095 -2.0556** -0.9323 
     
CEO Stock Ownership -0.0190 -0.0085 -0.0563 -0.2321 
     
Duality 0.0026 0.0031 -0.0097 -0.0344 
     
CEO Age 0.0004* 0.0004 0.0024* 0.0042** 
     
CEO time in firm -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0010 
     
CEO time in Role -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0046*** -0.0066*** 
     
Founder -0.0046 -0.0017 0.0374 -0.0234 
     
CEO Nationality 0.0042 0.0064 0.0469** 0.0558 
          
Notes; This table reports the marginal effects from Table 5.7 (models 1, 2 and 3). The dependent variable is one of the proxies shown as 
above. See Table 5.1 for the definition of variables. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. The variables are winsorized at the 1st 

















Table A.5.8. Overconfidence and dividend levels: pooled Tobit estimates (Marginal effects at the means (MEMs)) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Overconfidence -0.0103** -0.0088*** -0.0082** -0.0090*** -0.0095** -0.0105*** -0.0095** -0.0104** -0.0085* -0.0092***  
            
Pre-Holder           -0.0100*** 
            
Post-Holder           -0.0085** 
            
Cash Flow  0.2025***  0.1888***        
            
Leverage  0.0004    -0.0034      
            
Size (Assets)  0.0007 0.0003 0.0006 -0.0014 0.0002    -0.0009 -0.0009 
            
Current Growth  -0.0077*** -0.0075*** -0.0083*** -0.0091*** -0.0101***    -0.0102*** -0.0102*** 
            
Tangibility  -0.0122* -0.0102* -0.0108* 0.0058 -0.0028    -0.0040 -0.0042 
            
Stock Return  -0.0062*** -0.0061*** -0.0073*** -0.0084*** -0.0076***    -0.0074*** -0.0074*** 
            
Dividend Premium  0.0023 0.0032* 0.0027 0.0015 0.0014    0.0016 0.0013 
            
Profitability   0.2067***         
            
Undervaluation   -0.0029** -0.0021 -0.0114***     -0.0030** -0.0030** 
            
Investment     -0.0882**       
            
ROA      0.2516***    0.2280*** 0.2275*** 
            
Board Size       0.0012 0.0008**  0.0013** 0.0013** 
            
Board Composition       0.0149 0.0079  0.0040 0.0043 
            
Institutional 3%       0.0003     
            
Concentration 3%        -0.0045**  -0.0003** -0.0002** 
            
Option Ownership         -0.9335*** -0.7586** -0.7516** 
            
Stock Ownership         0.0829** 0.0215 0.0214 
            
Duality         -0.0020 -0.0049 -0.0048 
            
Age         -0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 
            
CEO Tenure         0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0002 
            
CEO in Role         -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 
            
Founder         -0.0008 0.0010 0.0011 
            
British         0.0016 0.0061 0.0060 
            
Notes: This table reports the marginal effects from Table 5.8. The dependent variable is Dividends/Assets. See Table 5.1 for the definition of variables. All explanatory variables 
are lagged by one year. The variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at firm level, which are reported in the 








Table A. 5.9. Overconfident and Share repurchases (Marginal effects at the 
means (MEMs)) 
 Model 7 Model 8 
Dependent variable: Rep (Dummy) 
  
Overconfident CEO 0.119* 0.120* 
   
ROA 0.945*** 0.961*** 
   
Undervaluation -0.039* -0.039* 
   
Size (Ln TA) 0.071*** 0.074*** 
   
Growth (in assets) -0.143** -0.142** 
   
Tangible Assets 0.180 0.179 
   
Stock Return -0.039 -0.039 
   
Dividend Premium 0.037 0.033 
   
Board Size 0.009 0.009 
   
Board Composition 0.089 0.093 
   
Institutional Holdings 3% 0.002  
   
Concentration 3%  0.001 
   
CEO Vested Option 2.741 2.816 
   
CEO Stock Ownership 0.147 0.122 
   
Duality -0.030 -0.030 
   
CEO Age -0.006 -0.006 
   
CEO Tenure -0.001 -0.001 
   
CEO in Role 0.005 0.005 
   
Founder -0.057 -0.057 
   
British 0.172** 0.172** 
      
Notes: This table reports the marginal effects from Table 5.9 (models 7 and 8). The 
dependent variable is Dividends (Dummy). See Table 5.1 for the definition of 
variables. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. The variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The t-statistics are based on standard errors 
clustered at firm level, which are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, * denotes 















Table A.5.10. Overconfident and Total payout (Marginal effects at the 
means (MEMs)) 





   
ROA 0.1246*** 0.1244*** 
   
Undervaluation 0.0022 0.0022 
   
Size (Ln TA) 0.0068*** 0.0068*** 
   
Growth (in assets) -0.0123*** -0.0122*** 
   
Tangible Assets 0.0040 0.0033 
   
Stock Return -0.0078*** -0.0078*** 
   
Dividend Premium -0.0040 -0.0039 
   
Board Size -0.0006 -0.0005 
   
Board Composition -0.0190* -0.0182* 
   
Institutional Holdings 3% 0.0149  
   
Concentration 3%  0.0001 
   
CEO Vested Option -0.4068 -0.4084 
   
CEO Stock Ownership 0.0036 -0.0056 
   
Duality 0.0015 0.0013 
   
CEO Age 0.0001 0.0001 
   
CEO Tenure -0.0001 -0.0001 
   
CEO in Role 0.0001 0.0001 
   
Founder -0.0045 -0.0049 
   
British 0.0079* 0.0083** 
      
Notes: This table reports the marginal effects from Table 5.9 (models 7 and 8). The 
dependent variable is total payout to the market value (total payout/MV). 
See Table 5.1 for the definition of variables. All explanatory variables are lagged by 
one year. The variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The t-statistics 
are based on standard errors clustered at firm level, which are reported in the 
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